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ABSTRACT 
 
Big data is predominantly associated with data retrieval, storage, and analytics. The 
world is creating a massive data size, which increases exponentially. Since the dawn of 
time until 2015, human had created 7.9 Zettabyte. This number will be exponentially 
raised up to 40.9 Zettabyte by 2020. Analytics in big data is maturing and moving 
towards mass adoption. The emergence of analytics increases the need for innovative 
tools and methodologies to protect data against privacy violation. Data analytics is prone 
to privacy violations and data disclosures, which can be partly attributed to the multi-
user characteristics of big data environments. Adversaries may link data to external 
resources, try to access confidential data, or deduce private information from the large 
number of data pieces that they can obtain. Many data anonymisation methods were 
proposed to provide some degree of privacy protection by applying data suppression and 
other distortion techniques. However, currently available methods suffer from poor 
scalability and performance, low granularity, and lack of framework standardization. 
Current anonymisation methods are unable to cope with the processing of massive size 
of data. Some of these methods were especially proposed for the MapReduce framework 
to operate in big data. However, they still operate in conventional data management 
approaches. Therefore, there were no remarkable gains in the performance.  
To fill this gap, this thesis introduces a sensitivity-based anonymity framework that can 
operate in a MapReduce environment to benefit from its advantages, as well as from 
those in Hadoop ecosystems. The framework provides a granular user’s access that can 
be tuned to different authorization levels. The proposed solution provides a fine-grained 
alteration based on the user’s authorization level to access a domain for analytics. The 
framework’s core concept was derived from k-anonymisation techniques, which was 
proposed by Sweeney in 1998 for data protection. Using well-developed role-based 
access control approaches, this framework is capable of assigning roles to users and 
mapping them to relevant data attributes. Moreover, the thesis introduces a simple 
classification technique that can properly measure the anonymisation extent in any 
anonymised data. Various experiments showed promising results in applying the 
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framework proposed in this thesis. The framework anonymisation expirements 
demonstrate fine granularity, good performance of parallel processing with high 
scalability and low distortion.  
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed framework in protecting privacy and reducing 
data loss, a diverse range of experimental studies are carried out. The experimental studies 
aimed to demonstrate the capability of the framework’s fine granularity by applying 
granular levels of anonymisation for data analysers. The experiments also meant to compare 
between the proposed anonymisation framework and the currently available frameworks. 
Also, all experiments are conducted by using big data operational tools, such as Hadoop and 
Spark. The comparison has been made in both systems. The results of the experiments 
showed higher performance output, in general, when anonymisation was conducted in 
Spark. However, in some limited cases, MapReduce is preferable when the cluster resources 
are limited, and the network is non-congested.     
The experiments unveil several facts regarding big data behaviour. For instance, big data 
tends to be more equivalent as the data size increases. Moreover, the major concern on big 
data is security, hence, focusing on security side should be the primary target. The few 
obfuscated records do not have a major impact on the overall statistical results. Therefore, 
the trade-off between security and information gain tends to give security a higher priority. 
It is expected that big data access is requested by a great number of users. This massive 
demand has recently increased with the social media blossom over the Internet. Personal 
and contextual information are available online publicly. Thus, personal re-identification 
has never been easier than now. For this reason, we believe that security should be the major 
focus of anonymisation algorithms.    
The experiments have also shown a high performance of processing and an average 
information loss for the proposed anonymisation framework. The anonymised data has 
gained a low classification error by the Bayesian classifier. In comparison to the current 
anonymisation methods, the proposed framework has a little lower classification error by 
0.12%. From the performance perspective, the proposed framework has reached up to 40% 
faster than the current anonymisation frameworks. For the security side, it was strengthened 
by increasing the k-anonymity value and assigning granularity for user’s access.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Big Data is a new technology trend as a result of the massive data growth in the recent 
past. Digital data can be obtained from many quantitative and qualitative data sources, 
including smartphones, radio frequency identification sensors, Internet of Things, driver 
trackers, smart watches, smart glasses, embeddable, video recordings, audio recordings, 
radar, navigation sequences, cheap storages, cloud services, social websites, tablets, and 
others. The International Data Corporation estimates that, on a worldwide basis, the total 
amount of digital data created and replicated each year has grown exponentially from 1 
Zettabyte (1,000,000 Petabyte)  in 2010 to 15 Zettabyte in 2017 [143].  
There is no clear definition of big data. However, the term big data refers to the massive 
amount of digital information [67].  Two major specifications distinguish big data from 
the conventional data: Online Transaction Processing scaling (OLTP), and Online 
Analytical Processing (OLAP). OLTP presents the storing and retrieving, while OLAP 
presents data analytics [8]. These two features can be gained by using a distributed 
environment, where many computers process the data in a parallel time [31]. Big data 
needs to be stored, retrieved and analysed. Thus, data analytics is one part of big data 
processes. Data is beneficial when it is analysed, so users gain more information, and 
can understand the bigger picture of the business activities. Hence, the term data 
analytics is involved with the big data [92].   
Data analysis has a multiple spanning disciplines [35]. Data analytics technique is 
becoming an essential part of the Information Technology business and research. 
Several scientific domains oblige analytics in operations. Some of these domains are; 
medical, financial, industrial, transportation, government intelligence, and more. 
Consider data analytics as a prominent tool to monetize business data. Medical 
organisations request medical data of patients, hospitals, tools, and equipment to find the 
best method of improving their business and developing medicine and tools. Banks rely 
on data analytics to develop their customer relationship, mortgage management, risk 
assessments, and fraud inspection [17]. The commercial side is not the only part of data 
analytics. In 2009, the American centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has 
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failed to track the H1N1 disease around the United States in a real-time. The disease was 
spreading everywhere and threatening the public health. Collected information from 
patients is lagging by two to three weeks. Google analysed over 50 million common 
search terms for Americans, and accurately tracked the areas infected by the flu virus by 
what people searched for on the Internet [91]. Data analysis manifests a new 
exploitation for the recent technology, which supports a real-time collaboration between 
customers and business. Numerous companies have established their businesses based 
on the collected data from the collaboration between customers and companies. 
Facebook and Uber are examples of the cases that customers interactively deal with the 
applications. The popularity of the smartphones and other handsets has induced such 
interactivity [145].  New technologies such as the Internet of Things, smart cities, 
machine learning, and others, rely on data analytics as a major data provider.      
Data analytics aims to provide statistical information without providing any privacy 
protection. Privacy attacks in data analytics is a major concern, which urged a need for 
protection policies and algorithms. Hence, scientists proposed several privacy models to 
reduce the probable attacks against data, by presenting two categories of privacy 
models: interactive and non-interactive categories. Interactive models tend to hide the 
actual data and provide statistical results instead. Data owners provide interactive 
interfaces, where queries are submitted to obtain statistical summary results. Protecting 
against queries is accomplished by sanitization approaches. This approach is conducted 
by adding noise to the input parameters or the output results. A small numerical value 
that can be calculated by Laplace or Gaussian equations is added to the output results, 
known as a perturbation. The perturbation is applied by using differential privacy 
models [29; 35; 98; 121]. In the non-interactive models, the data owner publishes an 
anonymised copy of the collected data, termed as anonymisation or de-identification. 
Also, data owner hides or removes some personal identifier attributes such as names, 
birthdates, and social security numbers [41; 87; 140]. However, other auxiliary details 
cannot be removed for statistical and scientific purposes. Information such as age, 
gender, postcode, marital status, and education are essential information in data 
analytics. 
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Homomorphic encryption is another type of the interactive models. Data is encrypted 
and stored, and users cannot view data without a dycrption key. Researchers are still 
developing three types of Homographic encryption: partially Homomorphic (PHE), 
somewhat Homomorphic (SWHE), and fully Homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. 
In PHE, either multiplication or addition calculation can be operated at once, but not 
both. SWHE can support a limited number of addition and multiplication operations. 
FHE sustains both addition and multiplication, so it can accomplish some statistical 
functions [107].  
Interactive models are highly secure for certain tasks and firms. However, users may 
find it difficult to create relevant queries, while they read from a black box. Users are 
unable to access the actual data; they can only view attributes description. This does not 
provide a wide range of flexibility on working with data groups, domains, and sub-
domains. On the other hand, non-interactive models provide a complete anonymised 
version of data, where users have the opportunity to view data and rectify the 
appropriate query for obtaining the statistical results. Moreover, non-interactive models 
consider the background knowledge by attackers, when performing attribute linkage 
protection. This intuition is essential since the recent few years. Cloud services and 
social media play a powerful role in providing adversaries with precise background 
knowledge.   
In non-interactive models, the auxiliary information may provide personal re-
identification to a certain extent. These identifiers may not gain 100% of re-
identification, but a risk of predicting some data remains high. For example, knowing 
the patient age, gender, and postcode, may lead to uniquely identifying that patient with 
87% [141]. These identifiers are known as Quasi Identifiers (Q-ID). A popular 
anonymity model, k-anonymity, was formally studied by Sweeney [141]. The model 
suggests an anonymisation for Q-ID, which tends to find a group of attributes that can 
identify some tuples in the database. The model hides the sensitive values by ensuring 
the equivalency between records with at least k times[140]. Two different techniques 
were developed to gain the k-anonymity: top-down specialisation (TDS) and bottom-up 
generalisation (BUG). The first technique is based on walking through the taxonomy tree from 
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the top towards the bottom, known as the Top-Down Specialisation. The second technique 
constitutes of techniques that generalise data from the bottom of the taxonomy tree towards its 
top. These two techniques aim to find equivalency in each data domain.  Examples of 
BUG are proposed in ℓ-diversity [85], and Incognito [76]. Example of TDS are proposed 
in LKC-Model [96], (α, k)-Anonymity [150], and the multi-dimensional TDS (MDTDS) 
[124] [40].  
The previously mentioned anonymisation models were proposed for average size data. 
Big data manifests different scalable approaches, which makes anonymisation imposes 
alternative techniques. There was a need for more relevant models in order to cope with 
large sizes of data. Proposed models should consider big data processing tools of 
parallel distributed computing, such as MapReduce. However, recently proposed 
models, such as parallel BUG [64], hybrid BUG / TDS [158], and Two-Phase TDS 
[153], are quite similar to the extent mentioned models for average size data. In fact, the 
modifications, over the previous versions, have degraded the information usefulness.  
Moreover, there is no rigorous access control framework for big data analytics. The 
increased demand for big data analytics has promoted the publicity-driven business. As 
a result, a larger number of users from different firms are engaged to benefit from data 
analytics.  This recalls a need for a large-scale framework that can control users in fine-
grained access. The framework should be able to manage the user’s authorization and 
authentication. As mentioned earlier, anonymisation provides a complete version of 
anonymised data, which makes re-identification more probable. Currently, we are 
unable to assign the access permission for certain attributes. The needed framework 
should control permit/deny privileges on the data attribute level. This permits the access 
of the needed data only. Also, the framework should provide granular levels of 
anonymisation as per user’s access privileges.     
To fill the previously mentioned gaps, this research proposes a novel fine-grained access 
control framework. The framework follows the BUG anonymisation model, with a 
multi-dimensional sensitivity-based anonymisation (MDSBA). The framework provides 
a scalable anonymisation approach, with a parallel distributed computation 
computability technique.   
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1.1 Research Questions 
As discussed in the introduction, big data suffers from a lack of a robust framework that 
can manage access control for analytics. Moving big data to the cloud network emerged 
multi-tenant’s data storage and multi-access of user’s levels. Security concept has been 
shifted toward a larger protection scale, where an unknown number of users, 
organisations, and applications may access big data, and from anywhere and at any time. 
Concurrently, currently provided anonymity solutions cannot be durable for such 
massive growing computational costs, and security threats. For these reasons, we may 
granularly lose control over the empowerment of data analytics with the data and users’ 
growth. Resolving these concerns may actualise a comprehensive framework that can 
control access privileges in a fine-grained paradigm. The framework should provide an 
access control model for data analysers, which depicts the role-based access control 
model. The framework’s operations should be efficient to provide high performance and 
a large scalability.     
The following question is raised and derived from the Big Data concerns: 
How can a framework of Access Control Model enforce the organisational business 
roles over Big Data analytics in a high scalability and performance concerns?   
We think such a framework should consider the following aspects: 
a. Should resolve the privacy violation of data analytics in Big Data. 
b. Should enhance the efficiency of OLTP. 
c. Can resolve the big data granular access for analytics. 
d. Can enforce the external organisational policies by delegating them access and 
roles permissions. 
e. Suitable for multi-tenant and multi-domain environments. 
f. Establishes a fine-grained access control, by implementing data anonymity 
approach. 
g. Integrates RBAC concept within the same framework. 
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1.2 Thesis Objectives 
The core objective of this thesis is to propose a framework of Access Control Model, 
which provides secure analytics for big data. The framework should provide fine-
grained access control by applying a granular data anonymisation. The anonymisation is 
provided by implementing a k-anonymity base approach, which protects the personal 
data re-identification from analysers. This is essential in a multi-domain environment, 
where users of multi-access levels need to access big data for analytics. The framework 
provides security by ensuring high levels of anonymity for users with lower levels of 
privileges and vice versa.    
The framework leverages granular anonymity and provides effective access permissions 
for big data. The framework is a role-based anonymisation control, which delegates 
business roles to organisations and users. Business roles determine the permitted data 
attributes by controlling the amount of gained information using anonymisation 
technique.  
1.3 Thesis Contributions 
In this thesis, a novel multi-dimensional sensitivity-based anonymisation (MDSBA) 
framework is developed. The framework provides anonymisation services for big data. 
The anonymisation is manifested by its granular obfuscation and high performance. 
MDSBA operates over the cloud network. The cloud is structured as a composition of: 
datasets, a federation service (FS), and a service provider (SP). SP accommodates multi-
tenant data repository belonging to multiple owners. Data owners are given the full 
delegation to control and manage access permissions to their own data. Moreover, 
organisations who wish to participate in data analytics, are partially delegated to assign 
security privileges to their own users. Data owners provide secure access on the FS side 
for any user who wishes to participate in data analytics. Following this structure, 
MDSBA framework was distributed between FS and SP. The framework is divided into 
three main services; core, initialiser, and anonymiser. The core service operates on the 
FS side, which stores the details of organisations, users, big data information, business 
roles, organisations security levels, anonymisation parameters, and Q-ID groups. The 
initialiser is located on the SP gateway side. Data owners upload big data parameters in 
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an XML format. The initialiser communicates with the core service through Security 
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [78]. The aim of the initialiser is to map between 
FS and SP access privileges and parameters. Finally, the anonymiser operates in the 
MapReduce domain, where NameNodes and DataNodes servers apply the granular 
anonymisation, by choosing one of the three masking methods: taxonomy-tree, interval, 
or suppression. The granular anonymisation is conducted by applying a sensitivity 
equation that calculates the specified anonymisation level assigned to the user.  
The anonymisation granularity approach relies on two main factors: the dynamic value 
of k (in k-anonymity), and the vertical split of data. MDSBA calculates the user’s 
appropriate k value based on the data owner’s relationship and trust. For instance, 
business co-owners have closer relationships than business partners or even public users. 
A closer relationship is given a lower k anonymity value. The lower k value reduces the 
applied anonymisation level, which causes higher information gained from data 
analytics. The anonymisation implements masking operations, by applying data 
probability based on taxonomy-tree, interval or suppression. Data attributes consist of 
different data types and each of which is anonymised by one or more of the masking 
operations. Hence, data with a taxonomy tree anonymisation nature can be generalised 
by moving from the root of the taxonomy tree toward the bottom. Numerical data 
anonymisation can be easily masked by applying an interval. The probability value is 
derived from the number of times that the attribute value may appear. Eventually, the 
value of k participates in computing the probability value that each masking process 
should apply. The granular anonymisation is controlled by: the taxonomy tree 
generalisation level, the interval range, and the number of suppressed characters. More 
anonymised data imposes a lower taxonomy level and a larger interval range. 
The framework adopts Hadoop ecosystems, Pig, Hive, and Spark, to operate 
anonymisation in highly scalable operations. MDSBA is constructed to fit Hadoop 
ecosystems’ operations. This is essential to permit the execution of a massive data, 
which reduces the number of data splits. Larger data size, as in big data, causes a 
computational data overflow in the small memory size. However, MapReduce 
aggregates several hosts’ memories, so memory size is extended to accommodate a 
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larger data block size. Splitting data into small blocks of data size may degrade 
information gained. Thereby, MapReduce memory extension reduces such a data 
degradation. Ultimately, MapReduce consists of its own Hadoop distributed file system 
(HDFS). The file system is designed to read a large size of data blocks, around 128 MB 
/ block. This structure revokes the need for splitting data into the small size of data 
blocks. 
Moreover, this research contributes to the following aspects: 
• The development of ownership level and sensitivity level equations. The 
ownership level is affected by two factors: ownership factor and time factor. The 
time factor is an optional value, which can be ignored by the data owner. 
• The integration of an equation that can calculate the amount of anonymised data 
on any anonymised dataset, by using the disruption value (D). The D value 
calculates the masking value that was applied to each Q-ID attribute. Each 
anonymised data block is calculated, while the total value of anonymised blocks 
equals D.  
• The development of a technique that can find the optimal solution of k-
anonymity value. The solution provides data owners with a few simple steps to 
calculate the most optimal k value. 
• The comparison between MDSBA framework and other BUG and TDS models. 
The comparison includes performance, and level of information loss. Also, a 
comparison between Hadoop ecosystem tools is conducted.                        
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
background and challenges of this thesis. The chapter manifests the big data general 
definition and the difference between traditional data and big data. This shows the 
predominant difference is in data analytics. The chapter exhibits the big data analytics 
challenges, by comparing data streaming and data batching processes. Moreover, big 
data analytics is prone to security threats and re-identification of a person. For this 
reason, the chapter explains amply several methods for preventing re-identification. All 
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proposed security protection methods can be categorized under one of the three privacy 
concepts: differential privacy, Homomorphic encryption, and k-anonymity. Several 
methods will be introduced as examples of differential privacy, and k-anonymity. After 
introducing security protection method for traditional data, similar sections will be 
introduced for security protection methods for big data. The sections show why some of 
the anonymisation methods in use for traditional data, may not be appropriate for big 
data.   
Chapter 3 explores the multi-dimensional sensitivity-based anonymisation method 
(MDSBA) and then delves into the MDSBA details. The chapter starts by proposing the 
requirements for big data anonymisation methods, including equivalency increase, 
focusing on security more than information gain, anonymisation algorithms should 
operate in a parallel environment and granular access. The rest of the chapter explores 
the MDSBA and the probability concept, which is the core part of the MDSBA method. 
Next sections describe data aggregation concept vertically and horizontally. Both 
probability and aggregation are the two main components of MDSBA structure. The last 
section before the summary describes the mathematical equations that are necessary to 
calculate the sensitivity level as per user’s access. This also includes the time factor and 
its impact on sensitivity value, and the masking operations in taxonomy tree and 
intervals. Moreover, the anonymisation algorithms will be described in detail.          
Chapter 4 illustrates the state of the art of MDSBA framework. The first sections 
illustrate the MapReduce and Hadoop ecosystems. The next section presents Hadoop 
security and the best protection methods for Hadoop network domain. After introducing 
Hadoop ecosystems and security, next sections apply MDSBA algorithms by using Pig 
Latin scripts. The scripts execute the anonymisation by applying several masking 
methods on taxonomy trees and discretization. The fourth section compares between 
MDBSA and Multi-Dimensional Top-Down Specialisation (MDTDS). The comparison 
includes some experiments that measure the prediction level through the classification 
error. The experiments prove that MDSBA is efficient in performance and has a very 
low prediction error in the large data size. The experiments will be conducted on several 
datasets in both small and large data sizes. The last few sections focus on creating a new 
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classification benchmark for measuring the performance of anonymisation methods. The 
sections introduce mathematical equations by implementing disruption concept to 
measure how much is the anonymisation impact on data. 
Chapter 5 explores the complete framework of MDSBA. The chapter starts by 
describing the communication method between the Federation Service (FS) and Service 
Provider (SP). The communication method is known by Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML). The second section proposes two types of datasets, archive and live 
data. Next sections present the details of access control and business roles. The sections 
describe the three services of MDSBA core. These services are distributed in FS and SP 
sides. The three services include: core, initialiser, and anonymiser. The sections 
conclude the method of generating the Pig Latin script. The second part of the chapter 
discusses two problematic concerns in MDSBA; Obvious Guess and Across Group 
Unique Identifiers (AGUI). The chapter part provides solutions for these two concerns. 
The solutions for Obvious Guess will be established by creating a zero-filtration stage 
before anonymisation, while resolving AGUI is established by increasing the value of k. 
The last section before the summary explains some experiments that measure the impact 
of the disruption values on AGUI. 
Chapter 6 discusses special topics regarding k-anonymity parameters. The chapter 
suggests a greedy-based heuristic approach toward an optimal k anonymisation value. 
This is a guide for data owners on assigning k-anonymity parameters. The suggested 
proposal relates to the role-based anonymisation control framework. The framework 
provides fine-grained access control by dividing Quasi-Identifier (Q-ID) attributes into 
vertical groups, with two to four attributes for each cluster. The chapter adopts two 
mathematical concepts to assign k value, which are cumulative frequency and linear 
regression. The linear regression requires more sophisticated calculations, so it can 
produce more rigorous results. The cumulative frequency is a special case of linear 
regression when the high accuracy is not essential. The section introduces k percentage 
parameter to manage and control the role-based anonymisation control. The last sections 
shed light on the dynamic groups of attributes.           
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Chapter 7 engages another recent parallel distributed framework, known by Spark. The 
chapter compares MapReduce and Spark in processing a sensitivity-based 
anonymisation framework. The sections are divided in a sequence of Spark structure, a 
general comparison between Spark and MapReduce, implementing MDSBA in Spark, a 
comparison between TDS and MDSBA, and finally a comparison between Spark in 
MapReduce in operating MDSBA. The section on implementing MDSBA in Spark 
describes the User-Defined Function (UDF) in Pig ecosystem of MapReduce, and in 
Spark. The section “Implementing MDSBA in Spark” merely compares between UDF 
in top-down specialisation algorithm and UDF in MDSBA algorithm. The comparison 
shows a TDS intensive dependency on UDF through (IF statements) and iteration, while 
MDSBA implements UDF in much less dependency.      
Chapter 8 provides the conclusions and future work of this thesis. The chapter mainly 
discusses the way the research is developed and highlights its contributions. It also 
reports on the limitations of this work. Finally, the potential future directions for this 
research are illustrated. 
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2 BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES 
 
This chapter presents the background to the thesis. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section introduces the general challenges regarding big data, while the 
second section focuses on challenges related to data analytics and research. The third 
and fourth sections delve into the contextual scope of the thesis and present various 
methods for protecting privacy in big data. The fourth section more closely investigates 
k-anonymity methods and techniques. This chapter gradually approaches the core study 
of the thesis, starting from a general concept and ending with the specific concept of 
data privacy protection. 
Section 2 describes some of the challenges associated with big data analytics, with a 
focus on the general challenges, such as the complexity of analytics algorithms and the 
shortcomings of the Pig and Spark frameworks. Both frameworks have limitations for 
iterated and conditional programming; therefore, programmers are forced to use 
customised user-defined functions that are executed in black boxes. However, 
customised functions cause several non-clear errors that may occur when executing big 
data. Spark and data streaming are cumbersome for large data volumes. Deep analytics 
may cause memory overflow, which can unexpectedly terminate the program or task. 
Section 3 investigates security in big data analytics. The most significant security 
challenges are privacy violation and personal re-identification. Various security 
breaches are described, along with some popular solutions for preventing or reducing 
personal re-identification attacks, including differential privacy and k-anonymity. With 
respect to differential privacy, two software applications are described: Airavat and 
GUPT. In addition, several challenges and impairments are presented in relation to 
differential privacy. Another popular security prevention method, k-anonymity, was 
chosen by many researchers over differential privacy, encryption and homomorphic 
encryption. In addition, the impairments and challenges related to k-anonymity are 
presented in the same section. In Section 4, k-anonymity is discussed in detail, including 
discussion of several methods of specialisation and generalisation techniques for 
traditional and big data. 
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2.1 Big Data Structure and Challenges 
Establishing an appropriate big data structure is a complicated task. This complexity 
begins with establishing the appropriate infrastructure for the available data type. This 
decision has consequences because the type of infrastructure selected can affect future 
choices regarding other computing and application layers. The following explains the 
complexity involved in selecting the correct infrastructure, computing and application 
layers. 
Recent advancements in technology have led to the ability to transmit data to the Cloud 
network. Portable hardware devices, such as tablets, smartphones and laptops, have 
encouraged investors to adopt Cloud infrastructure as an adequate solution for various 
I.T. hinders. Software applications designed for these new devices are technically 
correlated with the Cloud. The term ‘big data’ was coined to cope with these 
advancement trends. Big data exhibit unique characteristics in comparison with 
traditional data. These unique characters are summarised as the ‘3Vs’—volume, velocity 
and variety. To deal with massive volumes of data, we require efficient mechanisms to 
store, retrieve and analyse these large volumes. Hence, volume refers to the massive size 
of stored data, with the capability to scale up the storage size. Velocity is related to 
performance and efficiency in handling data transmission and process. Transmission 
time is the time spent collecting or storing data among storage nodes within a cluster or 
across clusters. Variety is related to the variety of data types, both structured and 
unstructured. These big data characteristics call for new system architectures for large-
scale data acquisition, transmission, storage and processing mechanisms [50]. 
Big data structure can be decomposed into three main layers: infrastructure, computation 
and application. The infrastructure consists of a pool of hardware devices and device 
management systems. The virtualisation system is part of this layer. This also includes 
all software programs related to network management and security. The second layer is 
the computation layer, which is the middleware between the infrastructure and the 
application layers. This layer is divided into three main components: integration, 
management and programming models. The integration is related to data distribution 
and aggregation to/from data nodes within the cluster. The integration is managed by the 
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file system. Many free-source file systems were developed during the last decade, such 
as Quantcast File System, Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), Ceph [147], Lustre, 
GlusterFS, Google File System and Parallel Virtual File System. These proposed file 
systems were essential to replace the traditional network file systems. For instance, the 
network file system is too inefficient to handle very large data across many nodes. 
Moreover, while the storage area network file system can be scaled up, it is extremely 
expensive because of its dependency on fibre channels. Recent file systems were 
specifically designed for big data, most of which provide parallel computation and a 
map–reduce concept or something similar. In addition, they provide a portable operating 
system interface. The network connections between the servers and storage disks, such 
as network-attached storage and network file systems, are not recommended in the 
MapReduce domain. Instead, a direct access connection is used, such as a Small 
Computer System Interface (SCSI), Serial Advanced Technology Attachment (SATA) 
or Serial Attached SCSI (SAS). Over time, most big data file systems have developed 
many similarities in structure and operations. The second component of computation is 
management, which is related to big database management systems, such as Structured 
Query Language (SQL) and NoSQL. Finally, the third component is the programming 
model, which combines the management and file system. It facilitates the data analysis 
applications and then organises the parallel distributed process. MapReduce [13], Dryad 
[42], Pregel [43] and Dremel [44] exemplify programming models. 
The third layer is the application layer. This layer connects the application interface with 
the programming model in the second layer. Both the programming model and 
application interface involve various data analysis functions, such as queries, statistics 
and classification. The application layer exploits the MapReduce and parallel distributed 
tools to inquire about statistical analyses, machine learning and precision, classification 
and other analytics needs. The three consecutive layers are related to each other. 
Selection of infrastructure should consider the application needs and functions. 
Selecting an appropriate file system is linked to the chosen programming model. 
Divisions and layers must be pre-planned before establishing the infrastructure. For 
instance, the HDFS does not efficiently operate with any storage virtualisation, such as 
Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID); instead, input/output (I/O) data are 
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handled by Just Bunch of Drives (JBOD). Therefore, data storage should be provided 
with HDFS compatibility to ensure optimal performance. In another example, if an 
organisation has decided to adopt a network-attached storage file system, then all 
storage devices must be provided with fibre channels [59]. 
With big data, it is essential to maintain the three layers under continuous monitoring. 
The extensive amount of data may overwhelm the management level because of 
selecting an inappropriate layer of infrastructure, management or application. Thus, this 
selection is very sensitive and must be very accurate, as a delay of microseconds may 
accumulate exponentially with continuous data increase. However, the complexity of the 
three layers, with varieties of choices, may mislead data owners when choosing the 
optimal solution for their applications. For the management model, there are many kinds 
of databases, yet there is no optimal database for all data types. The optimal database 
depends on the workload scenario, speed of read/write and many other options. 
Researchers have proposed general comparisons between database performance 
regarding reading, writing, latency, durability, synchronicity and asynchronicity [28] 
[71]. 
 
Figure 2.1—The three layers of the big data structure 
Researchers have inferred that no single database management system can make 
distinctive performance. The database is stored and retrieved by primary-key, key-value, 
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column or document. This variety of database management systems may perform 
differently. In addition, database management models differ. Some databases operate on 
random-access memory (RAM) and keep a replication or snapshot on disks. Other 
databases operate on disks and keep a cached copy on RAM. Moreover, some database 
structures retain a high level of consistency and a low level of availability or vice versa. 
Many NoSQL databases are available in the market, including MongoDB [26] and 
simpleDB [101] for file data, Bigtable and HBase for column data, Dynamo and Redis 
for key-value data, and PNUTS for row data. Ultimately, choosing the appropriate 
database type is one of the main challenges related to big data. 
In a similar concept to database management models, the programming model also 
contains different options. Data owners need to choose between batch processing, graph 
processing and stream processing models. The batch processing model deals with a 
snapshot of the targeted database. The stream processing model handles real-time data, 
so the amount of copied data from disks to memory is very small. The graph processing 
model suits certain applications, such as social media, where entities are related to one 
another [95]. This model is iterative in nature, and the same dataset is revised many 
times. The most popular graph processing models are Pregel [43] and GraphLab. 
A batch processing model consists of two user-defined functions—map and reduce—
which are known as MapReduce operations. Their concept is expressed by performing 
data-intensive computations in parallel distributed operations. A MapReduce reads input 
files from a distributed file system, which splits the data into multiple chunks. Each 
chunk is assigned to a mapper that reads the data, performs some computation and 
outputs a list of key/value pairs. In the next phase, reducers combine the values 
belonging to each distinct key according to some functions, and write the result into an 
output. The framework ensures fault-tolerant execution of mappers and reducers while 
scheduling them in parallel on any machine (node) in the system [144]. There are many 
batch processing models available in the information technology (IT) industry, such as 
Hadoop and its ecosystems, and Dryad. Hadoop is a free-source framework developed 
by Apache. Hadoop ecosystems reside at the top of Hadoop operations. Examples of 
these ecosystems are Pig, Hive and Spark. 
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MapReduce models provide a range of options for different business needs. Some 
MapReduce models operate in memory, while others operate in disks. Pig and Hive 
operate in disks, which reduces the efficiency of iterative and interactive jobs. This 
imposes a continuous reading from nodes’ disks on each MapReduce operation. 
Moreover, each set of iterative operations (query) is counted as a separate MapReduce 
job, which incurs significant latency [155]. In Spark, the concept is different, since it 
implements a resilient distributed dataset (RDD), which represents a read-only 
collection of objects partitioned across a set of machines. The RDD is explicitly cached 
in memory across nodes and reused in multiple MapReduce-like parallel operations. 
This process creates a temporary copy of the data in memory; thus, all iterative and 
interactive jobs are computed in RAM. This technique reduces latency, which is usually 
caused by travelling time spent on input and output with the disk. 
The three big data layers include many technologies and models; thus, designing an 
adequate big data network is not an easy task. The most difficult element is finding the 
most compatible design that suits the data type and structure. This is even harder when 
the data contain varieties of files, multimedia and database sets. This diversity may 
recursively appear in a multi-tenant data structure, when some users execute a massive 
data size, while other users need to deal with data stream projects. This diversity has 
created complexity, and these challenges urge researchers to find a suitable platform that 
can deal with a dynamic stack of operations. The stack should be able to select the 
optimal performance matrix based on the data type and structure. 
2.1.1 Data Analytics 
Data analytics is the most important aspect of big data. The aim of data analytics is 
extracting useful information that facilitates decision making, prediction, verification of 
the legitimacy of data, and diagnosing and inferring the reasons for faults. The great 
diversity of data analytics methods and needs has led to several types of analytics 
categories. The categories can be summarised as descriptive, predictive and prescriptive. 
Descriptive analytics implement data mining for insight analysis to determine what has 
occurred in the past. Predictive analytics implement statistics and forecast methods to 
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predict future behaviour. Prescriptive analytics implement simulation to identify system 
behaviour and subsequently enable decision making [38]. 
Big data analytics has gained increased popularity because of new technology trends. 
These trends include new business applications that rely on data analytics, network 
applications and scientific application evolution. The earliest business data were 
intuitive and straightforward, and relational database management systems were able to 
accommodate and operate the available amount of data. General stored data were 
structural. Online transaction processing and online analytical processing were operated 
at a small scale. However, from the beginning of the new century, there was a 
significant shift in data collection techniques. The internet has supported companies to 
provide some of their data online, which offers customers more interaction with the 
business, and enables better automation of the business systems. [119]. Online 
participants offer a tremendous number of products and large quantities of customer 
information. Clickstream data logs provide companies with the opportunity to study 
customers’ behaviour, required products and popular services. Moreover, since 2010, 
another wave of evolution has arisen, presented by smartphones. The number of 
smartphones and tablets sold exceeds the number of laptops and personal computers. 
Portable devices and the Internet of Things have also created new features, such as 
location tracking, person-centred care and context awareness [19]. 
The evolution of smartphones has supported the development of new services because 
of the increased number of users. Most of these services were not possible a few years 
ago. Smartphones are technically known as non-personal computers and impose 
limitations in processing and storing data. The amount of data produced by individuals 
exceeds the capacity of these devices. This concern led to users’ data being moved to the 
Cloud network. Currently, most mobile applications run on the Cloud network, and the 
Cloud network dominates the majority of global data. The most extensive data size 
occupied by users is multimedia data, such as images and videos. Social media has 
significantly participated in the data growth. It is estimated that more than 500 terabytes 
of data are uploaded to Facebook servers every day [33]. Moreover, scientific research 
has produced vast volumes of data in fields such as astrophysics, oceanography, 
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genomics and environmental research. The American National Science Foundation has 
announced a BIGDATA project that aims to advance the core scientific and 
technological means of managing, analysing, visualising and extracting useful 
information from large and heterogeneous data to accelerate the progress of scientific 
discovery and innovation [151]. 
Medical data are one of the most prominent forms of data, and have intensive analysis 
demand. Patients’ data are precious for many parties and organisations. Medical data are 
rotated and distributed to many medical and non-medical organisations. It is difficult to 
trace medical data in many countries because the mesh network of transmitting 
information may contain more than 50 different departments. Figure 2.2 illustrates the 
complexity of tracing patients’ medical data and the critical need for such data. The 
figure presents one example of how insurance companies can access data regarding 
physicians, hospitals, patients, pharmacies, employment and many other details, with 
and without the patient’s name. This high demand for medical data recall has led to the 
need to establish a complete data access framework, with fine-grained access privileges. 
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Legend:  With patient’s name  Without patient’s name 
Figure 2.2—Data map showing patients’ information distribution (Source [58]) 
2.2 Big Data Analytics Challenges 
One of the major challenges facing big data analytics is the analytics algorithm. 
Analytics techniques and algorithms in big data are unlike those of traditional data 
analytics. Although the calculation procedures of statistics, predictions and simulation 
are similar for both traditional and big data, the technique applied to calculate and 
conclude the results is different. Big data consist of structured and unstructured data, 
which imposes an extra step of structuring data before the analytics is conducted. 
Statistical or predication equations can not directly calculate unstructured data; thus, the 
unstructured data are first mined and converted to structured data [9]. However, the 
unstructured data are not the main concern—rather, the volume of big data remains the 
main challenge in analytics. 
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Two major paradigms are expressed in big data analytics: batching and streaming 
analytics. Some applications require fast and real-time analytics, while others do not. 
Real-time analytics is needed for many services, such as stock-trading analysis, alerts 
offered by financial services, fraud detection by examining transaction data, data and 
identity protection services, data generated by sensors and actuators embedded in 
physical objects (which is related to the Internet of Things), customer relationship 
management applications, clickstream analytics and more. In such applications, the 
processing time is essential and should not exceed a few milliseconds. The streaming 
process is continuous and infinitive because the size of data is unknown. The infinite 
process fetches any new upcoming data, and transfers this small portion to RAM. The 
fetching iteration is continuous, so the size of the transferred data is always small. The 
latest streaming frameworks are Storm, Flink, Kafka and Spark [43]. 
In batch processing, the data volume is known, and the processing time is finite, and 
may last for seconds, minutes or even hours. A large data size is fetched from storage, 
copied to RAM and processed. Therefore, a large size memory and central processing 
unit (CPU) are essential. MapReduce is the dominant model in batch processing. In this 
model, data are divided into small chunks of data, and the chunks are created by the file 
system and executed in a parallel distributed manner in two phases—map and reduce. 
This model schedules computation resources close to the data location, which avoids the 
communication overhead of data transmission. The MapReduce model is widely applied 
for bioinformatics, web mining, census data, medical data and machine learning. 
Depending on the application requirements, one can use streaming or batching modes. 
The differences in these two modes include the complex data storage and management 
systems used in batching mode, while streaming mode has no data management system. 
One of the most popular MapReduce models is known as Hadoop, which was especially 
designed for batch mode. Some models were primarily designed to operate in a 
streaming mode, such as Storm, Samza and Flink, while other models can operate in 
both modes, such as Spark [44].  
Big data tools have undergone dramatic progress during recent decades. Stream and 
batch tools are sufficiently efficient to handle millions of data records within a few 
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seconds. Technologies such as MapReduce have resolved the batch processing 
obstacles, while other technologies, such as Lambda architecture, have resolved the 
stream and batch processing obstacles. Lambda technology consists of many 
frameworks, such as Apache S4, Spark, Storm and Flink. Some of these frameworks are 
dedicated to real-time and stream operations, while others can operate in both stream 
and batch, such as Spark. However, some operations in big data need not only efficient 
frameworks, but also require efficient algorithms to benefit from the newly developed 
frameworks. Thus, one of the main parallel computing concerns involves algorithm 
structure. Ordinary programming and algorithms are inefficient for parallel processing; 
thus, special algorithms should be studied thoroughly to consider parallelism [18]. 
2.3 Security Challenges in Big Data Analytics 
Thus far, the previous sections have addressed some of the challenges that face analytics 
in big data. In contrast, this section addresses the big data security challenges, with 
various solutions to resolve these concerns. Data analytics is prone to a number of 
attacks, which can be categorised into four main types: storage, computation, 
communication and privacy. In this research, the main focus is the security of analytics 
operations in big data. Other types of external or surrounding attacks are beyond the 
scope of this research. The miners who attempt to access datasets for analytics purposes 
are prone to the four previously mentioned attacks [42]. Network administrators must 
protect network resources and the operations of analytics. The four types of attack are 
explained in detail below. 
Storage attack may occur on any data node. Usually, big data are stored in multiple 
nodes and replicated on many 3X nodes. In MapReduce frameworks, data are either 
stored as files or structured in a database management solution. As aforementioned, big 
data management tools are non-relational and contain a close structure to the file 
storage. Regardless of the data format, data can be encrypted on multi-levels, starting at 
the disk level, to the dataset level, and even the cell level. Big data encryption methods 
are very similar to traditional data encryption, such as transparent, column-level, field-
level, file system and hashing [42]. Unfortunately, storing data with such levels of 
encryption will degrade performance because of the high computation cost of decrypting 
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data before analysis. Thus, homomorphic encryption is an appropriate solution, so that 
miners can retrieve statistical results without decrypting the data. However, this type of 
encryption is still immature and undergoing research and development [107]. 
In computation and communication, the MapReduce environment should be secure 
enough to handle miners’ analytics queries. Section 2.2 delved into the MapReduce 
framework. In Hadoop, the domain must be configured to switch to a secure mode. This 
includes processes and HDFS storage. Securing communication is directly related to 
securing computation. Section 4.2 explains the procedures of switching Hadoop to a 
secure mode. 
One of the major security challenges in big data analytics is privacy re-identification 
attacks. Medical, census, scientific and commercial data may contain private details 
about individuals who do not wish to share this information publicly. Re-identification 
can occur even when hiding some attributes and values. In every dataset, there may be 
sensitive information, such as medical status, which should not be exposed to the public. 
Researchers have proposed different privacy protection techniques by hiding all or part 
of the datasets. Each technique may best suit some research fields and needs in specific 
domains. Two privacy attacks and the proposed methods for protection are presented 
below. 
In privacy attacks, re-identification may occur in three types of attacks: state attack, link 
attack and timing attack. A state attack can be triggered by an adversary code, which 
may change the values of statistical variables, such as the keyword. In this case, the 
privacy algorithms may lose protection control, and the attacker may run malicious code 
to transfer the other mapper’s output through the network. Another popular attack is the 
link attack, when the adversary reads some data and compares them with his or her 
external data. It is not necessary for the adversary to reach the sensitive data—it can be 
predicted based on the other attributes. A link attack may occur by a side-link attack or 
by simply guessing some private information based on homogeneity or background 
knowledge. Sometimes users know a specific person’s private information; hence, 
guessing other sensitive information is not difficult. Finally, a timing attack is possible 
by using an infinitive loop in the script, or by forcing scripts to run longer than the 
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expected time. A time attack can also occur through the adversary using a timing 
channel attack. The user keyword is also prone to attacks [29] [98] [54]. Privacy attacks 
can be resolved through several security methods. The most popular methods are 
differential privacy and k-anonymity. The next few sections describe both these security 
methods. 
2.3.1 Protecting Privacy with Differential Privacy 
The main challenge in big data analytics is the need for external users to access data. 
Data are given in interactive and non-interactive forms. Interactive forms mandate users 
to abstract statistical summary results without providing the actual data. This form 
conceals the actual data from users. Instead of showing data, attributes’ descriptions are 
provided to allow users to create their own queries. In non-interactive forms, users are 
given anonymised data for security and privacy protection. The interactive form can be 
applied in encrypted or plain data. Users submit queries and the system completes the 
statistical calculations, and returns the statistical results to the user. However, this form 
of results can provoke a type of privacy attack. The following example illustrates a 
possible security breach. Table 2.1 presents a list of patients, with attributes of age, 
gender, name and diabetes status, where (‘Has Diabetes’ = 1) means positive. The miner 
(analyser) has submitted query Q1 = ‘ a total number of Has Diabetes = 1’, while the 
second query Q2 = ‘find the total number of Has Diabetes, except Karen’. Since the user 
knows Karen’s name, and the abstraction of both queries Q2 − Q1 = 1, then Karen must 
have diabetes. This type of attack is very possible, even when hiding all data [29]. 
Table 2.1—Security attack using side information 
Patient_Age Gender Name Has Diabetes 
45 Female Mary 1 
40 Male Paul 1 
38 Male Mark 0 
55 Female Karen 1 
62 Female Nicole 0 
41 Male Steven 1 
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Resolving such an attack is possible by applying a differential privacy model [29; 35; 
98; 121]. This model aims to eliminate personal attacks by adding noise to the input 
parameters or output results. The perturbation is a small numerical value that can be 
calculated by Laplace or Gaussian equations. Differential privacy is best defined as 
follows: the outcome of any analysis is essentially equally likely, independent of 
whether any individual joins or refrains from joining the dataset. In the previous 
example, a probability value can be added to the total number of patients with diabetes, 
so the results of the probability or noise value will be: P[have diabetes] = 0.1 and P[have 
diabetes, except Karen] = 0.9. This protects the privacy re-identification of Karen, since 
the total of all patients with diabetes = 4.1, while the total number of all patients with 
diabetes, except Karen = 4.5. ∈ denotes the privacy loss of each query. This concept is 
mathematically stated as the following: 
𝑃𝑟[𝐾(𝑥) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ (1+∈)𝑃𝑟[𝐾(𝑦) ∈ 𝑆]      (2.1) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 Pr  𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 ∈ − 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑓, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠  
𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑆. 
Differential privacy was derived from two central concepts. First, the privacy method 
supposes that miners do not need to view data to retain any visible records. Second, 
increasing the statistical analytics queries may ruin privacy and increase re-identification 
probability. Hence, conducting deep analytics and creating extra analytics quires as per 
results output may be contaminated by this privacy technique. In medical research, 
miners need to create queries as you go along with the output results. For instance, they 
may search for Anthrax symptoms in a specific region, while the output results show all 
symptoms similar to cold and flu. These results are inaccurate, and further queries are 
needed to filter out some common symptoms. Moreover, the added values of noise are 
generated automatically, which may leave a gap for query manipulation by miners. One 
of the query manipulation methods is choosing other known auxiliary data to mislead 
the system’s query recognition. Detecting query manipulation depends on the algorithm 
used for detecting queries, and before applying differential privacy [36]. 
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2.3.1.1 Differential Privacy Frameworks 
Various differential privacy frameworks have recently been developed. The frameworks 
were specifically developed for big data MapReduce operations. Software engineers are 
still developing differential privacy for real-life applications. Enterprise companies, such 
as Apple, have implemented differential privacy in their big data analytics [142]. The 
most popular software applications are PINQ, Airavat [61] [104] and GUPT [126].  
2.3.1.2 Possible Attacks in Differential Privacy 
Differential privacy is prone to several covert-channel attacks, which include state 
attacks, time attacks and private budget attacks. Several proposals have introduced 
solutions for these attacks. Airavat and PINQ suggested two separate domains, where 
the trusted domain contains the actual database, and the untrusted domain is left for 
untrusted users. Untrusted users initiate an untrusted query, and return the results 
through the network. State and time attacks cannot be avoided if the user is able to reach 
the trusted domain, since these attacks require executing at least two programs—one is 
the query and the other is a program that can measure the execution time, CPU speed, 
power usage and other parameters. A time attack depends on measuring the query time 
with and without one record. The time difference may determine the record status. A 
private budget attack may occur because of manipulating the differential privacy 
algorithm. The algorithm assigns equations to measure the user’s query budget. It can be 
expensive when it contains some private requests, such as when the query asks about a 
specific person’s name or personal details [54]. 
As explained earlier, most attack’s channels are caused by a user’s query. Developers 
spend a considerable time fetching the query and calculating the query costs. This is 
essential to apply the ∈ − 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑦 on the output results. Regardless of 
the strength of the differential privacy algorithm, it is impossible to secure all queries by 
predicting the actual cost for each query. There are an unlimited number of queries that 
may manipulate or mislead the program. Moreover, queries can be initiated by more 
than one adversary. For instance, Adversary 1 may initiate Query 1, which contains all 
viewers who watch adult movies in a certain suburb, with an age falling between 30 and 
40. If the number of viewers is small, then another user may obtain the Adversary 1 
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results to build another query accordingly. Adversaries can be a group of users who 
have certain agreements on querying from data. This may prove that preventing users’ 
queries and attacks is impossible, and there is always a chance of security breaches [82]. 
2.3.2 Protecting Privacy with k-anonymity 
As aforementioned, data analytics can be either interactive or non-interactive. In 
addition, the previous section explained how interactive analytics can be protected by 
the differential privacy method. In non-interactive analytics, data are modified and 
anonymised to thwart re-identification attacks by ensuring that no individual’s record is 
unique in the data. In the non-interactive approach, miners can gain actual data views for 
analytics. This form offers more powerful tools to analyse data with an unlimited 
number of queries deeply. The first anonymisation method, known as k-anonymous, was 
proposed by Sweeney in 1998 [139]. Since then, more researchers have presented 
various methods related to the k-anonymity concept. 
One privacy technique is the quasi-identifier (Q-ID), which involves finding a group of 
attributes that can identify other tuples in the database. These identifiers may not gain 
100% of data, but the risk of predicting some data remains high. For example, knowing 
a patient’s age, gender and postcode may lead to uniquely identifying that patient with 
87% of his/her real identity. Q-ID was implemented in the k-anonymity method, and 
adopted as a scale for equivalency measurement. Only Q-ID attributes are verified for 
equivalency when investigating the k value. However, Q-ID is a group of attributes 
chosen by data owners. Thus far, there is no obvious technique to follow when assigning 
Q-IDs. Data owners select a group of attributes, and exposing these attributes together 
may thwart re-identification. Moreover, other auxiliary attributes may also support re-
identification; therefore, the Q-ID concept requires further study [100]. 
K-anonymity adopts the Q-ID definition. It guarantees privacy when releasing any 
record by attaching each record to at least k individuals, and this is correct even if the 
released records are connected to external information. Any table is called k-anonymous 
if one tuple has Q-ID values, and at least k – 1 equivalent records have Q-ID values. 
This means that the equivalence group size on Q-ID is at least k [140]. The method is 
stated formally by defining any Q-ID table as T = (A1, …, An) to be k-anonymity, if 
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each sequence of values in T appears k times. The principle of this definition aggregates 
Q-IDs by domains. Q-ID records in the table T appear with a sequence of k occurrence 
[141]. 
2.3.2.1 Impairments in k-anonymity 
As a new concept of privacy preservation, a considerable number of impairments have 
been reported by researchers regarding k-anonymity. It is essential to consider these 
concerns when proposing any future work for privacy-preserving frameworks. The 
following concerns were reported by a variety of studies. 
2.3.2.1.1 Multiple Queries and Anonymity Variations 
Sweeney addressed few possible security failures in the k-anonymity method [140]. An 
adversary may submit multiple queries for analytics, and then anonymisation is applied 
on different Q-ID attributes for each anonymisation query. Adversaries may request data 
several times with multi-queries; thus, the anonymisation process may apply anonymity 
on the first Q-ID attribute in the first trial, and on the second Q-ID attribute in the 
second trial. Hence, the linkage chance between the two anonymised tables is high. 
Table 2.2 illustrates an example of a multiple-query attack. 
Table 2.2—Multiple anonymisation example 
GT1  GT2 
Race Postcode 
  
  
  
  
  
Race Postcode 
Person 2138 Asian 2130 
Person 2139 Asian 2130 
Person 2139 Black 2140 
Person 2138 Black 2140 
 
This example demonstrates the effect of an unsorted match between first and second 
anonymisation. In GT1, the Q-ID attribute (race) was anonymised, while, in GT2, the 
attribute postcode was anonymised. Hence, re-identifying such records is readily 
possible by connecting GT1 with GT2, whereby both attributes can be easily identified. 
Table 2.4 reveals all the actual values of race and postcode by using two queries. In this 
case, k-anonymity masking is in vain. 
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2.3.2.1.2 Finding k Value in k-anonymity 
It has been theoretically proven that finding the k value is NP-hard [94] [13] [127]. 
Researchers studied the problem of anonymising data by column suppression and found 
that this problem is NP-hard for k ≥ 2. The complexity of this problem for k = 2 remains 
open. This non-clarity in finding the k value may create inconsistency in security levels 
among various datasets. 
2.3.2.1.3 Curse of Dimensionality 
The curse of dimensionality is described as the extraordinarily rapid growth in dataset 
attributes as the number of personal identifications (or dimensions) increases. With the 
attributes increase, the cost of computation grows exponentially with the dimension 
increase, which renders the cost prohibitive for moderate or large values of the 
dimension [73]. As a result of the recent increase in personal information, the curse of 
dimensionality is a real problem that may cause a bottleneck in applying k-anonymity. A 
significant amount of work has been done on the privacy preservation concern of 
different types of data. Numerous models [4] [79] have been proposed for privacy 
preservation. However, it has been proven that increasing the Q-ID attributes may make 
anonymisation difficult with dimensionality increase [2] [3]. 
The high-dimensional attributes have led to a more substantial number of personal 
attributes. Obviously, more personal attributes may increase background attacks. The 
anonymisation applied to one attribute must increase in parallel with the increased 
number of attributes. This imposes a higher amount of obfuscation and reduced 
information gained with the dimensionality increase. One of the suggested solutions to 
the curse of dimensionality is to find dependent personal attributes by implementing 
feature selection [115]. Feature selection can be used to determine the maximum 
dependent attributes, reduce the dimensionality of the dataset and retain a small subset 
of attributes. However, reducing the dimensionality of datasets will negatively affect the 
significant amount of information gained. The feature selection process depends on 
attributes transformation, which inevitably affects the final statistical results. Another 
suggested solution to the curse of dimensionality is the concept of horizontal 
fragmentation. This concept involves breaking up the attributes into small subsets of 
Chapter 2—Background and Challenges 
 
30 
attributes using horizontal fragmentation, and anonymising each subset independently. 
The small anonymised subsets are then aggregated together. This method reduces the 
large information loss that may occur when applying the feature selection method [157]. 
2.3.2.1.4 Background Knowledge Attack 
This type of attack is one of the most manifested attacks. This attack may occur if the 
adversary has some background knowledge about the user, such as age, gender, address 
or nationality. For example, Table 2.3B shows the data list held by an adversary, while 
Table 2.3A shows the data before anonymisation. The adversary (Alice) can only view 
Table 2.3B. However, Alice has a pen-friend named Umeko who is admitted to the same 
hospital as Bob, whose patient record also appears in Table 2.3B. Alice knows that 
Umeko is a 21-year-old Japanese woman who currently lives in postcode area 13068. 
Based on this information, Alice learns that Umeko’s information is contained in record 
number 1, 2, 3 or 4. Without additional information, Alice is unsure whether Umeko 
was diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or heart disease. However, it 
is well known that Japanese people have an extremely low incidence of heart disease, 
especially at this young age. Therefore, Alice concludes with near certainty that Umeko 
has HIV [88]. 
Table 2.3A—Non-anonymised data sample 
Non-sensitive Class 
Postcode Age Nationality  Condition 
13053 29 Russian Heart disease 
13068 28 American Heart disease 
13053 23 Japanese HIV 
13068 20 Japanese HIV 
Table 2.3B—Anonymised data sample 
Non-sensitive Class 
Postcode Age Nationality Condition 
130** < 30 * Heart disease 
130** < 30 * Heart disease 
130** < 30 * HIV 
130** < 30 * HIV 
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2.3.2.1.5 Homogeneity Attack 
This type of attack may appear after completing the anonymisation process. If a group 
of anonymised records contains similar sensitive information, then the adversary can 
guess the person’s condition. Table 2.4 shows a sample of anonymised medical data, 
with similar sensitive values of cancer. If a person lives in postcode 2116, then he or she 
must have cancer. 
Table 2.4—Obvious guess and homogeneity attack example 
Non-sensitive Sensitive 
Postcode Age Nationality Condition 
21** 3* * Cancer 
21** 3* * Cancer 
21** 3* * Cancer 
21** 3* * Cancer 
 
2.4 k-anonymity Frameworks 
2.4.1 k-anonymity Methods for Traditional Data 
2.4.1.1 Generalisation 
Sweeney proposed the concept of generalisation method. K-anonymity suggests a data 
generalisation and suppression for Q-IDs. The original k-anonymity method defines 
minimum generalisation (MinGen) and maximum generalisation (MaxGen). If the 
curator requests a query with two Q-ID attributes, then the MinGen can be represented 
by omitting some values or replacing them. The MaxGen implies complete suppression 
or hiding of the values. In each domain of a table T, a domain generalisation hierarchy 
(DGH) for an attribute A is defined within a tuple t(A). The generalisation g for the table 
T is defined as g(T). The generalisation level (z) depends on the attribute value (νi). The 
following relationship implies the existence of the value generalisation hierarchy for any 
attribute A for a function (f): 
𝑓𝑡(𝐴1,…𝐴𝑛) = 𝑓𝑡1(𝐴1), … . , 𝑓𝑡𝑛(𝐴𝑛)      (2.2) 
The generalisation is defined as follows: 
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𝑔(𝑇) = {𝑘. 𝑓(𝑡): 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑓−1(𝑓(𝑡))| = 𝑘}     (2.3) 
Some values can be generalised up to three levels before suppression has occurred (such 
as the postcode), while other attributes are generalised to multiple z level, such as the 
taxonomy tree. Referring to Table 2.5, the following examples illustrate the main 
concept of k-anonymity generalisation: 
Postcode generalisation DGH(postcode): Z0(2100, 2109, 2175), Z1(210*, 217*), 
Z2(21**), Z3(****). 
Race generalisation DGH(race): Z0(Anglo, South American, African), Z1(person), 
Z2(******). 
The generalised table’s results are GT(1,0), GT(1,1), GT(0,2) and GT(0,1), as shown in 
Table 2.5. Note that GT(3,2), GT(2,2) and others are not possible in generalisation, as 
they are assigned on suppression. 
Table 2.5—Generalised tables GT 
Race 
(E0) 
P. 
code 
(Z0) 
 Race 
(E1) 
P. code 
(Z0) 
 Race 
(E1) 
P. code 
(Z1) 
 Race 
(E0) 
P. code 
(Z2) 
 Race 
(E0) 
P. code 
(Z1) 
Anglo 2100 Person 2100 Person 210* Anglo 21** Anglo 210* 
S. Amer. 2109 Person 2109 Person 210* S. Amer. 21** S. Amer. 210* 
African 2100 Person 2100 Person 210* African 21** African 210* 
Anglo 2175 Person 2175 Person 217* Anglo 21** Anglo 217* 
Anglo 2109 Person 2109 Person 210* Anglo 21** Anglo 210* 
S. Amer. 2175 Person 2175 Person 217* S. Amer. 21** S. Amer. 217* 
African 2100 Person 2100 Person 210* African 21** African 210* 
S. Amer. 2175 Person 2175 Person 217* S. Amer. 21** S. Amer. 217* 
PT GT(1,0) GT(1,1) GT(0,2) GT(0,1) 
 
The precision value can distinguish the above tables. The higher precision is the chosen 
generalisation option. The precision table is calculated using the following equation: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐(𝑅𝑇) = 1 −
∑ ∑
ℎ
|𝐷𝐺𝐻𝐴𝑖|
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁𝐴
𝑖=1
𝑃𝑇∗𝑁𝐴
       (2.4) 
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In Table 2.5, DGH(postcode) = 3, and DGH(race) = 2. The number of attributes PT = 2, 
and the number of tuples NA = 8. The above table’s precision results are presented 
below: 
Prec(GT(1,0) = 1 − 8/2/16 = 0.75 
Prec(GT(1,1) = 1 − (8/3 + 8/2)/16 = 0.58 
Prec(GT(0,1) = 1 − 8/3/18 = 0.83 
Prec(GT(0,2) = 1 − 16/3/16 = 0.67 
The above calculated values prove that the highest precision is GT(0,1) = 0.83; 
therefore, it will be selected by the generalisation algorithm [41]. 
The generalisation using PT for each attribute is practically impossible for a large size of 
data; therefore, real-world data are generalised and suppressed using tuples instead of 
individual attributes. One of the systems that can be implemented for real-world data is 
the Datafly system [139]. This system guarantees k-anonymity results, but does not 
necessarily guarantee the MinGen of data distortion. However, Datafly is not very 
accurate and has crude decisions because it generalises all values associated with an 
attribute and suppresses all values within a tuple. Datafly is given the most important 
field so that it will be generalised—for example, D_O_B is generalised to the year of 
birth. The next step is counting the number of tuple occurrences. The non-repeated 
tuples with frequency = 0 will be suppressed. Another popular system is μ-Argus, which 
categorises attributes based on their sensitivity. Four identifying levels are assigned to 
measure each attribute: 0 (not identifying), 1 (most identifying), 2 (more identifying) 
and 3 (identifying). μ-Argus suppresses cells instead of suppressing the whole tuple, as 
in Datafly [140]. 
The generalisation algorithms apply a similar concept in taxonomy trees and 
suppression. The concept endeavours to gain k-anonymity by generalising Q-ID 
attributes starting from the bottom of the tree and moving upwards to the top of the tree, 
which is known as a bottom-up generalisation (BUG). Several algorithms and 
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frameworks have been proposed based on the BUG concept. The following sections 
discuss the two methods of Incognito and ℓ-diversity as BUG examples. 
2.4.1.1.1 Incognito 
The Incognito method is derived from the k-anonymity model to limit the confidence of 
the implications from the Q-ID to a sensitive value. Incognito iterates the Q-ID 
attributes by generalising the lattice nodes using join and prune. The method implements 
an algorithm of breadth-first search by iterating the global records several times to 
compute the frequency set of persons. SQL select queries are applied with (GROUP 
BY) for every two Q-IDs. The frequency number is calculated for each Q-ID attribute 
and compared with the other Q-ID attributes. The concept involves finding the Q-ID 
attributes that need to be anonymised before commencing the anonymisation process. 
These attributes are found by calculating the most frequent appearance of each Q-ID and 
then building the lattice accordingly. The lattice is like the taxonomy tree concept. Each 
Q-ID is given two numbers—one denotes its sequence and the other denotes the 
taxonomy level. For example, the taxonomy tree of Level Zero for three Q-IDs is 
presented below: 
L0 (Level Zero) = {Q-ID(0,0), Q-ID(1,0), Q-ID(2,0)} 
After computing the frequency set for each root, the lattice results may impose two 
options of generalisation. The first option moves one level up for the Q-ID0 taxonomy, 
one level up for the Q-ID1, and no generalisation for Q-ID2, as shown below:  
L0 − L1 = {Q-ID(0,1), Q-ID(1,1), Q-ID(2,0)} [first option] 
The second option moves one level up for Q-ID0, no generalisation for Q-ID1, and two 
levels up for Q-ID2, as shown below: 
L0 − L2 = {Q-ID(0,1), Q-ID(1,0), Q-ID(2,2)} [second option] 
These values present the minimum anonymisation level for non-equivalent records. This 
is an initial calculation for generalising tuples globally. In the second calculation, the 
distance vector can be derived. The distance vector is found by subtracting the two 
domain vectors {DA1 … DAn} and {DB1 … DBn}, so the distance vector DV = [d1 … 
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dn], where each value di denotes the length of the path between the domain DAi and the 
domain DBi in the DGH Hi. After calculating the distance vector and determining the 
best lattice on generalisation, a full-domain generalisation is applied to all datasets [76]. 
This method obtains better performance than the original BUG method of Sweeny and 
Samarati. The performance increases in parallel with the increased number of Q-IDs, if 
compared with BUG. Table 2.6 compares the number of nodes searched between BUG 
and Incognito. However, several disclosures are inherited from the original k-anonymity 
method, such as the curse of dimensionality and background knowledge. Moreover, the 
full-domain generalisation reduces the information gained in traditional datasets. Thus, 
Incognito leverages performance and reduces information usefulness. 
Table 2.6—Comparison between BUG and Incognito in number of searched nodes 
Q-ID Size BUG Incognito 
3 14 14 
4 47 35 
5 206 103 
6 680 246 
7 2,088 664 
8 6,366 1,778 
9 12,818 4,307 
 
2.4.1.1.2 ℓ-diversity 
The ℓ-diversity method was introduced by Machanavajjhala et al. [87]. This algorithm 
aims to reduce attributes linkage by preventing attribute disclosure. K-anonymity 
protects against identity disclosure, yet cannot prevent attribute disclosure. Attribute 
disclosure is involved in homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack. It 
develops from the fact that a q block is ℓ-diverse if it contains at least ℓ ‘well-
represented’ values for the sensitive attribute S. The ℓ-diversity is calculated using the 
entropy by grouping the Q-ID, and calculating the entropy for the groups using the 
following: 
−∑ 𝑃(𝑞𝑖, 𝑠)log (𝑃(𝑞𝑖, 𝑠)) ≥ log (ℓ)𝑠∈𝑆       (2.5) 
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For example, consider Table 2.7A as a part of inpatient data, and Q-ID = {Postcode, 
Age, Nationality}, while the sensitive attribute is disease. The records are grouped or 
compressed with similar Q-IDs. Based on the above definition, Table 2.7B represents k-
anonymity generalisation, but does not satisfy ℓ-diversity [105]. 
Table 2.7A—Original inpatient data 
  Postcode Age Nationality Disease (Class) 
1 13053 22 American HIV 
2 13068 25 European HIV 
3 13068 27 Russian Heart disease 
4 13053 28 African Heart disease 
5 14853 52 Asian Cancer 
6 14853 56 Indian Heart disease 
7 14850 46 Japanese HIV 
8 14850 48 Russian HIV 
9 13053 33 African Cancer 
10 13053 36 Asian Cancer 
11 13078 39 Indian Cancer 
12 13078 38 Japanese Cancer 
 
Table 2.7B—Anonymised inpatient data 
  Postcode Age Nationality Disease (Class) 
1 130** < 30 * HIV 
2 130** < 30 * HIV 
3 130** < 30 * Heart disease 
4 130** < 30 * Heart disease 
5 1485* ≥ 40 * Cancer 
6 1485* ≥ 40 * Heart disease 
7 1485* ≥ 40 * HIV 
8 1485* ≥ 40 * HIV 
9 130** 3* * Cancer 
10 130** 3* * Cancer 
11 130** 3* * Cancer 
12 130** 3* * Cancer 
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Table 2.7B shows that records 9 to 12 are prone to homogeneity attack. This imposes 
the need for another method of anonymisation. The new method should unintentionally 
increase the generalisation level, and subsequently reduce the information gained. The 
entropy equation is used to recalculate the entropy for smaller blocks of data. If data 
block Q is split into two sub-blocks, Qa and Qb, then entropy (Q) ≥ min (entropy (Qa), 
entropy (Qb)). This indicates that, for entropy ℓ-diversity to be possible, the entropy of 
the entire table must be at least log(ℓ) [86]. 
The recursive (c, ℓ) diversity is implemented through finding another way to aggregate 
attributes to regroup the records, as shown in Table 2.8. It is clear that the age 
anonymisation was intensively generalised to include a larger age interval. The table 
shows tuples shuffling caused by the regrouping. This kind of sequence supports the 
elimination of homogeneity that appeared in Table 2.7B. 
Table 2.8—Diverse impatient data 
  Postcode Age Nationality Disease (Class) 
1 130** ≤ 40 * HIV 
4 130** ≤ 40 * Heart disease 
9 130** ≤ 40 * Cancer 
10 130** ≤ 40 * Cancer 
5 1485* > 40 * Cancer 
6 1485* > 40 * Heart disease 
7 1485* > 40 * HIV 
8 1485* > 40 * HIV 
2 130** ≤ 40 * HIV 
3 130** ≤ 40 * Heart disease 
11 130** ≤ 40 * Cancer 
12 130** ≤ 40 * Cancer 
 
However, several drawbacks can be identified with this method. How about if most of 
the Disease (class) values are limited by one type of disease, for instance (HIV). In this 
case, ℓ-diversity cannot be implemented. In addition, this kind of regrouping may cause 
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a substantial loss in information gain. Hence, ℓ-diversity may be difficult or unnecessary 
to achieve. 
2.4.1.2 Specialisation 
The top-down specialisation (TDS) algorithm was developed to achieve LKC-privacy 
on high-dimensional data. This algorithm is also called high-dimensional TDS [40]. The 
idea starts from the most general value in the taxonomy tree, and then moves to the 
bottom of the tree. The taxonomy tree is pre-established for each attribute. At first, all 
tuples are generalised to the topmost root of the taxonomy tree (any), and this value 
suppresses any Q-ID. The taxonomy tree is the prominent value that provides the 
masking operation in any attribute, Dj. The data owner’s taxonomy tree can identify the 
masking operation as the topmost tree parent node, and a child or leaf node, ν, written ν 
 child (ν). A specialised Dj can be viewed as a cut of a tree, denoted as cutj. 
The taxonomy tree should be built in advance for each attribute. This technique 
implements the specialisation for the Q-ID attributes as a masking method. Several 
methods have been proposed based on the TDS algorithm. However, all methods follow 
similar procedures to determine the best score within the Q-ID attributes. The attribute 
with the best score will be specialised. The score equation is shown below: 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑣) =
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑣)
𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑦𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑣)+1
        (2.6) 
The value 1 is added to the denominator to avoid division by 0. This equation does not 
satisfy the form matric to capture the classification; therefore, Shannon’s equation is 
used for correctness. Next, InfoGain and AnonyLoss are found to determine the best 
generalisation for each attribute. This depends on the Q-ID used in each analytic: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑣) = 𝐸(𝑇[𝑣]) − ∑
|𝑇[𝑐]|
|𝑇[𝑣]|
𝐸(𝑇[𝑐])𝑐      (2.7) 
where 𝐸(𝑇[𝑥]) denotes the entropy of T(x). To determine the best score for a 
compressed table, let us consider Table 2.9, which is derived from Adult data with an 
extra attribute of ‘Education’. This attribute describes the patient’s education level, 
ranging from Year 8 to postgraduate studies. Herein, the TDS model is used, and the 
compressed records must start from the root of the taxonomy tree. 
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Table 2.9—Compressed patient table 
Education Gender Work_hrs Class # of Records 
10th year M 40 20Y0N 20 
10th year M 30 0Y4N 4 
9th year M 30 0Y2N 2 
9th year F 30 0Y4N 4 
9th year F 40 0Y6N 6 
8th year F 30 0Y2N 2 
8th year F 40 0Y2N 2 
Total: 20Y20N 40 
 
To calculate the InfoGain and AnonyLoss for each attribute, let us start from the 
topmost generalisation, which is ANY_Edu, for the whole records in the table: 
• QID = {Education, Gender, work_hrs} 
• Number of records = 40 
• E(T[ANY_Edu]) = −
20
40
× log2
20
40
 − 
20
40
× log2
20
40
 = 1 
• E(T[8th]) = −
0
4
× log2
0
4
 – 
4
4
× log2
4
4
 = 0 
• E(T[9th]) = −
0
12
× log2
0
12
 − 
12
12
× log2
12
12
 = 0 
• E(T[10th]) = −
20
24
× log2
20
24
 − 
4
24
× log2
4
24
 = 0.65 
• InfoGain(ANY_Edu) = E(T[ANY_Edu]) – (
4
40
× 𝐸(𝑇(8𝑡ℎ)) +
12
40
×
𝐸(𝑇(9𝑡ℎ)) +
24
40
× 𝐸(𝑇(10𝑡ℎ))) 
• InfoGain(ANY_Edu) = 1 − (0 + 0 + 24/40 * 0.65) = 0.6 
The InfoGain for gender is calculated as follows: 
• E(T[ANY_Gender]) = −
20
40
× log2
20
40
 − 
20
40
× log2
20
40
 = 1 
• E(T[M]) = −
20
26
× log2
20
26
 − 
6
26
× log2
6
26
 = 0.7793 
• E(T[F]) = −
0
14
× log2
0
14
 − 
14
14
× log2
14
14
 = 0 
• InfoGain(ANY_Gender) = E([ANY_Gender]) − (
𝟐𝟔
𝟒𝟎
 × 𝑬([𝑴]) + 
𝟏𝟒
𝟒𝟎
 ×
𝑬([𝑭])) = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟗𝟑 
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• E(T[1-99)) = −
20
40
× log2
20
40
 − 
20
40
× log2
20
40
 = 1 
• E(T[1-40)) = −
0
12
× log2
0
12
 − 
12
12
× log2
12
12
 = 0 
• E(T[40-99)) = −
20
28
× log2
20
28
 – 
8
28
× log2
8
28
 = 0.8631 
• InfoGain ([1-99]) = 0.39 
Table 2.10—The specialisation with education 
Education Gender Work_hrs Class # of Records 
10th ANY_Gender [1-99] 20Y4N 24 
9th ANY_Gender [1-99] 0Y12N 12 
8th ANY_Gender [1-99] 0Y4N 4 
 
The highest InfoGain is (ANY_Edu); thus, the specialisation for education starts as 
shown in Table 2.10. In contrast, AnonyLoss shows that ‘Gender’ should be generalised 
first, as calculating AnonyLoss is completed by the following equation: 
AnonyLoss (ANY_Edu) = A (QID) − A (ANY_Edu (QID)) 
The average AnonyLoss is usually calculated to determine the best generalisation and 
specialisation for each attribute. The total results can be determined by calculating the 
score for each attribute, where the score(v) = InfoGain/(InfoLoss + 1). For example, 
Score(ANY_Edu) = 0.0165 and Score(ANY_Gender) = 0.0183. For [1–99] = 0.0136. 
This indicates that the ANY_Gender score is the highest. 
2.4.1.2.1 LKC-privacy 
The LKC-privacy model can be applied for multidimensional data, such as patients’ 
information. This method assumes that the original k-anonymity and its extended 
privacy models exaggerate the security risk because they assume that an adversary could 
potentially use any of the Q-ID attributes for a background knowledge attack. LKC-
privacy assumes that it is challenging for an adversary to acquire all personal details 
accurately to launch an attack. Thus, it is assumed that the adversary’s background 
knowledge is bounded by, at most, L pairs of location and timestamp that the victim has 
visited. The general intuition of LKC-privacy ensures that Q-ID with a length of L and 
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sensitive value of S is not greater than Class C. The idea involves grouping length of 
records, L, in the data object, T, by at least k records [97]. 
The following example illustrates LKC-privacy. Suppose that the following Table 2.11 
and the taxonomy tree in Figure 2.3 comprise L = 2, K = 2 and C = 50% (yes or no). 
Table 2.12 was generalised using Figure 2.3 taxonomy. Based on the given information, 
let us determine whether the generalisation in Table 2.12 is correct in relation to the 
LKC-privacy model. 
Table 2.1—LKC-privacy model (original data) 
 Q-ID Class Sensitive 
ID Job Gender Age Transfuse Surgery 
1 Cleaner F 35 Y Appendicitis 
2 Cashier F 31 Y Appendicitis 
3 Teacher M 35 N Urology 
4 Engineer M 27 N Urology 
5 Plumber M 25 Y Vascular 
6 Electrician M 29 N Vascular 
 
Table 2.2—Generalising the previous data by job and age 
 Q-ID Class Sensitive 
ID Job Gender Age Transfuse Surgery 
1 Non-technical F 30–60 Y Appendicitis 
2 Non-technical F 30–60 Y Appendicitis 
3 Professional M 30–60 N Urology 
4 Professional M 1–30 N Urology 
5 Technical M 1–30 Y Vascular 
6 Technical M 1–30 N Vascular 
 
As shown in Table 2.12, every two records can be grouped. Only Record 3 of 
{professional, M, 30–60} cannot be grouped with the similar record, as the age interval 
is different. This implies another generalisation level of age—for example, between 0 to 
90, which results in higher utility loss [96]. This method can be suitable for datasets 
with larger numbers of k values. Small values of k may be better anonymised by using 
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BUG. Moreover, several privacy re-identification attacks cannot be resolved by using 
this method; thus, the (α,k)-anonymisation is more effective [96]. 
 
Figure 2.3—Taxonomy trees for job, age and Gender 
2.4.1.2.2 (α, k)-anonymisation 
This anonymisation method is categorised under TDS methods. It was introduced by 
Wong et al. in 2006 [150]. It can be considered a special case of recursive ℓ-diversity. 
The method aims to protect both identifications and sensitive associations in a disclosed 
dataset. Two approaches are developed to prevent disclosure. The first approach 
involves extra security being applied to some chosen sensitive values, but not all. The 
second approach is an extension of Incognito anonymisation [76]. The first approach 
assigns a decimal value, α, to some sensitive values in the attribute (Class). For instance, 
if users are diagnosed with HIV, then the HIV value must be exclusively protected more 
than the other sensitive values, such as flu or headache [55]. 
(α,k)-anonymisation is an extension of Incognito (eIncognito) with an extra parameter, 
α. The value of (α) denotes the de-association requirement for protection, which requires 
that the proportion of each sensitive value in each group be at most α ∈ [0, 1]. The 
objective is to find a local recording with a minimum cost or with a minimum number of 
suppressed records. The Incognito algorithm is an optimal algorithm for the k-
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anonymity problem. It has many advantages over the other anonymisation algorithms, 
such as resolving the diversity problem and making use of monotonicity property in 
searching the solution space. The search is a continuous iteration until finding the 
stopping condition. The stopping condition supposes merely that if a table T satisfies the 
privacy requirements, then every generalisation of the table T also satisfies the privacy 
requirement. eIncognito applies TDS operations, which is the opposite technique to 
bottom-up Incognito. 
The method proved that implementing TDS in eIncognito reduces distortion by two to 
four times. Generalisation or BUG imposes the use of global recording on 
anonymisation, which means one domain of generalisation for all non-equivalent 
records in the dataset. In eIncognito, the use of TDS has reduced the distortion because 
of replacing the local recording with the global recording. The local recording is shown 
in Table 2.15C. To understand eIncognito in depth, we need to understand the edge 
partition into four cliques in the graph theory [111]. Based on this theory, the 
anonymisation cost is calculated for each record. For instance, if k = 12 and α = 0.5, we 
can interpret these two parameters by supposing that, for four Q-IDs, there are four 
vertices in the 12 records corresponding to the edges in Q-IDs, and then a cluster of 
these 12 records are formed where each modified record has four *s (suppression). 
2.4.2 Critique of Traditional Data Anonymisation Methods 
Traditional data are unlike big data. Traditional data comprise a limited number of data 
records. There is no threshold value to distinguish traditional data from big data; 
however, the rough data size and record numbers may provide a distinguisher between 
traditional and big data. Intuitively, we may consider a few hundreds of thousands of 
records as still representing traditional data. Moreover, if anonymising data can be 
accomplished by a single machine in an acceptable time and does not require parallel 
distributed operations, then data can be considered traditional data. Anonymising 
traditional data algorithms does not require the dataset to be split into small blocks. In 
addition, the limited number of records reduces the operation’s failure and errors. This is 
because the small data size can be smoothly uploaded and fit into the current server’s 
memories. For these two reasons, there is no need to rectify the current known 
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anonymisation algorithms. The previously mentioned anonymisation methods in Section 
2.4 are sufficient and can accomplish operations in an acceptable time. 
Choosing the best anonymisation method is difficult. Some anonymisation methods may 
be reasonable for some datasets, but not for all datasets. Different data records may 
require different anonymisation methods. The two main types of anonymisation 
methods can be applied to various data types. In general, the TDS method is a suitable 
option when the k value is quite large, while BUG is a suitable choice when the k value 
is small. Determining the k value may depend on the data divergence and type. Two 
main factors may urge data owners to choose TDS algorithms over BUG: a large 
number of attribute values, and the organisation’s security policy. More secure 
anonymised data impose larger k values. For instance, if the data owner notices that the 
attribute ‘education’ contains many values with a wide range of education varieties, then 
he or she may select the TDS algorithm. In another example, if the organisation’s 
security policy is low, then the k value can be smaller than 4; thus, the BUG algorithm is 
a good option. 
2.4.3 k-anonymity Methods for Big Data 
The previous BUG and TDS methods have also been implemented in big data 
anonymisation. A few amendments were applied to suit the big data frameworks 
regarding parallelisation and distribution. The core concept of k-anonymity is similar to 
the previously mentioned methods. Similar techniques and algorithms are applied in 
both cases of TDS and BUG. Let us study some of these anonymisation methods to 
compare the previously mentioned methods in traditional data and big data. 
2.4.3.1 Generalisation 
Several algorithms were proposed recently for anonymisation using MapReduce. Most 
BUG methods follow a similar algorithm by implementing the BUG driver to leverage 
information gain and security trade-off. The search metric computes the Information 
Loss per Privacy Gain (ILPG). These equations measure the entropy and scores of each 
attribute. The algorithm generates a random number (ran). This number presents the 
number of random partition for the dataset (𝐷𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑛). Each sub-dataset is emitted to the 
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MapReduce BUG (MRBUG) driver for intermediate generalisation. This generalisation 
scans data, finds the equivalent records < k and merges Q-IDs up to Anonymisation 
Level 1 or 2—that is, AL1 or AL2. This intermediate generalisation is essential to 
reduce the final anonymisation computation. Finally, the datasets are scanned again and 
the search metric computes ILPG again. For each sub-dataset, if < k, then the best 
generalisation level is found and set to inactive. The process keeps iterating and moving 
up the taxonomy tree until k-anonymity is satisfied. As explained, the MRBUG driver 
operates twice—in intermediate and final. It first merges anonymisation and then applies 
generalisation. This algorithm is found in [11; 64; 65; 109]. 
2.4.3.1.1 Advanced BUG 
Pandilakshmi et al. [109] proposed advanced BUG. Advanced BUG consists of the 
following steps: split data into smaller partitions, run the MRBUG driver on a 
partitioned dataset, combine the anonymisation levels of the partitioned dataset and 
apply a generalisation to the original dataset [110]. Other anonymisation methods use a 
hybrid combination of BUG and TDS to anonymise data. A threshold value of k is 
determined by several algorithms to distinguish BUG from TDS use. The proposed 
methods consider that BUG is more suitable for small k values, while TDS is more 
suitable for larger k values [158]. Some hybrid methods were recently proposed for big 
data by Zhang et al. and Irudayasamy et al. [64; 65; 93]. 
2.4.3.2 Specialisation 
Since the evolution of MapReduce and parallel processing, Roy et al. [61] presented a 
data privacy model named Airavat. This system was developed after investigating 
MapReduce and differential privacy. This approach has encouraged researchers to 
redesign the available anonymisation methods for MapReduce computability. The TDS 
methods for big data were derived from the TDS proposed for traditional data. Minor 
corrections have been contributed to the early versions of the MapReduce framework. 
One of the powerful methods is known as two-phase TDS. 
2.4.3.2.1 Two-phase Top-down Specialisation 
Two-phase TDS depicts the two phases of map and reduce. The concept is very similar 
to the previously explained TDS, which depends on generalising all Q-ID attributes, and 
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calculating the entropy and score for each Q-ID. The highest Q-ID score will be 
specialised. This operation is iterated to find the best cut in the tree or the interval. In the 
first phase, dataset D is split into small chunks of data, Di. Di denotes any block of data, 
where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑝. The value 𝑝 denotes the number of blocks. An operation known as 
MapReduce TDS (MRTDS) scans each data block in a subroutine in parallel to make 
full use of the job-level parallelisation of MapReduce. The MRTDS driver is an 
intermediate anonymisation level that specialises data without violating k-anonymity. 
The MRTDS driver is applied once in each phase. In the first phase, the driver provides 
some sub-datasets of a 𝑘𝐼 value, where 𝑘𝐼 > 𝑘. The term 𝑘𝐼 denotes the intermediate 
anonymity parameter, which is usually given by anonymisation experts. Formally, the 
MRTDS operates multi-tasks on each data block for initial specialisation by 
𝑀𝑅𝑇𝐷𝑆(𝐷𝑖 , 𝑘
𝐼 , 𝐴𝐿0) → 𝐴𝐿𝑖
|
. The anonymisation level 𝐴𝐿0 presents the top 
generalisation level of the taxonomy tree, which is usually given by (any). Specialising 
Q-ID attributes is applied as per the highest score attribute. Another program is known 
as Information Gain per Privacy Loss (IGPL). The IGPL calculates the highest score for 
each specialised Q-ID attribute. This technique is popular in most anonymisation 
operations and algorithms. 
After completing the intermediate anonymisation, all (AL) values are aggregated and the 
next phase is initiated. The second phase operates MRTDS again to produce the best cut 
specialisation. The algorithm is similar to the first phase algorithm. The second phase 
receives data from the intermediate output as per the key-value of (key, list(count)). This 
phase updates the IGPL results that were initiated in the first phase. Initially, the first 
phase lists all of the best specialisations for each data block. In the second phase, the 
specialisation is validated or updated with a new specialisation value. The validation is 
accomplished by attaining two conditions. First, the parent value of specialisation 
should not be a root—that is, it should not be (any). Second, the anonymity should be 
𝐴𝑐(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐) > 𝑘. Several iterations can determine the best specialisation cut for the chosen 
Q-ID. The IGPL updates the specialisation list as per the information gain calculation, 
and the final list of specialisation is updated and emitted, so the data records are masked 
with this list [159]. 
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2.4.4 Critique of Big Data Anonymisation Methods 
Most big data anonymisation methods foster both TDS and BUG in a hybrid manner. 
Large data are managed and processed more easily if the hybrid technique is 
appropriately applied. This depends on the k value and other parameters. Both TDS and 
BUG are used in traditional data, and no amendments are made when implemented with 
big data. The concept of ILPG is the primary core of all anonymised methods. This is 
true for traditional and big data. ILPG can be successfully implemented on a single 
machine, where the ILPG driver iterates a large array of data records several times. The 
iteration attempts to find the best cut of generalisation or specialisation. In big data, this 
algorithm can be cumbersome because of memory size and processor limitations. Thus, 
the ILPG algorithm can be amended to fit the distributed system by splitting the dataset 
into small chunks of data. This is the solution adopted by the current anonymisation 
methods. Chapter 3 proves that data records equivalency increases in parallel with the 
number of records increased. The decisive fact about big data is the high percentage of 
records equivalency. Misusing this fact can negatively affect information gain. We 
require a method that is able to benefit from this advantage by nominally splitting data, 
rather than conducting a random split. The random split implemented in current 
anonymisation methods is inadequate. 
In addition to the random split disadvantage, the current big data tools operate 
differently. The ILPG driver was developed based on the early releases of MapReduce. 
The latest MapReduce and Spark frameworks are operated in a two-level stack. The first 
level is the core structure of the distributed system, attached to the second level of an 
ecosystem. For instance, MapReduce consists of many ecosystems operating at the top 
of ‘Yet Another Resource Negotiator’ (YARN), such as Pig, Hive and HBase. For this 
reason, implementing anonymisation with the newly released MapReduce ecosystems 
requires different algorithms. The newly released ecosystems diminish the iteration use 
and limit the conventional programming algorithms. For instance, Pig Latin script, Hive 
script, Scala script and other programming scripts have limitations on using IF 
statements and iterations. These scripts were developed explicitly for parallel 
programming and are not as flexible as traditional programming because scalability and 
performance concerns were considered when developing these programming scripts. If 
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iterations and several IF statements are required, then User-Defined Function (UDF) can 
play a role in programming the required part of the code. UDF can present a small and 
limited part of the code. A UDF is a black box, as discussed further in Chapter 4. Data 
need to flow outside the parallel system to a standalone UDF. If the data flow is large, 
there is no guarantee that the UDF will be able to handle this massive size of data. For 
this reason, data flowing to UDF must be limited and small. Unfortunately, the ILPG 
algorithm depends completely on iteration and IF statements. The algorithm is not 
rectified to fit the new ecosystems. Applying ILPG means converting the whole 
anonymisation program to one UDF program. In other words, a parallel distributed 
framework will be unable to process ILPG efficiently; instead, data will be transferred 
and processed in a UDF, which is outside the parallel distributed framework. 
Thus far, two critical concerns have been raised regarding the current anonymisation 
methods. One more critical issue involves the lack of scalability in the anonymisation 
program. The current programs have restricted the number of Q-IDs, with a maximum 
number of nine Q-ID attributes able to be assigned to each dataset. An increased number 
of Q-IDs may require intensive computation costs. Imagine that the ILPG needs to 
calculate the score for each attribute before determining the specialised one. More Q-
IDs will reduce the speed and performance. Thus, we need an anonymisation method 
that can use many Q-ID attributes. The need to increase the number of Q-IDs and 
auxiliaries is high. The recent evolution of social media and portable hardware service 
has urged developers to increase the number of Q-IDs in multidimensional data. 
Adversaries can easily identify a person by searching the internet for some details about 
the person’s posts on a profile from Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and others. Thus, we 
require an anonymisation framework that is able to deal with many Q-ID attributes 
efficiently. 
Increasing the number of Q-IDs in a multidimensional dataset supports security and 
granularity. The increased demand on data analytics requires improved tools to deal 
with authorisation level and access control. More demands placed on data analytics 
means more users are requesting access to data. The current anonymisation methods 
cannot be considered granular access control methods. The anonymisation is applied 
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evenly to all users, and there is no any granular access control for multiple users. The 
advancement of access control techniques exploits granular and fine-access control to 
improve the security level. Data owners may share data with business partners, strategic 
partners, co-owners, contractors and the public; thus, users’ business backgrounds can 
determine the security level for each organisation or user. Granularity can be applied to 
the level of anonymisation, whereby a user with high-security access is prone to a high 
level of anonymisation, and vice versa. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the background of big data analytics and the challenges that 
face big data analytics security at present and in the near future. The chapter initially 
introduced the big data framework structure and the recent tools for managing such a 
massive quantity of data. Three layers of big data structure were introduced: 
infrastructure, computation and application. Infrastructure refers to hardware equipment 
in data centres. Computation refers to the middleware of file systems for managing files 
and NoSQL for managing a big database. The application layer presents the parallel 
distributed frameworks that process queries of data analytics and cluster operations. The 
scope of this research is data analytics security. Data analytics was introduced by 
discussing its importance in big data, and the challenges that face analytics. One of the 
analytics challenges involves processing performance and speed. Data analytics 
algorithms tend to operate intensive computations probabilities and statistics. Analytics 
tools, such as MapReduce, still have limitations in accomplishing such large jobs in real 
time. This is the major concern in big data analytics. Parallel computing frameworks 
contain some tools were specially designed for batch processing only, while other 
frameworks were designed for both batch and stream processing. However, streaming 
tools are unable to operate efficiently in big data analytics. Two frameworks were 
introduced for each processing type: Pig for batch processing and Spark for stream 
processing. 
The next sections delved into data analytics and security. The sections reviewed both 
differential privacy and k-anonymity. Several methods support differential privacy, such 
as Airavat and GUPT. Other methods support k-anonymity in traditional data and big 
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data. The major difference between differential privacy and k-anonymity is the 
interactivity for each type. Differential privacy is an interactive form, while k-anonymity 
is a non-interactive form. The interactive form exploits statistical results without 
revealing data, in contrast to the non-interactive form, which permits partial data access 
after anonymising some data values. One major challenge in differential privacy is user 
queries. Applying some obfuscation to the statistical results requires a full understanding 
of user queries. Some adversaries may intentionally create risky queries, so they can 
avoid obfuscation. Researchers have invested considerable time predicting and finding 
appropriate solutions for attackers’ queries. 
This chapter then discussed two techniques of k-anonymisation: generalisation and 
specialisation. The technique of generalisation is the opposite of specialisation. 
Generalisation implements the taxonomy tree to move from the bottom of the tree up to 
the top of the tree; therefore, it is known as BUG. Specialisation implements the 
taxonomy tree to move from the top of the tree to the bottom of the tree; therefore, it is 
known as TDS. Both BUG and TDS algorithms operate efficiently in traditional data; 
however, big data anonymisation by TDS or BUG is inefficient for several reasons, such 
as data being split randomly, current anonymisation methods not coping with the latest 
technology of parallel distributed operations, and the lack of scalability of the 
anonymisation program. 
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3 MULTIDIMENSIONAL SENSITIVITY-
BASED ANONYMISATION METHOD 
 
Data analytics and their use in big data environments have undergone rapid growth in 
the past few years. Several undesirable side-effects have appeared in relation to data 
disclosure and privacy violation risks. This trend highlights the need to find privacy 
methods with a scale-up ability to cope with the big data growth. Data anonymisation is 
one of the pioneer privacy solutions that can minimise such risks. However, the current 
anonymisation solutions suffer from poor performance and high loss of gained 
information in the big data environment. This chapter introduces a novel privacy 
method: multidimensional sensitivity-based anonymisation. This method resolves the 
performance and information loss concerns and provides role-based anonymisation 
control. Various privacy methods have been proposed to anonymise data before 
exposing sensitive information on the Cloud; however, the contemporary anonymisation 
methods do not consider big data requirements. 
Big data analytics involve advanced analytic techniques operating on big datasets [122]. 
Analytics is the main concern in big data, and may be exploited by data miners to breach 
privacy [123]. In the past few years, several methods have been proposed to address data 
leakage concerns for traditional data [105; 117]. The proposed methods provide 
remedies for various types of attack against the data analytics process. Side attacks are 
considered one of the most critical attacks [35]. The side attack method was explained in 
Chapter 2. This attack is prevalent in medical data, where the attacker owns partial 
information about the patient, and the attacker aims to find hidden sensitive information 
by logically linking the data owned by the attacker and the targeted data [130]. The 
previous chapter also addressed possible attacks on both traditional and big data, with 
suggested solutions to prevent these attacks. However, current methods do not consider 
big data requirements and behaviour; thus, the proposed anonymisation methods are 
inadequate for a big data operation. This is true even for the recently proposed 
anonymisation methods. Recent methods—such as two-phase multidimensional TDS 
(MDTDS) [74], MRTDS and MRBUG—do not consider parallel processes and 
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operations [158]. The methods mentioned above can operate efficiently with traditional 
data; however, big data requirements and operational concepts are different. Big data 
operate in a parallel distributed environment, where performance and scalability are a 
major concern. 
There is a need for an anonymisation methods that can operate in parallel. This raises 
the need to change the core structure of anonymisation techniques. Before proposing 
any anonymisation method for big data, some specifications should be considered. 
Developers must distinguish between big data and traditional data. With big data, an 
effective anonymisation process should be able to reduce the computation costs, prevent 
high information loss and increase security. In addition, the anonymisation process 
should provide a granular access control method. Any big data anonymisation developer 
should devote attention to the following specifications: equivalency increase, 
information gain, parallel algorithm and granular access. These specifications will be 
discussed in the next sections. 
3.1 Requirements for Big Data Anonymisation 
Method 
3.1.1 Equivalency Increase 
Equivalency increase is a general specification that must be considered when proposing 
any k-anonymity method for big data. It can be defined as follows: 
Lemma: In datasets, the percentage of equivalent records increases in parallel with the 
increasing number of records. The rising number of records can help the least common 
attributes gain equivalency. 
This is true for most attributes. Few attributes are excluded because of their solitary 
nature, such as emails, usernames, telephone or fax numbers, and primary keys. To 
prove Lemma mathematically, let us denote a Q-ID attribute as Q-ID. Each Q-ID 
contains a set of values denoted by Q-ID = {qid(v1), qid(v2), qid(v3) … qid(vl)} in a 
total number of N data records. Suppose that every qid value appears only once every n 
records in a total of N dataset records. Therefore, the Q-ID probability is calculated by 
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P(qid(v)) = 1/n. If the number of Q-IDs is m, then each unique record may appear in a 
probability of the following factor: 
∏ 𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑖] = 𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑1
𝑚
𝑖=1 ]  ×  𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑2]  × …  𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑚]     (3.1) 
where P[QID] is the probability of each Q-ID. Each unique record of Q-IDs will appear 
every n number of records, which can be calculated by 𝑛 =
1
∏ 𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑖] 
𝑚
𝑖=1
. If we assume 
that each combination value appears only once, then we need at least n records to gain a 
one-time occurrence of all possible combinations of Q-IDs values. The value of n 
denotes all possible combinations of Q-ID values. In addition, we need k × n records to 
gain the k-anonymity for all combinations of values. Referring to k-anonymity, the 
records equivalency q is defined as records with similar Q-ID values, where q ≥ k for 
each occurrence. For instance, if k = 5, then each distinguished record must appear five 
times in a total of N records before gaining k-anonymity. In the actual datasets, the 
number of appearances of Q-ID combination can be smaller or larger than n. For 
example, the probabilities of Q-IDs in the Adult data are shown below: 
• P[age] = P [1-100] = 0.01 
• P[education] = P [Y5-6, Y7-8, Y9, Y10, Y11, Y12, HS-grade, some-college] = 
0.125 
• P[Gender] = P [male, female] = 0.5 
• P[salary] = P [< = 50K , > 50K] = 0.5. 
Based on these values, we can find the value of 𝑛 =
1
∏ 𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑖] 
𝑚
𝑖=1
=
1
0.01×0.125×0.5×0.5
=
3,200. The n value means that a record such as {Age = ‘23’, Gender = ‘male’, Edu = 
‘secondary’} appears in the dataset once every 3,200 records. This also means that the 
first 3,200 records consist of all possible combinations of Q-ID records, and every 
combination appears only once. However, this is not the case in actual datasets because 
the given combination records may appear less or more frequently. Based on this 
example, let us consider that, in the first 10,000 records, only 50% of all possible 
combinations have appeared at least once within a number of N records. This means that 
only 1,600 combinations have appeared in the dataset of N. Let us call this number of 
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combinations n̄. If we suppose that each combination appears only once, then we can 
calculate the minimum value of records (N) to gain the k-anonymity: 
𝑁𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑘 ×  ?̄?          (3.2) 
where n̄ denotes the number of combinations appearing in N records. The number of n̄ 
records presents the records starting from n = 1 to n = n̄. This number does not present 
all possible combinations of Q-ID values; instead, it presents only the available 
combinations in N records. In other words, all possible combinations are denoted by n, 
while the actual available combinations are denoted by n̄. 
In the previous example, if the number n = 3,200, then the number n̄ is usually smaller 
than n. Let us say that the number n̄ = 500. This number is true for the first 10,000 
records of the dataset. However, the records starting from n = 10,001 to n = 20,000 may 
contain more combinations when N = 20,000 records. This is because some records 
appear less frequently than others. Equation 3.2 assumes that each record has an equal 
number of appearances every n̄ record, which is not the case. Thus, Equation 3.2 
describes only one possible scenario. Nevertheless, the appearance probability of any 
unique combination remains between ‘stability’ and ‘increase’, and never decreases. For 
instance, the record {Age = ‘23’, Gender = ‘male’, Edu = ‘secondary’} may appear in 
the first 1,000 records, and then may not appear again in the next 10,000 records. This 
explains that the records’ appearances remain in either stable or increase statuses. In the 
actual dataset, the equivalency q is proportional to N, and can be described as q α N. 
This can be presented by the increase percentage of equivalency Q, which is given by Q 
= q/N. 
The relationship q α N can be proven experimentally. Three experiments were 
conducted using the Adult database from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [14]. 
The database describes the adults’ age, occupation, marital status, education, social 
status, position, gender, hours worked per week, race, county, native country and salary. 
Four Q-ID attributes were assigned as follows: age, education, salary and gender. The 
experiments were conducted using a MatLab simulator [90] by choosing three groups of 
N records: small, medium and large. During the experiments, it was assumed that k = 10, 
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and the Q-ID probabilities are shown above. As a result, the number of possible 
combinations 𝑛 =
1
∏ 𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑖] 
𝑚
𝑖=1
= 3,200. 
In the first experiment, the total number of records was N = 10,000. The number of the 
actual combinations’ appearance in 10,000 records was n̄ = 1,630, which presents 
around 50% of all possible appearances. The number of equivalent records was 
q = 6,272, which presents around Q = 60% of the total number of records. In the second 
experiment, the number of records was increased to N = 20,000. The number of actual 
appearing combinations was n̄ = 2,196, which presents around 69% of the probable 
appearances. The number of equivalent records was q = 14,828, which presents around 
Q = 75% of the total number of records. In the third experiment, the number of records 
further increased to N = 32,561. The number of actual appearing combinations was n̄ = 
2,498, which presents around 78% of the probable appearances. The number of 
equivalent records was q = 26,846, which presents around Q = 82% of the total number 
of records. 
Similar steps were applied to three groups of {G(QID)1, G(QID)2, G(QID)3} randomly 
selected Q-IDs in the same dataset. The three groups are presented in Table 3.1. The Q 
value was calculated for each group. All groups showed an increase in both equivalency 
percentage, Q, as shown in Figure 3.1, and the actual appearing combination, n̄, as 
shown in Figure 3.2. 
Table 3.1—Four Q-ID groups chosen randomly from the Adult dataset 
G(QID)1 G(QID)2 G(QID)3 
Age Marital status Position 
Education Education County 
Gender Social status Country 
Salary Race 
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Figure 3.1—Proportionality of equivalent records with increased record numbers 
 
Figure 3.2—Effect of increasing number of actual combinations with an enlarged number of records 
Both above figures indicate that data growth increases data equivalency in big datasets. 
They indicate a direct proportion between the equivalency and the increased number of 
records. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the logarithmic equivalency increase, parallel with 
the records’ number increase. For this reason, we need to determine a suitable algorithm 
that is able to process a large data size without the need to split data into small chunks 
randomly, and with a large data processing capacity. No algorithm should ignore this 
finding of equivalency increase. The random split of data blocks is an example of such 
ignorance. 
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3.1.2 Information Gain and Security 
Current anonymisation methods are mostly readjustments of approaches that were 
designed for traditional data [132]. Traditional data include a limited number of records; 
therefore, information gain is an essential matter. However, big data equivalency 
increases along with the data size increase, which generates a larger group of equivalent 
records. Thus, information gain concern may not be the primary factor in the 
anonymisation process. Logically, more equivalent data cause less anonymised records. 
This high equivalency in big data indicates that security is the predominant concern in 
data anonymisation. The increased number of user access and a massive quantity of 
personal information in datasets may increase re-identification probability. Hence, the 
trade-off between security and information gain may result in favour of security. 
Therefore, anonymisation algorithms should devote more attention to security concerns. 
To determine the best Q-ID anonymisation, best k value, or best cut and interval, 
algorithms with several iterations are inadequate for big data. Multiple iterations and 
scanning involve high computation costs. Moreover, the high level of accuracy and a 
small value of information gain increase do not affect the statistical and analytical 
results. 
One of the major distinguishing features of big data is the multidimensionality [66], 
which leads to a large number of Q-IDs. The previously proposed methods suggested a 
limited number of Q-IDs, reaching up to seven or eight. However, when data are 
multidimensional, more expected Q-IDs will join the data records. The large number of 
Q-IDs leads to a higher security threat. Re-identification becomes more manageable 
with an increased number of auxiliaries and data identifiers. More personal information 
revealed will facilitate side-link attacks or background knowledge attacks. Moreover, 
attack possibility has become even higher with the new technology evolution of social 
media, smartphones and Cloud services. Users are now able to find the most personal 
details over the internet. Hence, increased security vigilance is essential. 
The proposed anonymisation method should not entirely ignore information gain, but 
instead reduce the processing to determine the optimal anonymisation values. The 
optimal values usually lead to the lowest possible loss of information after 
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anonymisation. In big data, applying such complicated processes may not affect the final 
results of statistical output. The small statistical values can even be ignored, since the 
statistical results follow the principle of estimation prospects. This offers data miners 
flexibility in approximating and rounding some numbers to a few decimal places [51]. 
Therefore, pre-calculating the k value and predetermining the attributes that need to be 
anonymised is an advantage. Generally, this non-accuracy will not dramatically affect 
the data analytics results. 
Moreover, big data are beneficial when they are public, which means that many 
organisations from different fields need to access these data for multiple purposes [25]. 
These organisations all analyse, mine and output statistical results. This emphasises the 
security aspect of big data. Multiple users from various organisations may need to 
access the data, with different levels of access. Users cannot be given similar security 
levels; therefore, granularity is required as a part of security procedures. This will be 
further explained in a later section. 
3.1.3 Parallel Algorithm 
A parallel distributed environment handles big data, and multi-task processes should be 
considered in any anonymisation method used for big data. These processes can be 
implemented by splitting tasks into subtasks, and distributing the tasks among multi-
computers to cope with the massive data volume [57]. A parallel programming model is 
provided by the processing framework, such as MapReduce or Spark. The framework 
provides parallel operations for reading/writing data from/to disks, storing data in 
memory, and processing data in parallel. Big data frameworks can complete these three 
procedures. Parallel programming models are classified into two areas: process 
interaction and problem decomposition. Process interaction is related to managing 
shared memories to accommodate processed data, passing messages between nodes, and 
dividing large tasks into smaller subtasks. Problem decomposition is related to the 
skeleton of the algorithm, and the programming paradigm and sequence. This indicates 
that an efficient parallel framework and a suitable algorithm and programming sequence 
should lead to a successful and well-performed task [72]. 
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Many factors may hinder parallel programming models, such as network speed and 
message passing between nodes. This causes a bottleneck of sequential operations in 
shuffling phases. In addition, it is difficult to find a general valuable programming 
model. Any parallel model is judged on its generality, since some models perform more 
efficiently in managing specific data types and environments [52]. For instance, Flink 
and Storm frameworks perform well in multimedia and data streams, while the HDFS 
performs well with large data files. Parallel programming adopts the implicit and 
explicit parallelism concepts, whereas implicit parallelisation automatically converts the 
program codes from sequential to parallel. Explicit programming is difficult and 
requires high programming skills. Programmers must code all short messages and 
shared memories across the cluster nodes. For this reason, current parallel models for 
big data are partially implicit [77]. 
In big data, the processing framework, such as MapReduce, handles the majority of 
implicit parallelisation. However, some parts of the parallelism rely on the application 
programmer, who should be aware of the framework core structure. The programmer 
must know the optimal code that will result in the best performance. This can be 
implemented by several trials of running the program to arrange the commands of 
filtering, grouping, replacing and others in the best sequence. For big data 
anonymisation, the programming commands control the data flow operands without 
changing the program’s state. The programmer no longer specifies the detailed sequence 
of instructions in execution orders, but specifies the general operations to be applied to 
the dataflow. Eventually, the programmer has a small window of managing the 
operations sequence. The anonymisation framework should consider this level of 
programming. 
3.1.4 Granular Access 
Any proposed big data framework should consider the high demands on data analytics. 
Data growth imposes a larger number of analyser requests. The large data size is 
generated by many participants; so, the data contain a high percentage of personal 
information. As a result, analysing these massive data will enhance future plans and 
strategies in marketing, development and decision making [23]. Given that the nature of 
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big data is public and various analysers may wish to participate in data analytics, there is 
a need to consider security as the priority. One of the main security components is fine-
grained access control for users, which implies granular access through users’ rights and 
privileges. 
Granular access should be provided through anonymisation control by increasing or 
decreasing the anonymity level. Users with high privileges should be able to gain higher 
information levels. Therefore, the statistical analytics results should be similar to the 
original data analytics results. In contrast, users with low privileges should gain lower 
information levels. This data masking increase or decrease keeps data in the hands of 
authorised users and organisations. The access control should be able to hide some data 
view from certain users. The view is masked with levels of data anonymisation. 
Granular access control should not have a large effect on analytics performance. 
3.2 Anonymisation Concept in MDSBA 
The multidimensional sensitivity-based anonymisation (MDSBA) method was 
developed to fulfil the previous four specifications of equivalency increase, information 
gain, parallelism and user access disparity. MDSBA adapts a multidimensional 
technique to perform a high level of computation for big data. The MDSBA method 
requires a definition of the privacy method and masking pattern for each access level. 
The novel anonymisation method applies BUG in k-anonymity that can cope with big 
data frameworks. The method not only parallelises data for big data frameworks, but 
also reduces the overhead computation of data iteration. This is accomplished by 
providing pre-calculated k-anonymity parameters and predetermined attributes for 
anonymisation. MDSBA also supports anonymisation-based access control. This 
imposes granular anonymisation based on users’ access levels. MDSBA mimics role-
based access control by providing granular security access for multi-user levels. 
MDSBA consists of three main concepts: probability concepts, grouping and sensitivity 
value. Following this introduction, let us delve into MDSBA’s core concepts. 
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3.2.1 Quasi-identifiers and Classes 
The MDSBA general definition is similar to the previously proposed k-anonymity 
methods. Data owners select some private attributes as Q-IDs. The chosen Q-IDs 
contain personal attributes that can facilitate adversaries’ tasks of re-identifying some 
records. More importantly, they can unveil some sensitive attributes, known as ‘classes’. 
For this reason, some of the chosen Q-IDs will be anonymised if they do not fulfil the k-
anonymity rule. This imposes three different types of data attributes: Q-ID attribute, 
sensitive attribute (class) and ordinary attribute. This can be defined as table T 
consisting of m set of attributes, where each attribute can be a Q-ID, class (C) or an 
ordinary attribute (attr). T is a combination of T = {Q-ID, C, attr}. 
The chosen Q-IDs and C are predetermined by data owners. There are no clear 
instructions for selecting these identifiers, although MDSBA provides best-practice 
advice for determining Q-IDs. This will be further explained in Chapter 6. Data owners 
establish initial values of their own, including the Q-ID attributes decision. Data owners 
are the only users permitted access to the original copy of data. The anonymisation level 
increases granularly with the ownership increase. 
3.2.2 Probability Concept and Anonymisation Masking 
MDSBA adopts the Q-ID probability concept for aggregating Q-IDs and the masking 
process. The anonymisation is conducted by applying one of the three masking tools: 
taxonomy tree, interval or suppression. The probability is pre-calculated for each Q-ID 
related to the possible values that may appear in all data records. For instance, if we 
suppose that the human age range is between 1 to 100, the attribute probability of a 
person’s age is P(age) = 1/100. The Q-ID probability should be pre-calculated to 
accelerate grouping in the anonymisation process. The number of Q-ID values indicates 
the frequency of the arbitrary appearance of each value. If the values are unique or non-
repetitive, then the attribute cannot be an elected as a Q-ID attribute. Thus, the values 
must be finite and repetitive. Two probability concepts are applied in MDSBA, as 
discussed in the following subsections. 
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• Probability in Aggregating Q-IDs 
As aforementioned, Q-ID probability plays a role in aggregating records. In MDSBA, 
aggregating is conducted on a granular basis. This allows the first grouping for all Q-
IDs, followed by another grouping for all except one Q-ID, and then another grouping 
for all except two Q-IDs, and so on. In general, the lower Q-ID probability values may 
appear less frequently in data attributes. This means that data records with high Q-ID 
probabilities may return fewer data equivalency, and subsequently higher anonymisation 
output. For this reason, MDSBA is meant to reduce the anonymisation output by 
grouping the Q-ID attributes with the highest probabilities. MDSBA divides the 
grouping task into multiple tasks by grouping all Q-ID attributes in the first stage, so 
this can filter out the fully-equivalent records. In the second stage, the lowest probability 
among the Q-ID attributes is excluded from the second grouping process. In the third 
stage, the lowest two Q-ID probabilities are excluded from the third grouping process. 
The final stage aggregates only one Q-ID attribute, which is the attribute with the 
highest probability. 
• Probability in Masking 
Probability is also used in masking Q-ID attributes. This probability is derived from the 
taxonomy tree concept. The taxonomy tree, T, is propagated from the parent node, w, to 
a number of leaf nodes, ν, so that each parent node’s probability is 𝑃(𝑤) =
1
ν
. Figure 3.3 
illustrates the probabilities for each parent node in the education tree. For instance, the 
parent (Primary) has three children nodes, which indicates a probability of P = 1/3 ≈ 
0.33. The probability concept can be applied to taxonomy and interval masking. The two 
major anonymisation tools are presented by taxonomy trees and intervals. Choosing 
either one of them depends on the data type, since some data can be generalised by 
taxonomy trees, such as (Education). In contrast, other data types are numerical and 
best-fit interval masking. The intervals can also be presented by probability values. If a 
number n is presented in an interval of a minimum value, Vmin, and a maximum value, 
Vmax, then the probability of obtaining that number within the interval range is 𝑃(𝑛) =
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1
(𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛)
. For example, for an interval of [15–25], the probability is (P = 1/10 = 0.1). 
This probability concept supports fine-grained access for multiple users. 
3.2.2.1 Interval and Taxonomy Tree Masking 
In MDSBA, the probability is the core concept of providing granular levels of 
information gained from data. Users with higher privileges are provided more accurate 
data because of their high trust level. Higher trust leads to higher information gain. The 
trust level is determined by several factors, which will be discussed later. 
 
Figure 3.3—Taxonomy tree for ‘education’ in Adult data 
To illustrate the granularity in information gain, let us again consider Figure 3.3. Higher 
trusted users may receive anonymised data with a Level 1 taxonomy tree. This offers 
more accurate information about people’s education level. For instance, if a user is 
given an access level with a maximum probability of P(user) = 0.17, then the data 
sample in Table 3.2A will be anonymised as per Figure 3.3. The anonymisation results, 
as illustrated in Table 3.2B, show a high masking level, where most of the values are 
masked by Level 2, instead of Level 1. This is because the probability of the secondary 
node in the tree is 0.17, and the certificate probability is 0.067 < 0.17. In another 
example, if a user’s maximum probability P(user) = 0.5, then the given masking will 
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reveal more information, as shown in Table 3.2C. As a result, high probability causes 
low masking. 
Table 3.2—‘Education’ masking in Adult data 
Education 
A: Original Data B: High Masking with P ≤ 0.13 C: Low Masking with P ≤ 0.5 
Master Degree Postgraduate 
Bachelor Degree Undergraduate 
9th Secondary Secondary 
Some-college Certificate College 
5th to 6th Certificate Primary 
 
In the previous examples, users were given probability values to control their access 
level. However, we need a mechanism to assign this probability value. To control the 
granularity, let us define an instance of k-anonymity value that is given to each user. 
Suppose that one user is given a k-anonymity value of k1, while another user is given a 
value of k2, where k2 < k1. In this case, the smaller value of k1 imposes less 
anonymisation effect. Therefore, the user with k2 value will gain more information. The 
probability value given to each user can be better controlled by providing multiple 
values of k-anonymity as per users’ access level. Thus, users with higher values of k can 
gain less information than users with lower values of k. This enhances the probability 
concept and provides better tools to control access. 
Referring to the k-anonymity value and granularity, let us define an instant of k, denoted 
as ?̄?, and named ownership level. This is a parameter given to each user when accessing 
data for analytics. This number indicates the minimum number of equivalent Q-ID 
records to avoid anonymisation. A larger value of ?̄? implies a higher level of 
anonymisation. The probability value for each user can be called the ‘sensitivity level’, 
and is denoted by ψ. The sensitivity level, ψ, is calculated by assigning the ownership 
level ?̄? for users. Data owners determine the Q-ID attributes and the value of k, and then 
the level of sensitivity is determined by MDSBA equations as per the given ?̄? for each 
user. The sensitivity level of the class attribute (C) is denoted by ψ, and the ownership 
level of a user is indicated by ?̄? = i − k, where i = {k + 2, k + 3, …, k + k} and 2 ≤ ?̄? ≤ k. 
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3.2.2.2 Suppression Masking 
Data can be processed by applying three different types of masking: taxonomy tree, 
interval and suppression. Suppression imposes full or partial data hiding, so that zero or 
very little information is gained from the suppressed data. MDSBA implements 
suppression in some cases, such as non-equivalent records after completing all grouping 
stages. This is usually applied during the final grouping stage, when grouping cannot 
determine any semi-equivalent records. Moreover, suppression can be a suitable solution 
for some data types, such as data of postcodes, first names, last names and contact 
telephone numbers. These data are better anonymised by applying special characters to 
replace the actual values. A commonly used character is the asterisk (*). In addition, 
suppression can be applied by using the word ‘(any)’. 
Probability can be applied with suppressing masks. For instance, if an analyser attempts 
to access patients’ records. He was given 0.04 as a maximum probability. Suppose that 
patients’ records were anonymised by ‘patient’s first name’, then a name, such as 
(Mark), can be masked by one letter and displayed as (Mar*). The omitted letter’s 
probability P(letter) = 1/26 = 0.04, where 26 presents the total number of English letters. 
A similar concept is applied to postcodes. For instance, a postcode of (4514) manifests a 
value of 0.1 for each suppressed number. As a result, the previous postcode can be given 
as (45**) for the same user. 
This suppression concept is similar to intervals and taxonomy trees; however, some data 
types may only accept suppression, interval or taxonomy. Therefore, the data owner 
must determine the appropriate masking tool to use for each data attribute. For example, 
the previous postcode can be anonymised by an interval of [4510–4535]. If compared 
between both masking results, then the interval may produce more accurate 
anonymisation output. In the previous examples, the suppression process omitted two 
numerical values from the postcode. The probability of the omitted numbers = 0.1 × 0.1 
= 0.01, while the user is given a maximum probability of 0.04. However, it is not 
possible to omit one number of the postcode because the probability of omitting one 
number is P = 0.1, while the maximum given probability is P = 0.04. In contrast, 
interval masking can accurately assign the exact probability. In the previous example, 
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the user’s probability is 0.04, which is presented as an interval of 1/0.04 = 25. The 
postcode can start from 4510 with an interval of 25; thus, the maximum interval value is 
4535, so the interval can be [4510–4535]. In cases in which the interval or taxonomy 
methods are more accurate, it is better to ignore suppression masking, or keep 
suppression as a last resort. 
In some cases, it is possible that the probability value assigned to the user is much lower 
than the probability value of the taxonomy tree root. In such cases, the probability 
concept is ignored, and data are fully suppressed. For instance, if the maximum 
probability P(user) = 0.01 was given to a user, referring to the previous EDU taxonomy 
tree in Figure 3.3, the root probability of P(any) = 0.04. Based on the probability 
concept, the EDU data cannot be anonymised by the value (any) because P(user) < 
P(any). However, (any) is the highest level in the tree, and no further generalisation can 
be applied. Therefore, the masking algorithm generalises any EDU value with (any) if 
the user’s probability P(user) ≤ 0.04. 
3.2.3 Grouping Data Vertically and Horizontally 
To parallelise massive quantities of data and support anonymisation granularity, 
MDSBA logically splits Q-IDs vertically and horizontally. This technique supports 
several aspects of big data. Section 3.1 identified three different requirements for any 
anonymisation method. The grouping concept mitigates anonymisation costs and 
increases the security level. It supports the anonymisation requirements of equivalency, 
security, parallelisation and granularly. Vertical grouping divides Q-IDs into small 
groups, which can be an advantage for big data anonymisation. When grouping data 
horizontally, more attributes can be chosen to be Q-IDs, which enhances the security 
level of the anonymised data. This technique splits large data into smaller data sizes to 
support parallelism. Each group of data is sent to a separate node and processed in 
parallel. Vertical grouping enhances the access control method, as users are only given 
the required Q-ID groups. The unneeded groups are hidden, so users are only given the 
required amount of data. Eventually, vertical grouping reduces the computation costs, so 
the computation process is conducted individually for each group. 
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Horizontal grouping enhances the information gained by splitting data logically, instead 
of randomly. This is further explained in Chapter 5. Moreover, this grouping fits the 
MapReduce framework by staging data from map to reduce. In horizontal grouping, data 
are grouped several times, becoming smaller each time. In horizontal grouping, 
algorithms do not need to load a massive quantity of data with multiple iteration times; 
instead, data are dramatically reduced each iteration time. This grouping method 
enhances information gain, equivalency increase and granularity. Let us further study 
each type of vertical and horizontal grouping. 
3.2.3.1 Grouping Data Vertically 
MDSBA splits Q-IDs into small groups of two to four Q-IDs. The groups are chosen 
based on business roles. Personal information and related auxiliaries can be categorised 
based on users’ interests. In MDSBA, the aim is including all or most personal attributes 
in Q-IDs. This increases the total number of Q-IDs, so there should be a method to deal 
with this large number of Q-IDs. Referring to users’ various needs and the increased 
number of Q-IDs, it is possible that each Q-ID group can be mapped to a business role. 
For example, a human resource administrator may focus on the patient’s address, age 
and salary, while a radiologist may focus on the cancer type, status and size. The 
mapping between Q-ID groups and roles will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
We may describe the vertical grouping definition by denoting N as the number of 
records and m as the total number of attributes. The data owner defines the number of 
Q-IDs as Q in m attributes, so Q ≤ m. Each two to four Q-IDs are aggregated in a group, 
G(QID), so the number of created groups, denoted by ϒ, is related to the total number of 
Q, and can be presented by 
𝑄
4
 ≤ ϒ ≤  
𝑄
2
 , where ϒ = ∑𝐺(𝑄𝐼𝐷). Each non-overlapped 
G(QID) group consists of Q-IDs and one class, which is usually mapped to one or more 
business roles, R. Let us also denote U as a user, so the role-based anonymisation 
control is presented as {G(QID)  R} (many-to-many relationship), and {R  U} 
(many-to-many relationship). The vertical grouping principle is described by the 
following definition: 
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Definition 3.1: A table T contains a Q number of Q-IDs and a C number of classes. Q-
IDs are grouped vertically by dividing Q and C attributes into ϒ groups. Each G(QID) 
group contains one class attribute and two to four Q-ID attributes. In other words, 2 ≤ 
G(QID) ≤ 4, and C = 1. 
The vertical grouping divides Q attributes into small groups of two to four Q-IDs, with 
one class attribute. Each Q-ID group, G(QID), is mapped to a business role and given a 
fixed value of k. In this manner, users are provided authorisation rights to access some 
Q-ID groups as per their given business role. Let us study the following example to 
illustrate the access control structure. Five users = {user1, user2, … ,user5} have 
requested to access the following two Q-ID groups: G(QID)1 = {admission_date, 
cancer_found(yes/no), diagnosis(class)}, and G(QID)2 = {age, job, suburb, 
salary(class)}. G(QID)1 is mapped to ‘Doctor’ and given a value of k = 20, and 
G(QID)2 is mapped to ‘Finance Manager’ and given a value of k = 30. Suppose that 
users are given the following roles: {user1(Doctor1), user2(Doctor2), user3(F. 
Manager1), user4 (F. Manager2) and user5(Doctor + F. Manager). Each of these users 
will be given a value of ?̄? to represent owthe nership level. The values are provided in 
Figure 3.4. This figure illustrates the core base of access control management in 
MDSBA. The access granularity is presented by giving the G(QID) groups fixed k 
values, and giving users variable values of ?̄?. The k value determines the maximum 
optimal value for each group, G(QID). 
Chapter 6 illustrates the method of finding the optimal k value. Each user is given a 
value of ?̄?, which determines the user’s access level. Users with higher access privileges 
obtain low values of ?̄?, and vice versa. In Figure 3.4, Doctor 1 gains more information 
than Doctor 2 when accessing G(QID)1, while neither doctor is permitted to access 
G(QID)2. Similarly, Finance Manager 2 gains more information than Finance Manager 
1 when accessing G(QID)2, while neither manager is permitted to access G(QID)1. The 
figure also shows the possibility of assigning more than one business role to a specific 
user. In Figure 3.4, User 5 has permission to access both groups, since he or she was 
assigned to both business roles. User 5 will gain high information from G(QID)1 and 
low information from G(QID)2. 
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Figure 3.4—Access control structure in MDSBA 
3.2.3.2 Grouping Data Horizontally 
It is evident that, in most datasets, records equivalency increases in parallel with data 
growth [5]. Therefore, splitting data nominally may increase the data equivalency. A 
random data split ignores the distribution of equivalent records in tables. For instance, 
Adult data that contain the following attributes—patient’s age, gender and education 
attributes—may appear similar in the first 1,000 records, and then related records may 
appear again at the end of the table. The random appearance of similar records may 
reduce the number of equivalency when splitting data into small random chunks, which 
increases data masking. 
The following four definitions describe the horizontal split of data by implementing the 
grouping method of equivalency in MDSBA. It was proven earlier that splitting data 
nominally would increase the equivalency ratio. Let us consider a dataset, D, with a total 
number of m attributes and N records. The data owner defines the number of Q-IDs as Q 
in m attributes, so Q ≤ m. Let some k records have similar values in part of the Q-ID 
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attributes, denoted by q, where q attributes are part of Q, so q ≤ Q ≤ m. Hence, the 
wholly or partly similar records are defined as follows:  
Definition 3.2: All D records are split based on the class C values. Each set of records 
that contains a similar class value is aggregated in a Gi group, where i denotes the 
number of values appearing in the class C. Every Gi group is further processed 
individually. 
Definition 3.3: The fully-equivalent group (SG) contains some k equivalent records in 
some Q attributes. For this group, there is no any anonymisation process applied. 
Definition 3.4: The semi-equivalent group (SSG) contains some k equivalent records in 
some q attributes, where 2 ≤ q ≤ Q-1. The highest Q-ID probability is usually chosen for 
q attribute equivalency. The anonymisation is applied to the rest of the non-equivalent 
Q-IDs. 
Definition 3.5: The non-equivalent group (NG) contains a number k of equivalent 
records in some q attributes, where the number of q = 1. The highest Q-ID probability is 
usually chosen for the q attribute. The anonymisation is applied to the rest of the non-
equivalent Q-IDs. 
As explained in Definitions 3.4 and 3.5, the SSG and NG anonymisation is applied to 
the lowest Q-ID probabilities. For instance, the Q-IDs probabilities in the Adult data are 
P[Age] = 0.01, P[Gender] = 0.5 and P[Edu] = 0.08. Based on these values, the SSG 
anonymisation will be applied to the Q-ID with the lowest probability, which is [Age]. 
Thus, the semi-equivalency is measured by grouping the Gender and Edu attributes, 
while the Age attribute is anonymised as per interval. The NG anonymisation will be 
applied to all Q-IDs, except the Q-ID with the highest probability. In our example, the 
anonymisation will be applied to [Edu] and [Age], while records are grouped as per 
[Gender] equivalency. 
The MDSBA framework splits data recursively to create three dependent stages of 
MapReduce processes. Stage 1 aims to produce Gi groups for the whole dataset with one 
Pig command only, which filters each data record based on its class attribute, as 
described in Definition 3.2. The number of the produced Gi groups relies on the number 
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of sensitive class values. For instance, the Seer cancer data contains four values of 
sensitive attribute (Cancer): {no positive histology, positive histology, positive 
microscopic confirm and positive laboratory test}. The four values create four groups of 
Gi = {G0, G1, G2 and G3}. Each group is stored in a separate HDFS location. Stage 2 
filters G groups in parallel to categorise data records between wholly or partly 
equivalent, or between SG and SSG. According to Definitions 3.3 and 3.4, the SG 
groups denote the equivalent Q-ID group, while the SSG groups denote the semi-
equivalent group. The SG groups are equivalent, so anonymisation is skipped, and data 
are stored in an output directory. Stage 3’s input is derived from Stage 2’s output, so 
SSG groups are stored in an input directory waiting for Stage 3. The process begins by 
reading SSG groups and abstracts the non-equivalent groups, denoted by NG. Both NG 
and SSG are anonymised by employing the user-defined function in the Java program. 
In the Adult data example, the Q-ID attributes are grouped by the three Q-IDs—Age, 
Gender and Edu—so the number of equivalent records must be greater than or equal 
to ?̄?. These equivalent records are stored in SG, while the equivalent records with a 
number smaller than ?̄? are stored in SSG. In the second stage, the three attributes are 
grouped again by the largest probability values (Gender and Edu). The equivalent 
records with a number greater than or equal to ?̄? will be anonymised. The 
anonymisation is applied to the attribute with the lowest probability value, which is Age. 
The equivalent records with a number smaller than ?̄? are stored in NG to be further 
grouped and anonymised. 
3.2.4 Mathematical Equations to Calculate the Sensitivity  
As explained before, data are split into several groups or domains vertically and 
horizontally. In each Q-ID group, a different anonymisation is applied depending on the 
user’s access level. The anonymisation process is managed by the value of the 
sensitivity level, ψ, which increases or decreases the information gained from the data. 
Users with a higher value of ψ gain more information, and vice versa. The sensitivity 
level is determined by two major factors: the sensitivity factor, ω, and the ageing factor, 
τ. In datasets, the value of 𝑘 represents the k-anonymity, while ?̄? represents the 
ownership level. A large value of ownership level implies a weak ownership relation; 
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thus, the weakest ownership relation is when ?̄? = 𝑘. The integer values of 𝑘 and ?̄? are 
such that 2 ≤ ?̄? ≤ 𝑘. In other words, low values of ?̄? correspond to reduced anonymity 
as a result of higher ownership relations. The sensitivity factor, ω, is calculated based on 
its maximum and minimum probability values. The maximum probability value of ω is 
defined as: 
𝜔𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃(𝑞𝑖𝑑0), 𝑃(𝑞𝑖𝑑1), 𝑃(𝑞𝑖𝑑2), 𝑃(𝑞𝑖𝑑3))     (3.3) 
The minimum value of ω is defined as the product of all Q-IDs probabilities, or: 
𝜔𝑚𝑖𝑛 = ∏ 𝑃[𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑖] 
4
𝑖=1         (3.4) 
Based on Equations 3.3 and 3.4, the value of ω can be found linearly between ωmin and 
ωmax, as shown in Equation 3.5: 
𝜔 = 𝜔𝑚𝑖𝑛 + (𝑘 − ?̄?) (
𝜔𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝜔𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑘
)       (3.5) 
Equation 3.5 presents a linear relation between ω and ?̄? values. The equation lowers the 
value of ω when the user’s ?̄? value is high, so that the data anonymity is higher. Users 
with fewer privileges are given higher ?̄?, while the value of k is constant. It is also 
proposed that the lowest value of ?̄? should be 2 to avoid unique re-identification. The 
anonymisation is only applied for external organisations’ access. External organisations 
are permitted to access an anonymised copy of the original data, while access to the 
original data is exclusive to the data owners. 
Equation 3.6 collates both terms of ω and τ to compute the sensitivity level, ψ. The 
sensitivity level directly manages users’ access privileges. Higher sensitivity levels lead 
to upper access ranks, where less data masking and concealments are applied. In 
addition, the sensitive nature of an object can be reduced as it is related to the dataset 
age. The ageing factor, τ, affects sensitivity reversely, with consideration of the negative 
values of the ageing factor. Based on their owners’ decisions, old objects can be deemed 
less sensitive, which increases ψ with age. In essence, two factors determine the 
sensitivity level of the data: the sensitivity factor, ω, and the ageing factor, τ, as 
described in Equation 3.6: 
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𝜓 = |𝝎 +  𝝉|          (3.6) 
Equation 3.6 is used to calculate the sensitivity level, ψ, by establishing the sensitivity 
level of an object for a given user’s access level. The masking process tends to find any 
number close to or smaller than the sensitivity value. For instance, if ψ = 0.5, then any 
value between 0 and 0.5 is acceptable. However, values closer to ψ improve the 
information usefulness and granularity precision. For instance, the age interval of [10–
20] is derived from ψ = 0.1, while the age interval of [10–12] is derived from ψ = 0.5. It 
is clear that the small age interval provides more information gain than the large age 
interval. In addition, assigning the value closer to ψ is essential to improve the 
information gain. The ageing factor creates a perturbation to the sensitivity value. This 
factor becomes more significant as the data pass a particular age, known as the 
obsolescence value. Equations 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that a lower sensitivity level requires 
a higher value of ?̄?, which corresponds to lower information gain. In other words, lower 
sensitivity levels correspond to higher anonymisation and masking levels of 
information. 
3.2.4.1 Sensitivity Level and Time Factor 
The ageing factor, τ, depends on four different parameters: the object obsolescence 
value, Ø; the ageing participation percentage, ρ; the object age, y; and the sensitivity 
factor, ω. The Ø value is defined as the critical age before the object sensitivity starts to 
degrade. It can be measured by units of hours, days, weeks, months or years, depending 
on the object’s obsolescence speed. However, Ø cannot be given a value less than 2; 
thus, the value of one year, for example, can be replaced by 12 months. The ageing 
participation percentage, ρ, is an approximation percentage chosen by data owners. It 
measures the ageing factor participation in data objects. The ageing factor, τ, can remain 
constant or decrease linearly. It remains unchanged when the age of the object, y, is less 
than its obsolescence value; hence, it remains constant if y < Ø. In contrast, if the object 
age is greater than or equal to its obsolescence value—that, is y ≥ Ø—then the sensitivity 
level increases logarithmically, which subsequently decreases the anonymisation level. 
These two cases manage the ageing factor, τ, as described by Equation 3.7: 
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𝜏 = {
−𝜌 × 𝜔                             𝑦 < Ø
−𝜌(𝑦−2) × 𝜔 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦              𝑦 ≥ ∅
 
      (3.7) 
 Ø𝜖 ℤ, Ø ≥ 0 , and 𝑦𝜖 ℤ ∶ 𝑦 ≥ 2 
Data owners may set ρ to 0% if their data objects are not affected by time and age. In 
addition, the maximum value of ρ cannot exceed 90% to avoid a nil value for ψ. It can 
be noted from Equation 3.7 that τ is always negative. In other words, the sensitivity level 
ψ increases with the age of the information and the passage of time. Newly created data 
objects result in a lower sensitivity level compared with old data. In other words, if y < 
Ø, then ψ < ω when the ageing factor is incorporated. Equation 3.7 is derived based on 
our proposed ideas for incorporating the ageing factor and sensitivity analysis to 
improve the anonymisation process. It relies on a linear condition ˗ρ × ω and a semi-log 
component (˗ρ(y − 2) × ω × logy). The linear part produces a constant value of the ageing 
factor when the information has not reached its obsolescence value. The semi-log 
portion is derived from the plotted graph, shown in Figure 3.6. The figure illustrates the 
concept that incorporates the age of data objects. Older data are considered to have a 
logistic degradation with age and the passage of time. The degradation starts swiftly, 
before plateauing at the sensitivity factor value, ω. 
To illustrate the time factor effect, let us consider the following example. Social media 
data have an ageing participation value set at 0.9, with an obsolescence value of 15 days 
and a sensitivity factor of 0.4 (ρ = 0.9, ω = 0.4 and Ø = 15). Plotting the data’s 
sensitivity diagram can be initiated by assuming a constant value of the sensitivity 
factor, multiplied by the ageing participation percentage to determine the ageing factor. 
Therefore, τ = ˗ρ × ω = ˗0.36, and ψ = 0.04. Next, a logistic graph can describe the 
sensitivity level increase in direct proportion to the variable y. Data become less 
important with the time pass. The sensitivity level increases dramatically between days 
15 and 30. This sharp increase describes the object degradation importance, which will 
intentionally reduce the obscurity level of data anonymisation. 
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Figure 3.5—Plotted graph to derive Equation 3.6 for ageing factor 
The following example illustrates the calculation steps of sensitivity value, ψ. Consider 
an object with three Q-ID attributes—for example, student IQ test results, similar to 
those shown in Table 3.3. The data owner intends to anonymise the data with k = 20, 
while the obsolescence value, Ø, is set to 10; the ageing participation, ρ, is 70%; and the 
age of the object, y, is 13 years. Now suppose a user was given an ownership value ?̄? = 
10. Based on the given attributes, the sensitivity level ψ can be calculated using 
Equations 3.4 and 3.5. To determine the sensitivity factor, ω, it can be noted that the 
values of ωmax = max (0.01, 0.005, 0.125) is 0.125 and ωmin = 0.01 × 0.005 × 0.125 is 
6.25 × 10-6. The value of ω as per Equation 3.4 is ω ≈ 0.063. Based on Equation 3.7, the 
ageing factor τ = ˗(0.7)11 × 0.063 × log (13) can be seen to be ˗0.00138. Therefore, the 
sensitivity level ψ = 0.063 − 0.00138 is found to be 0.062. 
Table 3.3—Three Q-ID attributes example 
Q-ID (Attribute) Q-ID Type Probability 
Q-ID0 (IQ_value) Interval IQ_value = [50–150] P(Q-ID0) = 1/(150 − 50) = 
0.01 
Q-ID1 
(Student_country) 
Taxonomy tree 
Student_Country_Level1 = {German, French, 
Chinese, Kenyan, American …} 
Student_Ancestry-Level2 = {Caucasian, Asian, 
Middle Eastern, African, Red Indian …} 
Q-id_level-3 = {human} 
 
 
P(Q-ID1-L2) = 1/150 = 0.007 
P(Q-ID1-L3) = 1/200 = 0.005 
Q-ID2 
(Student_Grade) 
Suppression Student_Grade = {A+, A, A-, B+, 
B, B-, C+, C, C-, D+, D, D-, F} 
P(Q-ID2) = 1/13 = 0.077 
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3.2.4.2 Anonymisation Operations 
The anonymisation process can be divided into two main operations. The first operation 
is completed before the anonymisation process starts, which involves determining the 
sensitivity level, ψ. This operation is completed in the federation service side. The 
second operation involves masking Q-ID values by taxonomy tree, suppression or 
discretisation. The second operation relies on the first operation’s result. Any user 
requesting data access is subjected to an authorisation level evaluation. This evaluation 
imposes a mathematical calculation for the sensitivity level, ψ. The value of ψ is then 
used to calculate the degree of masking and the number of equivalent records during the 
grouping process. The algorithm of the anonymisation process is shown in Figure 3.6. It 
provides a brief description of the anonymisation process. The algorithm shows the 
parameters that the program needs to retrieve for the entire operation. The program must 
read the user’s ?̄? and ψ to complete the grouping and masking operations. In addition, 
the program needs to know other parameters, such as the masking type, Q-ID 
probability, Q-ID names and class attributes. These parameters are pre-prepared and 
stored in an Extensible Markup Language (XML) file for each dataset. Two major files 
are linked with the anonymisation operations: the user file and data information file. 
The masking pattern is decided by the data owner, who finds the best-fit mask. In some 
cases, suppressions can be more accurate than intervals, or vice versa, and this depends 
on the data type. The data owner must be accurate when selecting the best masking 
pattern. The masking is applied granularly, depending on the value of ψ. This value 
provides the granularity tool when applying the masking pattern. The masking pattern 
criterion is chosen based on the probability multiplication. The anonymisation results 
should be approximate to the sensitivity level, as described below: 
ψ ≈  ∏ 𝑃𝑖[<∪ Cutj ,∪ Supj ,∪ Intj]  <  1𝑖=1      (3.8) 
Let us consider the following examples of how the masking pattern is applied. In the 
first example, a user was given ψ = 0.04 and ?̄? = 4, while Q-ID = {Age, Gender, 
Suburb}. The probability for each Q-ID is shown in Table 3.4. The created semi-
equivalent records are grouped based on the highest two Q-IDs, and these are P(age) and 
P(Gender). Suppose that the chosen Suburb pattern is the taxonomy tree for Sydney 
Chapter 3—Multidimensional Sensitivity-based Anonymisation Method 
 
77 
suburbs or <Cutj>. The anonymisation process relies on grouping and masking. As 
explained before, the grouping of records is an iterated process. The first grouping stage 
filters out all the fully-equivalent records, while the rest of the non-equivalent records 
are stored in SSG1 waiting for the next stage. In the next stage, the SSG1 group is 
grouped by the highest two probabilities, Gender and Age, while the Suburb1 Q-ID is 
masked by the taxonomy tree. The anonymised suburb should follow the sensitivity rule 
by finding a probable value ≤ ψ. 
In Table 3.5, the first SSG1 record was anonymised by Suburb. Luckily, all suburbs in 
the first record were in Penrith; hence, the generalised value became Penrith, since 
P(Penrith) = 1/40 = 0.025 < 0.04. In the second line, the number of grouped values was 
8. Since the value of ?̄? = 4, the masking can be applied on the four values separately. 
Thus, the first four suburbs are in Mosman, while the remaining four suburbs are mixed 
between different areas. Although three of them are in Mosman, the fourth suburb is 
from another area; thus, it has contaminated the masking level, and extra generalisation 
is needed. For this reason, the masking moves to a higher level in the taxonomy tree, 
which is Sydney. The Mosman value is accepted because P(Mosman) = 0.033 < 0.04. In 
the last record, the suburbs are located in one area, Randwick; however, P(Randwick) = 
0.47, which is > ψ. Therefore, the masking cannot be with Randwick, so Sydney 
masking is chosen. After applying the masking process on the SSG1 records, the 
anonymised data are finally stored in the SG group. 
Table 3.4—Three Q-ID attribute examples 
Q-ID P(Q-ID) Description 
Age 0.01 From 1 to 100 
Gender 0.5 Male, female 
Suburb 0.0001 850 suburbs in Sydney 
 
  
                                                          
1 All the suburbs mentioned in this example are part of the New South Wales state in Australia. 
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Table 3.5—Anonymisation for SSG1 
Age Gender Suburbs in New South 
Wales 
Anonymised Suburbs 
25, 25, 25, 25 F, F, F, F Mulgoa, Colyton, Caddens, 
Penrith 
Penrith, Penrith, Penrith, 
Penrith 
30, 30, 30, 30, 
30, 30, 30, 30 
M, M, M, M, M, 
M, M, M 
Mosman, Balmoral, Chowder, 
Obelisk, Parriwi, Taylors, 
Pearl, Kirkham 
Mosman, Mosman, 
Mosman, Mosman, Sydney, 
Sydney, Sydney, Sydney 
42, 42, 42, 42, 
42 
F, F, F, F, F Kensington, Coogee, Chifley, 
Malabar, Maroubra 
Sydney, Sydney, Sydney, 
Sydney, Sydney 
 
In the second grouping stage, the rest of the SSG1 records are grouped again with the 
highest Q-ID probability. This implies that records will be grouped by Gender only. The 
rest of the two Q-IDs, Age and Suburb, will be anonymised. The probability factor of 
both Q-IDs must not be above the ψ. Table 3.6 illustrates this kind of anonymisation. 
This grouping will result in two records only—male and female. 
Table 3.6—Anonymisation for SSG1 
Age Anonymised Age Gender Suburb Anonymised Suburb 
29, 31, 31, 
32, … 
[25–35], [25–35], 
[25–35], [25–35] 
M, M, M, 
M, … 
Lansvale, Cabramatta, 
Carramar, Yennora, … 
Fairfield, Fairfield, 
Fairfield, Fairfield, … 
22, 25, 32, 
32, 41, … 
[20–35], [20–35], 
[20–35], [20–35], 
[40–45], …  
F, F, F, F, 
F, … 
Kensington, Coogee, 
Chifley, Malabar, 
Maroubra, … 
Randwick, Randwick, 
Randwick, Randwick, 
Randwick, … 
 
As indicated in Table 3.6, the anonymised age is masked by intervals, and the table 
shows only a small part of the data. For security purposes, the minimum interval is set to 
5. The probability factor for the first record is P(total) = P(Fairfield) * P(10-year age 
interval) = 0.037 * 0.1 = 0.0037, which is smaller than ψ. The interval was chosen based 
on the Age values. The first value of the Age record was 29, and the fourth value was 
32. To fulfil the k-anonymity requirements, a minimum of four records must be 
equivalent. Thus, the interval included the first four values. In the second record, the 
Suburb masking of Randwick was not possible in the previous table. However, in this 
stage, the factors of both Q-IDs enabled a lower masking level in the Suburb attribute. 
The comparison of Table 3.5 and 3.6 illustrates the difference between both Suburb 
records. In the first table, the Suburb anonymity was generalised to (Sydney), while, in 
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the second table, the generalising was set to (Randwick). This was related to the 
probability factor decrease. 
It is clear that each record in the previous Table 3.6 contained a long array of values. 
This was due to the Gender grouping. This type of grouping separates all the dataset into 
two compressed records only. Anonymising each of these arrays is not an easy task. 
Here are some facts that we must remember before masking this array. The masking 
pattern is chosen based on the sensitivity value, ψ. The algorithm can be used to 
determine the closest masking pattern. The general algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
Anonymisation methods apply data distortion using masking operations. Masking 
implies a taxonomy tree, suppression or discretisation. The taxonomy tree is the critical 
anatomy for data masking. It implies hiding special information from generalising data. 
For example, if data contains a person’s suburb as ‘Sydney’, then the taxonomy tree 
contains Australia (country)  New South Wales (state)  Sydney (city). In BUG, the 
masking of the first cut is New South Wales, and the second cut is Australia. 
Discretisation means replacing numerical values with a single interval, and is denoted 
by Int. The interval deals with numerical data, where a set of numbers is presented by 
two numerical values for the start and end. Finally, suppression of values means 
replacing all the relevant values with an asterisk (*) or other characters. This operator is 
denoted by ‘Sup’ [15]. In addition, suppression can be presented by other values, such 
as ‘any’ or ‘person’. Some data can be only masked by suppression, such as a person’s 
gender {Male, Female}. Other data can be only anonymised by using interval or a 
taxonomy tree, as shown in Table 3.7. The three masking patterns are presented as 
<∪Cutj, ∪Supj, ∪Intj> [153]. 
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Figure 3.6—MDSBA algorithm 
The sensitivity value of the attribute S is calculated based on the user access level and 
other factors. This sensitivity value is the milestone that determines how the masking 
pattern will be applied on Q-IDs. First, the Q-ID data type is chosen, as shown in Table 
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3.7. Second, the masking pattern is implemented on the chosen data type. This imposes 
three masking tools for anonymisation: taxonomy tree level for the ∪Cutj pattern, 
interval distance for ∪Intj and the number of suppressed digits for the ∪Supj pattern. 
Table 3.7—Masking pattern for some data types 
Masking Pattern Data Type 
∪Cutj, ∪Intj, ∪Supj  Date  
∪Intj, ∪Supj Integer 
∪Cutj Polynomial (Ex. education tree) 
∪Supj Binomial (Ex. Yes/No) 
∪Intj Real 
∪Supj Text 
 
The user access level influences the chosen masking pattern for Q-ID. In Table 3.7, 
some data types can be distorted by any of the three masking patterns, while others 
permit one or two patterns only. For example, postcode can be masked by any of the 
three patterns, while gender can only be suppressed by ∪Supj. In addition, masking 
methods imply different security levels, as explained in the next section. Two main 
types of masking are introduced in MDSBA, as discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2.4.3 Taxonomy Tree Masking Example 
When grouping records, a long array is created containing a large bag of data records. If 
the array is a set of text values that require ∪Cut or taxonomy tree, the algorithm reads 
the masking pattern and applies the masking accordingly. Referring to the Table 3.5 
example, if the array objects for Suburb is arr1 = {Roselea, Mosman, Balmoral, 
Chowder, Obelisk, Cowan, Parriwi, Taylors, Macquarie}, generalising the array objects 
to the first taxonomy level will result in the following array: arra1 = {Hornsby, 
Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, Hornsby, Mosman, Mosman, Ryde}. Next, the 
array is sorted in ascending order: arr1 = {Hornsby, Hornsby, Mosman, Mosman, 
Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, Ryde}. The array objects are now ready for 
equivalency check. The anonymisation program reads a number of ?̄? objects, verifies 
the equivalency and stores them in arr2. In this example, the first group in arr2 is arr2 = 
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{Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, Mosman}, while the second group contains five objects: 
arr3 = {Hornsby, Hornsby, Mosman, Mosman, Ryde}. If the last ?̄? object in arr1 is 
reached, then all remaining objects are read. Also, if the number of the last objects <
2 × ?̄?, then all objects are read and generalised. Given that arr3 objects are non-
equivalent, the generalisation moves to the next taxonomy level. The next level is given 
by Sydney; thus, so the generalisation will be {Syd, Syd, Syd, Syd, Syd}. The final 
array will contain the following objects: arr2 = {Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, Mosman, 
Syd, Syd, Syd, Syd, Syd}. The taxonomy tree anonymisation algorithm is further 
explained in Section 4.3.2.3. 
3.2.4.4 Discretisation Masking Example 
The discretisation or interval is another masking pattern implemented in MDSBA. This 
masking pattern can be more accurate than the taxonomy tree; however, selecting the 
masking pattern is related to the data type. The data type of real, integer or date value 
can be anonymised by intervals. The interval requires a range of minimum (Vmin) and 
maximum (Vmax) values to generalise numbers within the range. The interval range can 
be derived from the ψ value. The interval is calculated by ∪Int = 1/ψ, where UInt ≥ 5. 
Thus, if the interval is smaller than 5, it will be set to 5. Moreover, the minimum and 
maximum intervals are chosen with units of 5 starting from 0, and base five units are 
added to each time extension. Assigning the interval in this manner is essential to 
protect data privacy, especially data on both interval ends. To explain this, let us 
consider two values of {13, 14} and an interval range = 2. The interval can be written as 
[13–15], which clearly indicates the original numbers to the adversary. The idea behind 
creating a range of units is hiding the original numbers from adversaries. 
The algorithm is very similar to the previous taxonomy tree masking. The main essential 
aspect is calculating the interval for each group of array objects. It is apparent that the 
masking process must prioritise taxonomy tree masking if possible. If masking requires 
more than one Q-ID, then the first Q-ID masking must be the taxonomy tree, followed 
by the interval, and finally followed by suppression. The process consists of three main 
IF statements to determine the best interval for each group of objects in the array. The 
numerical array is sorted first. The Q-ID factor is calculated and compared with ψ. If the 
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Q-ID factor ≤ ψ, then the algorithm proceeds with the masking. The range is calculated 
by 𝑃(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦) × 𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙) = ψ, so the (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙) =
ψ
𝑃(𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦)
. Eventually, 
we can find the minimum and maximum values of the interval by referring the small 
array object to the low unit of 5, and adding the found interval to the minimum value to 
determine the Vmin. For instance, if the minimum value is 6 and the interval is 7, then the 
Vmin = 5 and the Vmax = 15 as a result of (5 + 7 = 12). It is clear that both minimum and 
maximum values must refer to the base five rule.  
After determining the interval, the algorithm loops for all objects in the array. The first 
IF statement finds all objects between the minimum and maximum values. The second 
IF statement is only used when the objects are the last in the array. The third IF 
statement verifies whether the number of objects within the interval fulfils the ?̄? value. 
The last IF statement creates the intervals. To understand the anonymisation algorithms, 
a few more examples are illustrated in Section 4.3.2.4. 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed a large part of MDSBA, including general definitions, 
grouping and probability methods. This chapter has proven that data equivalency 
increases in parallel with the general growth of data. This raises the need to reconsider 
big data anonymity techniques. Four characters were identified as necessary when 
developing any big data anonymity method: equivalency increase, information gain and 
security, parallel algorithm and granular access. This chapter explained how sensitivity-
based anonymisation method has benefited from big data characteristics. This novel 
method is able to provide access control for multiple levels of user access. The main 
concept of MDSBA is dividing datasets into small groups of attributes (vertically) and 
equivalent groups of records (horizontally). These two types of grouping help 
parallelisation of data operations over multiple nodes. Big data must operate in a large-
scale framework, such as Spark or Hadoop. These frameworks require special 
algorithms that can cope with the framework structure. This chapter discussed two main 
masking tools: taxonomy tree and discretisation. The operation sequence assigns the 
taxonomy tree filtration first, and then assigns discretisation or interval. 
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The next chapter experiments MDSBA efficiency and performance. MDSBA will be 
further examined and compared with the other popular anonymisation methods. Hadoop 
framework and ecosystems (such as Pig) will be applied with several scripts to examine 
the efficiency and performance of anonymising data with MDSBA. 
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4 IMPLEMENTING SENSITIVITY-
BASED ANONYMISATION WITH 
HADOOP ECOSYSTEMS 
 
The MapReduce transaction method is different from the more traditional transaction 
procedure in the analytics process. MapReduce divides the data processing into two 
main tasks: reading data from multi-repositories and aggregating results in reduced 
output. MapReduce imposes a new method of disposition in privacy-related operations. 
The anonymisation process should be amended to fit the reading, shuffling and reducing 
of data, as per the MapReduce environment. Some privacy preservation methods are 
modified to fit the MapReduce framework and perform parallel data-intensive 
computations on commodity computers [23]. Computation reads input data from a 
distributed file system, which splits the data into multiple chunks. Each chunk is 
assigned to a mapper that reads the data, performs some computation, and emits a list of 
key/value pairs. In the next phase, the reduce phase combines the values belonging to 
each distinct key according to some functions, and writes the result to an output file. The 
framework ensures fault-tolerant execution of mappers and reducers, while scheduling 
them in parallel on any node in the system [144]. 
The MapReduce operations include split, map, shuffle and reduce; thus, any practical 
security solution should consider these transactions. Any tweaking in the available 
algorithms should consider the milestones of the scale-up efficiency and data privacy 
[152]. Recently developed methods in k-anonymity moved towards finding 
parallelisation techniques in the anonymisation algorithms. The techniques should be 
able to split the massive quantities of data into smaller blocks so that the algorithms can 
overcome the intensive and recursive computation operations. Several methods have 
split data for parallelisation randomly, such as the two-phase multidimensional TDS 
method [153] and the method proposed by Sowmya et al. [134]. 
Anonymisation methods were proposed during the early release of Hadoop. Currently, 
MapReduce can be easily implemented by using Pig Latin, Hive or Spark, which 
enables MapReduce to function more easily. The old anonymisation methods require 
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indirect methods that can provide better-performed operations. Previously, Hadoop 
scripts were implemented by programming languages only, such as Java. Currently, Java 
can be replaced by ecosystems (such as Pig Latin or Hive) for many operations, while 
Java use can be reduced to a minimum and used only when necessary. 
Before implementing an appropriate parallelisation algorithm, the security of 
MapReduce when operating big data analytics should be investigated. As mentioned in 
the previous chapters, security is one of the main concerns when building any 
anonymisation framework. Security concerns encompass the three main types of attack: 
state, link and time attacks. The main security threats involve state and link attacks. A 
state attack may occur against data and queries; thus, users’ queries, analytics results, 
and the analytics process must be protected. A link attack leads to a privacy attack, 
which includes all kinds of data re-identification. Section 4.1 presents Hadoop structure 
and ecosystems. Section 4.2 describes Hadoop security and protection through the 
MapReduce framework. Since MapReduce is the dominant framework for MDSBA, the 
security and protection methods should be partially related to Hadoop security. Securing 
Hadoop is a safeguard for analytics protection. Section 4.3 deploys MDSBA by using 
Hadoop ecosystems. The last three sections compare, experiment, and measure the 
performance of MDSBA. 
4.1 Hadoop in Data Analytics 
Hadoop is a MapReduce framework that can process a large quantity of data. Many 
open-source frameworks were recently developed for parallel distributed processing. 
The massive growth of data has urged developers to produce more efficient computation 
operations and frameworks, and Hadoop MapReduce gained popularity for its flexible 
core design. Since the development of Hadoop Version 2, one major Hadoop component 
has been added to deal with several newly developed frameworks, known as YARN. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, in Hadoop’s new Versions 2 and 3, YARN took over cluster 
management from MapReduce. Data management is handled by several ecosystems, 
such as Sqoop, Flume, Pig, Hive, Spark and Storm. The principle of Hadoop has 
dramatically changed since Version 2. This jump in the core design indicated the need to 
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change the analytics techniques, as the majority of the previously developed data 
analytic and anonymisation methods were related to the first version of Hadoop [149]. 
The new versions of Hadoop provide a set of ecosystems to facilitate data analytics 
tasks. Hadoop ecosystems operate with tools residing at the top of Hadoop. These tools 
are essential for big data management and operations. The tools may be protected by 
applying security features to the Hadoop core. The security features of Hadoop consist 
of authentication, service-level authorisation, authentication of web console and data 
confidentiality. The Hadoop core structure comprises three main parts that should be 
protected: HDFS, YARN and JobHistory. The three parts are secured by using Hadoop 
secure mode; thus, each user and service needs to be authenticated by Kerberos before 
accessing Hadoop services [75]. 
 
Figure 4.1—Comparison of Hadoop Versions 1 and 2 
As aforementioned, Hadoop security is able to protect data, user access and processes. 
These three services can be protected by Hadoop secure mode. Hadoop secure mode can 
protect against a state attack, yet is unable to protect data against a privacy attack. A 
privacy attack appears at the data level by authorised users, who should not be able to 
explore sensitive data. Private and sensitive data cannot be available to every authorised 
user. Instead, limited users should be eligible to access such sensitive data. An 
authorised user refers to a user who is permitted to access all or part of the data. 
Big data are correlated to many users, which increases the possibility of unauthorised 
access and security breach. There is a need for a framework that can organise and 
control the amount of data accessed by implementing access control methods. Hadoop 
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security features are unable to provide such a level of data protection; hence, Hadoop 
security features only secure data from unauthorised access, without providing robust 
access control. 
4.1.1 Hadoop Core 
Hadoop Version 1 implemented a JobTracker daemon service to submit and track 
MapReduce jobs. In Version 2, this was replaced by a resource manager (YARN). This 
resource manager, located in NameNode, communicates regularly with the node 
manager, located in DataNode. The node manager continuously provides the resource 
manager with available resources from disks, CPU and RAM. If a client launches a job, 
the application master, located in NameNode, creates a list of map tasks, and requests 
containers from the resource manager to execute the tasks. The resource manager 
responds by creating many containers on the available nodes. The number of containers 
depends on the available resources in each node of the cluster. Each container is a single 
Java virtual machine (JVM) that is mapped to one or more tasks [32]. 
4.1.2 Hadoop Ecosystems 
The phrase ‘Hadoop ecosystems’ has been generalised to include any recently 
developed frameworks that operate at the top of Hadoop. For example, Spark and Storm 
are known as Hadoop ecosystems. Most developed big data frameworks implement one 
of the Hadoop components for data processing. The new Hadoop versions (Versions 2 
or 3) can accommodate several frameworks by keeping the YARN engine at the top of 
the nodes management. YARN can process multiple tasks at the same time. It boosts 
Hadoop to include any new technologies found within the data centre so that they can 
take advantage of cost-effectiveness, linear-scale storage and processing [10]. 
4.2 Hadoop Security 
By default, Hadoop is shipped with no security mode. Thus, users may access illegal 
files and directories, especially since Hadoop does not provide any authentication 
service. In non-secure mode, users can be created in NameNode servers only, while the 
DataNodes servers may not contain specific usernames. However, YARN is able to 
access all DataNodes if the NameNode is authorised. In secure mode, users must be 
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added to all DataNodes, which is difficult to implement in a multi-user environment. 
However, this can be implemented by creating a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
(LDAP) or Network Inform Service (NIS) domain to contain NameNodes and all related 
DataNodes in one domain. LDAP provides a practical method for single sign-on (SSO) 
over the local network. LDAP and Kerberos are appropriate combinations to secure 
users’ access to services, files and folders. Kerberos and LDAP provide both 
authentication and authorisation levels for users. If LDAP was implemented without 
Kerberos, then users are able to access any data block stored in DataNode with no 
restrictions. In contrast, implementing Kerberos without LDAP obliges administrators to 
add users to every DataNode, which is impractical. For this reason, both LDAP and 
Kerberos services should be implemented together. 
4.2.1 Establishing LDAP Domain in Hadoop 
LDAP domain is an essential part of Hadoop security mode. Kerberos is essential in the 
LDAP domain. It provides a proper security level; thus, the created keys are mapped to 
domain users by assigning a security identifier to each user. Hadoop NameNodes and 
DataNodes should be available in one domain. In UNIX, the domain can be established 
by NIS, LDAP, DNS or BIND [16]. The domain service is essential in distributed 
environments because domains can centralise login procedures by implementing SSO. 
Users need to access the domain NameNode with an SSO; hence, the rest of the 
DataNodes in the cluster should inherit the authorisation and authentication details. 
Newly created users are merely added to the centralised LDAP server to gain 
authorisation and authentication access. LDAP with Kerberos are highly recommended 
for their compatibility in protecting network objects [89]. 
The MDSBA framework adopts both Kerberos and LDAP services to provide a level of 
authorisation and authentication. Figure 4.2 illustrates the Hadoop domain structure in 
MDSBA. The service provider establishes a gateway between the user’s access point 
and Hadoop domain. A centralised server contains the LDAP service to connect all 
NameNodes and DataNodes of the Hadoop cluster. New users must be added to the 
LDAP server before being authorised to access NameNode. The authorisation includes 
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some UNIX processes, Hadoop processes, local directories and specified directories in 
HDFS. 
 
Figure 4.2—Kerberos and LDAP server in MDSBA 
4.2.2 Applying Kerberos for Hadoop Secure Mode 
One of the essential Hadoop security features is enabling proper authentication for 
Hadoop services. This can be implemented by providing a Kerberos authentication 
service. Kerberos requires a key distribution centre server that provides the entire 
network with an authentication service and ticket-granting service. Kerberos provides a 
powerful tool to protect the cores of the Hadoop structure, which are HDFS, YARN and 
MapReduce. Protection can be established by various internal secret keys—a delegation 
token, block access token and job token [106]. 
It is essential to generally understand the three Hadoop internal secret keys. The 
delegation token is the first secret key given by Kerberos to the user. Once the user 
attempts to access the NameNode, then he or she will be requested to authenticate 
before being given the delegation token. The second token is the block access token, 
which is implemented for HDFS. Any Hadoop client requesting data from HDFS needs 
to fetch data blocks directly from DataNode after reading the block identification (ID) 
from NameNode. The block access token secures the transfer of user privileges to 
DataNode. The main purpose of the block access token is to ensure that only authorised 
users are able to access the data blocks stored in DataNodes. When a client needs to 
Chapter 4—Implementing Sensitivity-based Anonymisation by Hadoop Ecosystems 
 
91 
access the data stored in HDFS, the NameNode provides the block IDs for the data. 
NameNode verifies the requested user’s permissions for the data and provides the list of 
block IDs and DataNodes locations. The third shared secret key is the job token key, 
which is stored locally with the user’s profile and is used by the Task Tracker to protect 
the user’s submitted task. Thus, the job token ensures that the user who submits a job 
only has access to the authorised local file systems of task nodes [135]. 
Kerberos protects the three entire Hadoop cores and related ecosystems. The three entire 
cores include YARN, HDFS and MapReduce (mapred), while the ecosystem tools 
include Sqoop, Pig, Hive, Oozie, Spark, Flume, HBase and others. YARN is responsible 
for the resource manager, which monitors and manages the node manager and 
application master. In Hadoop Version 2 and higher, YARN manages the infrastructure 
of the Hadoop environment; thus, it acts as an operating system for Hadoop. HDFS is 
the file system responsible for file naming and data block storing and replicating 
between nodes. The third core is (mapred), which manages the MapReduce and 
JobHistory server. The security mode is initiated by creating Kerberos principals in the 
key distribution centre database. Kerberos then creates a key tab file containing pairs of 
Kerberos principals and encrypted keys derived from the Kerberos user password. One 
key tab is created for each of the three main services—HDFS, YARN and mapred. Once 
key tabs are created, they need to be moved to a Hadoop configuration folder, such as 
/usr/hadoop/etc/hadoop/ in CentOS 7. This folder must be accessible to all Kerberos 
users. Moreover, the configuration contains the XML configuration files of core-
site.xml, hdfs-site.xml and mapred-site.xml. These three configuration files are edited to 
map the keytab locations [129]. 
Kerberos follows similar steps in authorising all Hadoop cores and ecosystems. 
NameNode and DataNodes servers must be members of one LDAP domain. To protect 
Hadoop core services and ecosystems, the administrator must create a principal for each 
process, and then a keytab. The keytabs then first need to be copied to the configuration 
folder, and the configuration folder’s path needs to be added to the XML configuration 
files before starting Hadoop services. On the other side, users need to initiate their own 
Kerberos key by using ‘kinit’ command after authenticating throughout the LDAP 
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domain services. Figure 4.3 describes the steps that administrators should follow to 
secure any service by Kerberos. In Hadoop’s case, the steps include [103]: 
1. creating service principals for YARN, HDFS and mapred 
2. creating keytabs for the three services 
3. copying keytabs to the Hadoop configuration folder 
4. updating Hadoop XML configuration files with the keytab locations 
5. starting Hadoop. 
 
Figure 4.3—Kerberos general steps to secure services by administrators 
4.3 Deploying Sensitivity-based Anonymisation by 
Using Hadoop Ecosystems 
4.3.1 Pig Core Structure 
MapReduce specifications and the available tools should be considered when working 
with Hadoop. Before delving into MDSBA technical details, we should be aware of the 
Hadoop programming tools and general structure. MDSBA is structured and 
implemented based on Hadoop ecosystem scripts, such as Pig Latin and Spark. Pig Latin 
is a programming tool that provides a high-level platform for Apache Hadoop 
operations. Pig can execute scripts in three different modes—local, Tez and 
MapReduce. The local mode is fast, reliable and suitable for developers. In local mode, 
all scripts are run on a single machine without requiring Hadoop MapReduce or HDFS. 
When running local mode, the Pig program runs in the context of a local JVM, and data 
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access is accomplished via local file systems on a single machine. In MapReduce mode, 
Pig script is executed on the Hadoop cluster. In this case, Pig script is converted into a 
series of MapReduce jobs that are then run on Hadoop [114]. 
The Pig compiler resides at the top of YARN and HDFS, which results in the client 
being responsible for running the script. Pig Latin is a combination notation of SQL-like 
and Java idiom. It allows three modes of user interaction: interactive, batch and 
embedded mode. In interactive mode, the client is presented with an interactive shell, 
called Grunt. The interface allows users to interact commands line by line. This mode is 
suitable for developers and debuggers. Batch mode is the production mode, where users 
write complete codes in files with extensions of (. pig). Finally, in embedded mode, Pig 
is provided with Java library source [46].  
Pig controls the data flow of tuples by creating data bags and maps. The bags are 
aggregated tuples of potentially varying structures, which may contain duplicates. Pig 
Latin was designed based on functional reactive programming. This programming 
depends on lazy evaluation and the push/pull model. Pig was designed by pull or 
(iterator) model through the execution pipeline. The pull model was chosen by Pig 
developers over the push model for many considerations, such as UDF and bags nested 
inside tuples [116]. Pig operates in a similar way to Hadoop, and includes map, sort, 
combine, shuffle, merge and reduce. Data are aggregated by tuples to create bags, which 
leverage execution performance and speed. Pig Latin operator is triggered by either 
(DUMP) or (STORE), which is known as evaluation. Without a (STORE) command, the 
operator does not execute any task. This has an advantage in the logical plan because it 
may optimise the program structure by using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) [48]. 
Moreover, if more than one STORE command is in the script, the data are split and 
multiplexed, so they are processed in parallel [77]. 
One of the technical difficulties that may face developers of big data models is JVM’s 
limited heap memory. JVM developers recommend a maximum of 25% memory 
allocation of the total RAM. If this maximum percentage is applied in big data 
operation’s tools, there will be a large memory waste and Java heap memory errors [37]. 
In the MapReduce structure, JVM may allocate the major portion of the memory, which 
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is greater than 25% of the memory. This uses the memory usage in JVM, which reduces 
the Java heap memory errors. Therefore, it is more efficient to execute programmes 
using JVM through MapReduce, rather than using locally created JVMs. Since UDF is 
executed by local JVMs, it can be considered a bottleneck in MapReduce. Avoiding a 
large data size flowing to UDF is essential to reduce error rates by Java heap memory 
failure. 
However, reducing the size of data flowing to UDF does not completely prevent 
operations failure. When using Pig, there is the possibility of passing a large quantity of 
data bags to the database system—known as materialisation. In the usual case, Pig Latin 
is able to cope with a large size of bags by grouping two or more bags. However, 
memory overflow may appear in Pig because of the materialisation of large bags of 
tuples between and inside operators. In some cases, Pig needs to materialise large bags 
inside the pipeline for holistic bag computation. For this reason, another technique arises 
to avoid the overflow—called ‘spill’. This technique transfers some data rows to the 
disk in a temporary location. In a few cases, the spill may fail to manage the large data 
flow, which causes an error of (out-of-memory) exemption. Such an error can be 
avoided by increasing JVM heap memory or modifying Pig Latin scripts, or both actions 
[47]. 
Pig is still under development and a considerable number of concerns have not yet been 
resolved. Pig lacks optimised storage structures, such as indexes and column groups. 
Moreover, Pig shell requires a considerable time to start and to clean up jobs. It was 
developed merely for batch processing; therefore, it is inefficient for data streams. Pig 
Latin language is inefficient to complete some programming algorithms, such as 
iteration, nested iteration and IF statements. Therefore, developers need to implement 
many UDF programs. In UDF, error messages are general and unclear. Developers 
agree that the biggest advantage of Pig is the simplicity of coding Pig Latin script, and 
the smooth logic of data flow [69], unlike the coding complexity in Spark, as discussed 
next. As shown in Figure 4.4, the Pig compiler resides at the top of Hadoop. The script 
may run through the Hadoop editor, known as Grunt, or by using a UNIX terminal. The 
script is stored in a file extension of (.pig). The Pig Latin commands and structure differ 
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from the programming structure of Java, and also differ from SQL idioms and notations 
[125]. 
 
Figure 4.4—Illustration of Pig structure 
In this chapter, the following experiments apply Java in UDF programs only. The main 
script is encoded by Pig Latin, which recalls Java/UDF program from within the main 
script. The script reads data by using the Hadoop reading process. The process splits 
data into large blocks of 128 MB, and each block is mapped to a DataNode. The 
framework ensures fault-tolerant execution of mappers and reducers while scheduling 
them in parallel by using the job scheduler that is available in NameNode [144]. 
MapReduce evolves the use of parallel and distributed computing for a large data size, 
which may exceed tens of terabytes. MapReduce uses split, map, shuffle and reduce; 
therefore, any practical security solution should consider these main processes [152]. 
MDSBA mimics the MapReduce operational steps. The data block size (128 MB) is 
large enough to accommodate the large size of big data. Traditionally, the SQL language 
is the database dominator to manage and alter data. Hive is the data warehouse system 
for Hadoop, which aims to simplify Hadoop usage for data workers by providing an 
SQL-like language for Hadoop [15]. Pig Latin is another Hadoop tool that manages the 
warehouse system by using a proprietary scripting language. Pig Latin treats data as a 
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set of tuples, which supports tackling very large datasets. As such, substantial 
parallelism and a slew of optimisation techniques are supported. Pig provides 
customised support for the UDF by supporting many common languages, such as Java, 
Python [116], JavaScript, Ruby [117] and Groovy [118]. Similar to Hive, Pig supports 
ad-hoc queries, joins and other SQL-like operations [19]. Pig Latin is a combination 
notation of SQL-like and Java idiom; however, Pig cannot implement high-level 
programming notations; therefore, UDF is essential. [20].  
 
Figure 4.4—Pig structure at the top of the processing engine 
MDSBA is proposed mainly for the MapReduce structure. MDSBA divides the 
anonymisation into multi-jobs, including reading, filtering, grouping and filtering data 
again to create SG and NG groups. The master server divides the user’s query into the 
multi-job process, and each job is divided into multi-tasks. MDSBA aims to reduce the 
processing time in each DataNode by splitting tasks logically among the distributed 
system in the cluster. 
4.3.2 Anonymisation by Pig Latin Scripts 
MDSBA was proposed to fit the new Hadoop ecosystems. One of Hadoop’s ecosystems 
is Pig, which is used to program MapReduce in an SQL-like script. Pig script is essential 
to anonymise data before permitting user access. The script is generated based on some 
XML files received from the federation service or the SSO authority. The XML file 
contains the user’s access level, which consists of ?̄? and ψ values. More details on the 
general structure of the MDSBA framework are described in the next chapter. The Pig 
algorithm relies on vertical and horizontal grouping when applying anonymisation. The 
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vertical grouping is applied by dividing the data attributes into small Q-ID groups, 
where each group, G(QID), may comprise two to four Q-IDs. The groups are created 
before commencing the anonymisation process. Each group is mapped to one or more 
business roles. In contrast, vertical grouping is applied during the anonymisation process 
to fulfil the k-anonymity conditions. Vertical grouping comprises four different types of 
groups: G, SG, SSG and NG. The grouping was explained in Section 3.2.3. 
This section focuses on implementing vertical grouping by Pig Latin script. Vertical 
grouping is the core concept of data anonymisation in MDSBA. The Pig Latin algorithm 
can be divided into four major procedures: filtering, grouping, ungrouping and masking. 
The first two procedures are accomplished by Pig Latin script, while UDF accomplishes 
ungrouping and masking. An SQL-like script has the capabilities of grouping and 
filtering data records, yet ungrouping and masking may require a high-level language to 
execute more complicated algorithms. The basic principle of anonymisation involves 
dividing the anonymisation process into stages. The number of stages varies depending 
on the number of G(QID). As described before, a Q-ID group may contain two to four 
Q-ID attributes; hence, the number of generated scripts depends on the number of Q-ID 
attributes in the group. If the number of Q-ID groups is G(QID) = 4, then there are four 
processing stages. If the number of Q-ID groups is G(QID) = 3, then there are three 
processing stages. Finally, if the number of Q-ID groups is G(QID) = 2, then there are 
two processing stages. Figure 4.6 illustrates four stages for G(QID) = 4, while Figures 
4.7A and 4.7B illustrate three and two stages for G(QID) = 3 and G(QID) = 2, 
respectively. 
The figures show the stages that begin with filtering each sensitive class value and 
storing them in a separate G group. Each G group is processed individually. The filter of 
the class value is essential to reduce the shuffling times in the reduce phase. It also 
supports the parallelisation of large data size by splitting data logically and distributing 
loads among the cluster nodes. In each stage, the full-equivalent records are aggregated 
in an SG output. These records do not need any further masking or processes. In the first 
stage, the Pig Latin script can achieve this aggregation of SG output by following three 
methods: GROUP, COUNT and FILTER. The GROUP clause in SQL-like is used to 
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arrange identical attributes into groups to conclude data bags. The COUNT clause 
follows GROUP to count the number of aggregated records, which represents the 
number of equivalent records in each data bag. Finally, FILTER is used in collaboration 
with a conditional statement to filter out the number of equivalent records greater 
than ?̄?. The three commands syntax for three Q-IDs can be presented as below: 
• G = GROUP data by (QID1, QID2, QID3). 
• SG = for each G, generate COUNT (data) as cnt: long, data.QID1 as QID1, 
data.QID2 as QID2, data.QID3 as QID3. 
• SG_1 = FILTER SG by (cnt > = ?̄?). 
 
Figure 4.6—Four processing stages to anonymise four Q-ID group 
In the following stages, and after the first stage, the SSG groups cannot be converted to 
SG groups by following similar clauses of GROUP, COUNT and FILTER; instead, the 
UDF program accomplishes this task. This is because the masking operation is needed 
for semi-equivalent records. In the first stage, masking is not required, so there is no 
need for UDF programs. However, the next stage requires masking operations for the 
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semi-equivalent records. Therefore, the UDF program can apply masking before 
filtering out the equivalent records. The UDF program can complete both tasks of 
masking and aggregating the SG records. 
Figure 4.6 is divided into four main stages. Each stage generates a set of data groups. 
Stage 1 filters or splits data based on class values to generate G groups. Loading data 
from the HDFS location implement this and before the split, so each class value is 
created in a separate G group. Each G group is then processed separately. After creating 
G groups, a GROUP command is applied to all Q-ID attributes for each G group. In the 
case of four Q-ID attributes, four Q-ID attributes are grouped for equivalency. The idea 
is to group all Q-ID attributes to filter the full-equivalent records and store them in the 
SG location. The non-equivalent records are stored in a separate SSG1 location. In Stage 
2, the largest three Q-ID probability values of SSG1 data will be grouped for semi-
equivalency. The records that pass the semi-equivalency criteria are further anonymised. 
The anonymisation is applied to the lowest probability value of Q-ID attributes and 
finally stored in the SG location. The records that fail the semi-equivalency criteria are 
stored in the SSG2 location for the next stage. In Stage 3, a similar concept is applied to 
a semi-equivalent group, before applying anonymisation. 
 
Figure 4.5—Anonymisation process of three and two Q-ID groups 
In the four Q-ID cases, the anonymisation process aggregates the highest Q-ID 
probability values, while the lowest Q-ID probability values are anonymised. It is an 
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iteration process of aggregating four Q-IDs first, followed by three, and then two, and 
finally one. If the aggregation includes three Q-IDs, then the fourth Q-ID is anonymised. 
If the aggregation includes two Q-IDs, then the remaining two Q-IDs are anonymised, 
and so on. Figure 4.7 illustrates the anonymisation process in the cases of three and two 
Q-IDs. 
However, in all previous stages, the grouping command is cumbersome. The command 
compresses the records format and transposes data from horizontal to vertical. Because 
the grouped records cannot be re-grouped, we need a program that can adjust the 
grouped records back to their original format [114]. A UDF Java program was 
developed to read the data as bags and converts them back to tuples, named 
(ADJUST.java). All grouping processes are filtered by comparing their number of 
records with the ?̄? value—if they are larger, then anonymisation will occur. Stage 2 
filters three Q-ID attributes of SSG1 data, so if count ≥ ?̄?, then SSG_P1 Java program 
will anonymise the data before storing them in the SG group. Otherwise, data are stored 
in the SSG2 group for the next stage. In Stage 3, the SSG2 data will be grouped by the 
largest two Q-ID attributes. The data will then be anonymised by SSG_P2. In the final 
fifth stage, records are grouped by the highest QID probability and anonymised either by 
NG_P if ≥ ?̄? or by SUP_P if < ?̄?. A complete Pig script for Adult data is available in 
Appendix 1, with three Q-ID attributes. 
The created SG groups of equivalent records are collected together under one HDFS 
directory. In Figure 4.6, every G group produces SG groups, including, SG1-1, SG1-2 
… SG1-5. The SG groups are collected and merged into one file. Notice that groups of 
G, SSG and NG are all temporary and must be converted to SG by applying the masking 
processes. As aforementioned, the first stage groups and filters data with a need for UDF 
programs. In the next stage, the UDF programs apply masking, aggregate SG records 
and ungroup the grouped records. 
4.3.2.1 Pig Latin Script Example 
Let us study the following example of anonymising data by implementing the Pig Latin 
script, as shown in Figure 4.8. The anonymisation is applied to Seer cancer data. Table 
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4.1 shows the suggested Q-IDs and the probability for each attribute. Table 4.2 shows 
the class attributes with four sensitive values. 
Table 4.1—Seer cancer data Q-IDs and probability 
 Year of Diagnosis [int] County [int] Race [chararray] Age [int] 
Data 1973–2012 80 COUNTY BLACK, WHITE, OTHERS 0–85 
Probability 0.025 0.013 0.33 0.012 
Table 4.1—Seer cancer data class (four sensitive values) 
Diagnostic 
No positive histology 
Positive histology 
Positive microscopic confirm 
Positive laboratory test 
 
Figure 4.8—Pig Latin script example for the first two stages 
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Suppose that data owner assigns k = 400 and ageing factor τ = ˗0.02. A user attempts to 
access these data with an ownership level ?̄? = 250. Referring to Table 4.1 and the 
sensitivity equations described in the previous chapter, the 𝜔𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.33 and 𝜔𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 
1.29 × 10-6; thus, the sensitivity factor is found to be ω = 0.124. The data will be 
anonymised with a sensitivity level ψ = ω + τ = 0.124 − 0.02 ≈ 0.122. This sensitivity 
level indicates the anonymisation degree that will be applied on attributes. For instance, 
if four numerical Q-ID attributes need to be anonymised, each attribute can be rewritten 
by a minimum interval distance of 2. The factorial result for the four attributes is 
1
2
×
1
2
×
1
2
 ×
1
2
= 0.063 , which is an accepted value because it is smaller than ψ = 0.122. 
Therefore, if the anonymisation is applied on the four numerical Q-IDs, then the Year of 
Diagnosis can be given intervals of 2, such as (1973–1975), and similar intervals can be 
applied to the rest of the anonymised attributes. However, the interval distance is 
determined based on the minimum and maximum numerical value, and within the semi-
equivalent group. This interval is determined by the UDF program. 
Referring to Figure 4.8, Pig Latin script controls the data flow by dividing the program 
into stages. Stage 1 filters the class attribute into four G groups, as shown in Table 4.2. 
The filtration commands are shown in Figure 4.8, Lines 2 to 6. Each G group is 
processed by grouping all Q-ID attributes (Y_O_D, COUNTY, RACE, AGE) in the first 
stage. Line 9 presents the filter with a conditional statement, where all cnt ≥ 250 are 
equivalent records, and subsequently should be stored in the SG group after adjusting 
them, as shown in Lines 10 and 11. The variable (cnt) counts the number of equivalent 
records, as shown on Line 8. The rest of the data records that cnt < 250 will be 
transferred to ADJUST program, and stored in SSG location, as described in Lines 12 
and 13. In Stage 2, SSG data are retrieved and grouped again, as shown in Lines 15 to 
16. In this stage, the grouping is conducted by only three Q-ID attributes (Y_O_D, 
COUNTRY, RACE). The attribute (Age) is excluded because it is the lowest probability 
value among the four Q-ID attributes, as illustrated in Table 4.2. In this stage, the first 
anonymisation is applied in Line 19 by calling the program SSG_P1, and transferring 
the grouped data to the program SSG_P1. The rest of the data records that cnt < 250 will 
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be transferred to ADJUST program and stored in SSG location, as described in Lines 22 
and 23. 
The rest of the script iterates the same procedures by grouping the two Q-ID attributes 
of (Y_O_D, RACE). The rest of the attributes will be anonymised by SSG_P2 and 
stored in SG location. The final stage groups (RACE) and anonymises the rest of the 
three attributes by the NG_P program. The remaining records will be completely 
suppressed by SUP_P. The previous procedures are repeated for each G group. In the 
Seer data example, the script generates four G groups, as described in Table 4.2. The 
more created G groups will lead to a better distribution of data in parallel. Table 4.2 was 
created and prepared before conducting any anonymisation process. This was essential 
to build Pig script as per the given information about Q-ID probabilities and class 
values. The Pig script is an auto-generated script during the user’s access phase. This 
will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
4.3.2.2 User-defined Function 
In UDF, all registered operations are executed in a black box [80]. A separate JVM is 
created beyond the resource manager scope. YARN does not manage this JVM, and it 
cannot be considered a node container. The created JVM is controlled and managed 
locally by the operating system. YARN registers the UDF file (such as a Java Archive 
[JAR] file), transfers the data to the created JVM, and waits for the output. UDF may 
cause two major problems if used with a massive data size. The first problem is the non-
parallelisation of tasks, which creates a bottleneck for operational performance. The 
second problem is the limited JVM size, which leads to a Java heap memory failure. 
JVM does not spill large data size to disks, but it is possible by using Java code and 
recalling disk-based map library source. If the flowing data size to the UDF is large, 
then the unexpected process termination is high. For these reasons, the implemented 
UDF should be thoroughly studied to mitigate the effects of large data flow. 
In MDSBA, six main UDF Java programs are defined in Pig Latin script: SSG_P1, 
SSG_P2, NG_P, SUP_P, OBV_P and ADJUST. The first three programs anonymise 
data by one Q-ID attribute, as in SSG_P1; by two Q-ID attributes, as in SSG_P2; or by 
three Q-ID attributes, as in NG_P. The program SUP_P suppresses all Q-ID attributes as 
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a last resort. The complete suppression occurs when a few Q-ID bags do not meet the k-
anonymity criteria. The program SSG_P2 is only used when the number of Q-ID = 3. 
The program NG_P may anonymise one, two or three attributes when the total number 
of Q-IDs is two, three or four simultaneously. 
Java files are merged into a JAR file as a UDF program. Six main Java files are created 
to execute the following: masking and ungrouping. In masking processes, there are three 
main algorithms implemented for taxonomy tree, interval and suppression. The aim of 
any created UDF in MDSBA is keeping the algorithm humble, with the minimal number 
of iterations and arrays. This is essential to reduce the data flow from JVM reserved for 
YARN to JVM reserved for UDF. Flowing a massive quantity of data to a black box of 
JVM may create Java heap memory error. Table 4.3 describes the Java programs needed 
for each G(QID) group. 
 
Table 4.2—The required programs for each Q-ID group 
Q-ID Group Programs Used 
G(QID) = 2 ADJUST.java, NG_P.java, SUP_P.java, OBV_G 
G(QID) = 3 ADJUST.java, SSG_P1.java, NG_P.java, SUP_P.java, OBV_G 
G(QID) = 4 ADJUST.java, SSG_P1.java, SSG_P2.java, NG_P.java, SUP_P.java, OBV_G 
 
Six Java programs are encapsulated in one JAR file. However, two main algorithms 
execute the primary masking operations in all anonymisation tasks. Algorithms that 
mask taxonomy trees or intervals are the major two algorithms among the six programs.  
4.3.2.3 Taxonomy Tree Anonymisation Algorithm 
Converting any taxonomy tree to an XML file is essential in anonymisation processes. 
MDSBA adopts a swift conversion method. This method is structured to simplify the 
XML parsing by the anonymisation program. The taxonomy tree is structured from the 
top root element down to the parent elements. Two main nodes are created: root and 
branch. Each branch consists of children and parents. The children are located at the 
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bottom of the node, while parents are presented by the rest of the tree nodes, except the 
root. The taxonomy tree structure is shown in Figure 4.9. 
Figure 4.9 illustrates the parents and children in each branch. Three branches can be 
abstracted from the illustrated taxonomy tree: branch1 = {A, P1, P2), branch2 = {B, P1, 
P2} and branch3 = {C, P2}. However, in XML parsing, it is more reliable to create a 
similarity between XML nodes and all branches should contain an equivalent number of 
objects. In the previous example, each branch should contain three objects so that 
branch3 can be represented by three objects: branch3 = {C, P2, Root}. The object (Root) 
is added to create an equivalent number of objects in all branches. For a better 
understanding, let us consider a taxonomy tree for cars, as shown in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.9—Taxonomy tree structure for XML files 
Figure 4.10 presents an example of a car taxonomy tree with the probability for each 
node. Referring to the structure shown in Figure 4.9, an XML file can be generated as 
illustrated in Figure 4.11. The XML shows the root name and probability value at the 
top of the file, while the branch nodes show both children and parents. Children are 
given in a sequence of values in one sub-node, for <children names = ‘KE series, AE 
series’/>. The XML sample in Figure 4.11 illustrates part of the Figure 4.10 taxonomy. 
When anonymising any value, two conditions must be applied: 
1. The probability of the anonymised value must be equal to or small than ψ.  
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2. The k-anonymity must be fulfilled. 
 
 
Figure 4.10—Example of car taxonomy tree 
To understand these two conditions, let us study this example. Suppose that the 
following values were found in a dataset vehicle = {AE series, AC series, MC series, SV 
series}. Suppose that a user attempts to access this dataset with a value of ψ = 0.4 and ?̄? 
= 3. First, the anonymisation process parses the XML file to match the XML children 
node and vehicle values. Second, the masking process must achieve the first condition, 
as described above. Third, the masking process must achieve the second condition, as 
shown above. The masking of vehicle values is given by the followings: 
• AE series [apply masking]  Corolla [first level]  P(Corolla) = 0.5 
If P(Corolla) ≤ ψ NO [0.5 > 0.4], then move to the second level. 
• Corolla [apply masking]  Toyota [second level]  P(Toyota) = 0.125 
If P(Toyota) ≤ ψ YES [0.125 < 0.4], then stop. 
• AC series [apply masking]  Camry [first level]  P(Camry) = 0.33 
If P(Camry) ≤ ψ YES [0.33 < 0.4], then stop. 
After masking the rest of the values, the semi-final masking will be as follows: 
Vehicle = {Toyota, Camry, Camry, Camry} 
Vehicle
P = 0.0625
Mitsubishi
P = 0.2
Lancer
Magna
P = 0.33
TE series
P = 0.5
Sedan
Wagon
Toyota
P = 0.125
Camry
P = 0.33
AC series
MC series
SV series
Cressida
P = 1
Corolla
P = 0.5
AE series
KE series
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After applying the second condition, the final masking will be as follows:  
Vehicle = {Toyota, Toyota, Toyota, Toyota} 
Note that the final result is more general than the semi-final result. This is because 
generalising Camry to Toyota is the k-anonymity fulfilment. Figure 4.11 shows several 
element nodes. One of these nodes is <parents_no>3</parents_no>, which indicates the 
maximum number of parents in the taxonomy tree. This number is essential for the 
number of iterations in the masking algorithm. In some cases, if the masking was 
pointing to the (Root), then the root probability is compared again with ψ. If the 
sensitivity level is smaller than the probability value of the root, then the value is 
suppressed by using the word (Any). 
 
Figure 4.11—XML file example for the taxonomy tree in Figure 4.10 
In Figure 4.11, nodes like ‘Lancer’ and ‘Cressida’ are presented by three parents and 
one child in the XML file. The element ‘children’ is presented as below:  
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<children names=” Cressida”/> 
While the three parents’ elements are presented as below: 
<parents> 
<parent1> 
<parent1 name=”Toyota”/> 
<parent1 prop=”0.125”/> 
</parent1> 
<parent2> 
<parent2 name=”Root”/> 
<parent2 prop=”0”/> 
</parent2> 
<parent3> 
<parent3 name=”Root”/> 
<parent3 prop=”0”/> 
</parent3> 
</parents> 
Notice that the element ‘Root’ is repeated twice. Such examples of ‘Cressida’ or 
‘Lancer’ contain two levels in the taxonomy tree; however, we have to include three 
levels on creating the XML file. This is because the maximum element contains three 
levels. This concludes that the number of levels in the XML file is determined by the 
maximum number of levels in the taxonomy tree. 
A complete masking algorithm is shown in Figure 4.12. The algorithm verifies the 
number of objects and compares the number with ?̄?. The complete anonymisation in this 
algorithm consists of two nested iterations. The first iteration allows a continuous loop 
until all objects match the value of ψ. The second iteration counts the similar objects, 
and tests whether they are smaller than ?̄?. If so, another masking level is applied. The 
masking generalises the value until reaching the root of the tree. In addition, some 
remaining values in the data bag are added to the anonymised objects, which is similar 
to the above example. 
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Input:array1={a1,a2,a3,…,an}, a∈ R: array objects 
parents_no=readXML(parents_no) 
Processes 
//Anonymise all array objects to parent1 or higher (Initial Anonymisation)  
Do While i < length_of_array(array1) 
   //Check if  parent probability ≤ ψ 
FOR parent=1 TO parents_no 
parent_prob=array1(i).readXML(parent) 
parent_value=array1(i).readXML(parent) 
 
IF  parent_prob ≤ ψ 
BREAK FOR 
END IF 
END FOR 
//Update array1 with the anonymised values 
array1(i)=replace_anonyised_object(parent_value) 
i=i+1 
END While 
//Arrange the array in ascending order 
array1.ascend 
 
Completed=false 
All_greater_than_k=true 
i=1 
count=1 
//Keep anonymising until k-anonymity is applied on all array1 objects 
Do While completed = false 
//Another nested loop to scan array1 objects  
Do While i < length_of_array(array1) 
//IF statement to find the number of equivalent objects 
IF array1(i)=array1(i-1) 
count=count + 1 
ELSE IF count < ?̄? 
All_greater_than_k=false 
//anonymise to a higher parent 
IF parent ≤ parents_no 
parent_value=array1(i-1).readXML(parent) 
//Update the new anonymised value in a reverse order 
h=i 
Do While h > i – count 
array1(h-1)=replace_anonyised_object(parent_value) 
h=h-1 
END While 
//Arrange the array in ascending order 
array1.ascend 
ELSE 
parent_value= array1(i-1).readXML(root_name)           // 
Anonymise  by the root 
//Update the new anonymised value in a reverse order 
h=i 
Do While h > i – count 
array1(h-
1)=replace_anonyised_object(parent_value) 
h=h-1 
END While 
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//Arrange the array in ascending order 
array1.ascend 
END IF 
END IF 
//This condition is for verifying whether to stop the loop or 
continue  
IF All_greater_than_k=true AND i= length_of_array-1 
Completed = true 
END IF 
All_greater_than_k=true 
i=i+1 
count=1 
END While 
END While 
Output: array1={A1, A2, A3 ….An} 
Figure 4.6—Taxonomy masking algorithm 
The algorithm can be summarised in the following steps: 
1. Mask all array objects to Parent 1, 2 or more. 
2. Verify if Parent 1 probability ≤ ψ. 
3. If Parent 1 probability > ψ, then move to Parent 2. Continue moving until 
reaching the root. 
4. If the root probability > ψ, then suppress by (Any). 
5. After anonymising the array, arrange the array in ascending order. 
6. Loop continuously until completed = true. 
7. Scan the array objects and count the equivalency. If the equivalency is smaller 
than ?̄?, anonymise to the next parent. 
8. Continue scanning until there are no equivalent records smaller than ?̄?. 
The UDF program anonymises the taxonomy tree values, and concatenates them with 
the rest of the attributes. The program inputs the data bag with compressed tuples and 
returns the anonymised tuples to the Pig program. For a better understanding of the UDF 
anonymisation procedures, let us consider a substance of Seer data, as shown in Table 
4.1. For this example, let us omit the Age attribute, while keeping the remaining 
attributes: Year of Diagnosis, County, Race and Diagnostic class. A data sample for this 
dataset is shown in Table 4.4. 
The dataset sample is grouped for anonymisation with  ?̄? = 3. The first input of the data 
bag contains the first three records with the following format: {2010, [MI: Oakland 
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(26125), MI: Oakland (26125), MI: Wayne (26163)], Black, [positive histology, no 
positive histology, positive histology]}. The grouping was applied on both Race and 
Year of Diagnosis. The anonymisation was applied on the lowest probability value, 
which was County. The UDF program masked the County to Parent 1 of the taxonomy 
tree, which was (Michigan). Luckily, the north state could be generalised to include the 
three tuples. However, the next four tuples could not be generalised to Parent 1, since 
Parent 1 for Montgomery was given by (Alabama), while Parent 1 for Jefferson was 
given by (Kentucky). In addition, moving up to Parent 2 did not resolve the equivalency. 
Therefore, the masking moved up to the root of the tree, which was (United States [US] 
State). 
Table 4.3—Sample of Seer data 
Year of Diagnosis County Race Diagnostic 
2010 MI: Oakland (26125) Black Positive histology 
2010 MI: Oakland (26125) Black No positive histology 
2010 MI: Wayne (26163) Black Positive histology 
2013 AL: Montgomery (36043) White Positive microscopic  
2013 AL: Montgomery (36043) White No positive histology 
2013 AL: Montgomery (36043) White Positive histology 
2013 KY: Jefferson (21111) White No positive histology 
 
The previous example can be anonymised by following the algorithm steps. First, all 
County objects are masked to Parent 1. Second, the probability of Parent 1 is compared 
with ψ. If the probability is ≤ ψ, then the first masking step outputs the following values. 
For the first group, County(Parent1) = {Michigan, Michigan, Michigan}. For the second 
group, County(Parent1) = {Alabama, Alabama, Alabama, Kentucky}. The algorithm 
then organises each array in ascending order, and then loops continuously until gaining 
full equivalency. The first group will be scanned once to verify the equivalency. Part of 
the algorithm, described in Figure 4.12, is shown below: 
IF array1(i) = array1(i − 1) 
count = count + 1 
ELSE IF count < ?̄? 
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All_greater_than_k = false 
As a result, the first group will not be further anonymised. The second group contains 
one different value (Kentucky), which should be similar to the rest of the counties. To 
target this value, the second group will be scanned and masked to a higher parent, 
County (Parent2) = {South State, South State, South State, Southeast State}. As noticed, 
generalising to a higher parent did not resolve the dissimilarity. Therefore, a higher 
generalisation is required. The group is scanned and masked to a higher parent because 
one object is dissimilar to the other three objects. Parent 3 will be the root, and the final 
result of generalisation is County (Root) = {US State, US State, US State, US State}. 
4.3.2.4 Interval Anonymisation Algorithm 
MDSBA implements UDF in different locations. This is essential for two main 
purposes: anonymising and ungrouping. In anonymising, three masking types of 
interval, taxonomy tree and suppression are implemented. Figure 4.13 shows the 
algorithm for anonymising any numerical group. Minimising the amount of data flowing 
to the UDF program is essential to reduce the processing cost and avoid data overflow, 
as described before. 
To understand the anonymisation algorithm precisely, let us study the following 
example. A list of numerical values is given as follows: list = {2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 12, 12, 18, 
25, 26, 26, 30}, with ?̄? = 5. The algorithm anonymises this list as per ψ value. If ψ = 0.2, 
then the range = 1/0.2 = 5. The values are arranged in ascending order. Referring to 
Figure 4.13, the algorithm includes four sections. The algorithm first initiates some 
values: length_of_list = 10, minimum = 2 − (2 mod 5) = 0, and medium = 0 + 5 = 5. In 
the first section of the process, the loop starts reading the first object of the list (2). The 
IF statement ensures that the list objects is within the interval range. In Figure 4.13, the 
main IF statement shows that the object (2) falls within the interval range. As a result, 
the counter variable (rep) will be incremented, so rep = 1. The second IF statement will 
be skipped because the object list has not yet reached the end of it. In the third IF 
statement, the algorithm jumps by four objects, since Remain_to_k_dash = k_dash − rep 
= 4. The fifth taken number is 12, and the variable (rep) will be updated accordingly: 
rep = 1 + 4 + 1 = 6. In the 3.1 IF statement, the interval is updated to include the fifth 
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object in the list. The initial value of range = 5, while the fifth object of the list is 12. 
Thus, the 3.1 statement will increase the range up to 15, so the interval will be updated 
by [0–15]. 
The fourth IF statement verifies whether the sixth object of the list should be included 
within the interval. In this example, the sixth and seventh object values are 12. In this 
way, both objects fall within the interval [0–15]. In the second iteration loop, the first 
statement increments rep up to rep = 7, while the statements two, three and four are 
skipped. Similarly, the third loop increments rep by rep = 8. In the third iteration, the 
number 18 exceeds the range, and the program skips to the fourth statement. This is the 
first time that the fourth statement is true, and an iterated loop of eight times generates 
the string of all_intervals, so the results will be new_list{[0–15], [0–15], [0–15], [0–15], 
[0–15], [0–15], [0–15]}. In this fourth statement, the loop generates the new list, and 
both the minimum and maximum are updated by minimum = 15, and maximum = 15 + 
5 = 20. The next loop updates the medium up to 35, so the final new list is updated by 
{[0–15], [0–15], [0–15], [0–15], [0–15], [0–15], [0–15], [15–35], [15–35], [15–35], [15–
35], [15–35]}. 
Input: list={a1,a2,a3,…..an}, a∈ R: list is in ascending order  
Variables definitions 
var length_of_list=lists.size 
var minimum=list(0)-list(0)%5 
var range=1 / psi 
var medium=minimum + range 
Processes 
//The value of (?̄?) is denoted by k_dash in the pseudocode 
//Loop to anonymise umerical 
 
Do While object < length_of_list 
        object=object +1   //counter for objects in the list 
//1. The main IF statement [FIRST IF STATEMENT] 
      IF list(object) >= minimum AND list(object) < medium THEN 
             rep=rep+1 //counter for objects within the interval 
      END IF 
//2. Include the last few objects [SECOND IF STATEMENT] 
        Count_remained_objects= length_of_list – object 
                    IF Count_remained_objects < k_dash  THEN 
                          medium=list(length_of_list-1)+(5-list(length_of_list-1)%5) 
 
                          rep=rep + Count_remained_objects 
                          object=object + Count_remained_objects    
                      END IF 
//3. Jump to the object that fulfil k_dash [THIRD IF STATEMENT] 
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                   IF rep < k_dash THEN 
                         Remain_to_k_dash= k_dash – rep 
//3.1. Update the medium value by increasing the interval    
 medium=list(object+ Remain_to_k_dash-1)+(5-list(object+ Remain_to_k_dash-1)%5) 
                          IF medium – minimum < range THEN 
                                                medium =minimum + range 
                          END IF 
                          rep=rep + Remain_to_k_dash+1 
                          object=object + Remain_to_k_dash 
                    END IF 
//4. Get the next object [FOURTH IF STATEMENT] 
                    IF list(object) > list(object-1) THEN 
                             FOR I =0 TO rep  
                                   
                                        all_intervals=all_intervals+"["+minimum+" - "+medium+"[," 
                              NEXT I    
                       minimum = medium  
                       medium=medium + range  
                     rep = 0 //reset the counter 
                 END IF 
END WHILE 
Output: list={[A1-B1[,[A2-B2[,[A3-B3[,…,[An-Bn[} 
Figure 4.7—Algorithm illustrating the numerical value anonymisation 
4.4 Comparison of Sensitivity-based Anonymisation 
and Other Methods  
The first comparison experiments were conducted on the Adult and Seer datasets from 
the UCI Machine Learning Repository [14]. These data are public benchmarks for 
anonymisation algorithms experiments. Both datasets were earlier described in chapter 
3. The experiments compared MDSBA, BUG and MDTDS in traditional and big data. 
First, the experiments tested the information gain and performance by small data size. 
Second, similar experiments were conducted with big data size. The aim of the 
experiments was to establish a comprehensive comparison of MDSBA and the other 
anonymisation methods. However, testing the information gain in any anonymised data 
is not a straightforward task. This can be achieved by implementing public benchmarks, 
such as Naïve Gaussian and C4.5 classifiers. 
Three separate scripts of Pig Latin were programmed for MDSBA, BUG and MDTDS. 
In addition, two UDF Java programs were embedded in both Pig script programs. In 
MDTDS, the algorithm relies intensively on the Java UDF program, while Pig script 
handles very limited tasks. The script aggregates the full-equivalent Q-ID attributes. 
Data bags with a number of records < k are transmitted to the UDF Java program. The 
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algorithm calculates the scores for all Q-ID attributes. The highest attribute score will be 
specialised. For instance, if the Education attribute gains the highest score, then 
(Education) will be specialised from (Any) to (School, Undergraduate or Postgraduate). 
In Chapter 2, the entropy, scores and InfoGain equations were described in detail. The 
next section explains the implemented algorithm in Pig Latin script. 
4.4.1 UDF Algorithm for MDTDS 
The MDTDS method relies intensively on UDF because of the several iterations 
involved in calculating the best Q-ID score. Recall that Pig Latin script groups the 
transmitted data to UDF. The Pig script groups by (EDU, GENDER, AGE) and 
transmits data to UDF as a bag with a number of records < k. In UDF, the algorithm 
must group all Q-ID attributes. To understand the iteration process, let us study a test 
dataset from the Adult data. The Adult dataset is given by three Q-IDs (EDU, 
GENDER, AGE), as illustrated in Table 4.5. The UDF algorithm calculates the highest 
score among the three Q-IDs. The calculation imposes several aggregations. For 
instance, to calculate the Education score, the UDF algorithm receives the grouped data 
bag from the Pig Latin script, ungroups the bag, and masks one of the Q-ID attributes by 
(ANY), as shown in Table 4.6A. The algorithm counts the objects of Q-IDs and the 
class, and then calculates the Education score. The following steps calculate the score: 
• Mask Education, Gender and Age by (Any), as shown in Table 4.6A. 
• Group by (EDU, GENDER, AGE). 
• Find the entropy of 𝐼(𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑌) = −∑
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑌)
|𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑌|
 ×  𝑙𝑜𝑔2
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑌)
|𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑌|
. 
• Mask Education by the first parent of the taxonomy tree, {School, University}, 
as in Table 4.6B. 
• Find the entropy of 𝐼(𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐿) = −∑
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐿.)
|𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐿|
 ×  𝑙𝑜𝑔2
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐿)
|𝑅𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐿|
. 
• Find the entropy of 𝐼(𝑅𝑈𝑁𝐼) = −∑
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑅𝑈𝑁𝐼)
|𝑅𝑈𝑁𝐼|
 ×  𝑙𝑜𝑔2
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞(𝑅𝑈𝑁𝐼)
|𝑅𝑈𝑁𝐼|
. 
• Find the InfoGain of 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐸𝐷𝑈) = 𝐼(𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑌) − (
𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐺
𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐺
× 𝐼(𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐺) +
𝑅𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷
𝑅𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷
× 𝐼(𝑅𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷)). 
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• Find the AnonyLoss of 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝐸𝐷𝑈) =  𝐴2(𝑄𝐼𝐷) − 𝐴1(𝑄𝐼𝐷), where A2 presents 
the number of records when EDU = Any, and A1 presents the number of records 
when EDU = parent. 
• Find the score of 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝐸𝐷𝑈) =
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐸𝐷𝑈)
𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑦𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝐸𝐷𝑈)
. 
• Repeat the previous steps for Gender. 
• Find the entropy of I(Any), I(Male), I(Female). Finally, find the score by 
calculating the InfoGain, AnonyLoss and score. 
• Repeat the previous steps for Age. 
• Compare the score(Edu), score(Gender) and score(Age). The highest score value 
will be specialised. 
• Repeat the previous processes many times until there is no more cut left. 
Table 4.4—Original Adult data sample 
Education Gender Age Salary (Class) 
5th Male 20  ≥ 50K 
10th  Male 35 < 50K 
12th Male 36  ≥ 50K 
Bachelor Female 26 < 50K 
Bachelor Female 33 ≥ 50K 
Master Female 42 ≥ 50K 
 
Table 4.5A—Adult data after generalising EDU 
Education Gender Age Salary (Class) 
Any Any Any ≥ 50K 
Any Any Any < 50K 
Any Any Any ≥ 50K 
Any Any Any < 50K 
Any Any Any ≥ 50K 
Any Any Any ≥ 50K 
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Table 4.6B—Adult data after specialising EDU 
Education Gender Age Salary (Class) 
SCHOOL Male Any ≥ 50K 
SCHOOL Male Any < 50K 
SCHOOL Male Any ≥ 50K 
UNIVERSITY Female Any < 50K 
UNIVERSITY Female Any ≥ 50K 
UNIVERSITY Female Any ≥ 50K 
 
As shown before, MDTDS implements an expensive computation process by leaving the 
program with an unknown number of iterations. The program reads the data bag several 
times to reduce the AnonyLoss by specialising the best Q-ID score. This algorithm may 
operate successfully with a small data sample; however, with big data, the algorithm is 
expensive and time consuming. When working with millions of records, calculating the 
high scores and determining the best cut is impractical. Instead, predefining the Q-ID for 
anonymisation and predetermining the best cut before anonymisation can be a more 
reliable solution. MDTDS may perform better with traditional data; however, its 
performance may degrade and become slow with big data. The anonymisation of big 
data should focus on increasing security and performance, rather than focusing on the 
information gained. Neglecting the high accuracy of the best specialising cut will not 
dramatically affect the general statistical results—the statistical results are not affected 
by minor values of anonymisation loss. 
4.4.2 UDF Algorithm for BUG 
The applied algorithm in this UDF was derived from the advanced BUG introduced by 
Pandilakshmi et al. in [109]. The procedures are very similar to the other BUG [70] and 
MRBUG [64] methods. Advanced BUG deliberately splits a random number of data 
groups, and then performs generalisation as per ILPG. The implemented ILPG equations 
are like the previous MDTDS equations of entropy and InfoGain. The algorithm 
summary depends on multiple iterations of generalisations. The first stage of 
generalisation applies Parent1 for each Q-ID attribute separately. For instance, in the 
Adult data attributes (EDU, GENDER, AGE), the algorithm applies a generalisation to 
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EDU, followed by InfoGain calculations. Next, the algorithm applies the generalisation 
on GENDER, followed by InfoGain calculations. Finally, AGE is generalised and 
InfoGain is calculated and compared with the other two results. The accepted 
generalisation among the three attributes is the one with the highest InfoGain result. In 
the case that Parent1 generalisation does not satisfy k-anonymity, the iteration moves the 
generalisation to the top of the taxonomy. Figure 4.14 describes the algorithm of the 
implemented BUG. 
Algorithm BUG driver 
Input: Dataset D, anonymisation level AL0, anonymity parameter k. 
Process: 
1. Scan dataset D. 
2. Initialise generalisation by AL0 for each attribute. 
3. Calculate the values of the search metric ILPG for each generalised attribute. 
4. While gen < k. 
5. Identify the available generalisation set, AGSet, out of all the active generalisation 
candidates. 
6. Choose the generalisation for the attribute with the highest InfoGain. 
7. If gen < k then: 
8. Generalise the QID attributes to Ali. 
9. Calculate the values of search metric ILPG for each generalised attribute 
10. End If 
11. End while. 
12. Identify the available generalisation set, AGSet, out of all the active generalisation 
candidates. 
13. Choose the generalisation for the attribute with the highest InfoGain. 
Figure 4.14—BUG driver algorithm implemented in UDF 
4.4.3 Small Data Size Experiments 
The first experiment aimed to compare MDSBA, BUG and MDTDS in the traditional 
dataset. The used Adult and Seer datasets were divided into a training and testing 
dataset. The chosen datasets were based on a 70:30 ratio, with 70% of the source dataset 
for the training model, and 30% of the source dataset for the testing model. Each dataset 
was enlarged to three different sizes: 3.8, 20.1 and 65 MB. The total number of records 
was 32,561 for the 3.8 MB, and 572,000 for the 65 MB. The enlargement was created 
by applying Excel Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) script to produce tens of (.csv) 
files. Seer cancer data of Q-IDs and the class are described in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The 
Adult data included Q-IDs = {EDU, GENDER, AGE} and the class contained salary = 
{< = 50K, > 50K}. 
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As aforementioned, the experiments were conducted by three Java programs embedded 
in three Pig scripts. All experiments were conducted at the university Hadoop cluster, 
which contained one NameNode and four DataNodes. Each node’s CPU was an Intel 
Xeon CPU E5-2665 0 @ 2.40 GHz x86_64, with a physical memory of 8 GB. The 
operating system was CentOS 7 configured with Hadoop Version 2, and Pig Ver. 0.15. 
The first experiment implemented a commonly available classifier for comparison of the 
three anonymisation methods. The first comparison relied on a Naïve Bayesian 
classifier. The anonymisation was applied to two datasets—the Adult and Seer datasets. 
After completing the anonymisation processes for each dataset, the classification error 
was calculated by using RapidMiner Studio.2 The calculation was conducted before and 
after the anonymisation. The experiment followed similar steps as in [40]. The 
classification error before anonymity is called baseline error (BE), and after anonymity 
is called anonymity error (AE). The BE classification error was 0.18 for the Adult data, 
and 0.15 for the Seer data. Figures 4.15 and 4.16 indicate the classification error 
comparison between the three anonymisation methods. The comparison considered k = 
15 in all trials. Three different data sizes were compared in the three anonymisation 
methods. 
 
Figure 4.15—Classification error for three sizes of Adult datasets 
                                                          
2 RapidMiner Studio is a program used for advanced analytics processes with machine learning, data 
mining, predictive, and business analytics: https://rapidminer.com/products/studio/. 
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In Figures 4.15 and 4.16, the classification error was much lower for the MDTDS and 
BUG methods. As expected, the MDSBA method was not successful for the small size 
datasets. This was because the algorithm core does not precisely calculate the best 
generalisation attribute. MDTDS iterates an unknown number of times to find the best 
Q-ID score. The best Q-ID score will be specialised, while the rest of the attributes are 
unspecialised. During each specialising process, scores calculation is conducted for each 
Q-ID attribute. The MDTDS and BUG algorithms reduce the anonymisation effect, but 
are computationally expensive. BUG also follows similar techniques. ILPG is calculated 
each iteration time, and generalisation is given according to InfoGain scores. In contrast, 
MDSBA predetermines the anonymised Q-ID attribute and pre-calculates the amount of 
anonymisation applied. Hence, there is no need to iterate the program to make a decision 
because the anonymised Q-ID is predetermined, and the minimum generalisation level is 
pre-calculated. 
  
Figure 4.16—Classification error for three sizes of Seer datasets 
Figure 4.15 shows that AE drops below the BE line. Logically, this may indicate low 
precision and recall of this classifier. This diagram indicates that datasets may return 
better prediction after anonymisation. This is practically possible because Naïve 
Bayesian and other classifiers measure the level of predictions, but not the information 
gained or lost. This concern is a good reason to derive a better benchmark for measuring 
and comparing the anonymisation loss in various anonymisation methods. Nevertheless, 
the classifier accuracy—the aim of this experiment—is comparing MDSBA, BUG and 
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MDTDS. Thus far, the comparison shows more accuracy when anonymising data by 
either MDTDS or BUG. 
However, MDSBA computation cost is lower than BUG and MDTDS. Figure 4.17 
illustrates the processing time of the Seer cancer data. The diagram shows a comparison 
of the three methods’ performance per minute. The results were expected because of the 
low number of iterations and computation in MDSBA. It is apparent that reducing the 
computation cost may negatively affect the information gain percentage. MDSBA was 
not proposed for traditional data size; instead, it was developed to leverage large data 
size, where small changes in accuracy may not affect the final statistical results. 
 
Figure 4.8—Processing time comparison for the three anonymisation methods 
4.4.4 Large Data Size Experiments 
In the second experiment, the datasets were enlarged to larger data sizes. Four different 
common types of data were used in this experiment: Adult data, Seer cancer data, heart 
disease data and the Kasandr dataset. Each dataset was randomly enlarged up to three 
size varieties: 1.2, 3.3 and 4.6 GB. The enlargement was created by applying Excel 
VBA script to produce tens of (.csv) files. The Seer cancer data, Adult data and heart 
disease data are illustrated in Table 4.7, and Kasandr data are illustrated in Table 4.8. 
The Kasandr dataset consists of the following attributes = {userid, offerid, city, 
category, merchant, purchase_date, implicit_feedback}. For security reasons, the user 
ID was omitted, and the chosen Q-ID = {city, category, purchaseDate}. The class was 
divided based on the 738 types of the merchant. The dataset of Kasandr was collected in 
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Germany. The cities represent around 80 German cities, and the products category 
comprises around 50 types of product, while the purchase date was recorded for five 
years over 365 days per annum. Based on these numbers, the probabilities are given as 
follows: P(city) = 0.0125, P(category) = 0.02 and P(date) = 0.0005. The testing and 
training data were merged during the anonymisation process. The purchaseDate was 
generalised by a taxonomy tree of day, month and year, as shown in Figure 4.18. 
Table 4.6—Heart disease Q-ID attributes, probabilities and class values 
Q-ID Attributes CLASS 
Age 
P = 0.01 
Gender 
P = 0.33 
Smoking 
P = 0.5 
Chest Pain (CP) 
P = 0.25 
Class of Electrocardiographic 
(restecg) 
1–100 • Male 
• Female 
• Others 
• Yes (1) 
• No (0) 
• Typical angina (0) 
• Atypical angina (1) 
• Non-angina pain (2) 
• Asymptomatic (3) 
• Normal (0) 
• Having ST-T wave 
abnormality (1) 
• Showing probable or definite 
left ventricular hypertrophy 
by Estes’ criteria (2) 
 
Table 4.7—Kasandr Q-ID attributes, probabilities and class values 
Q-ID Attributes CLASS 
City 
P = 0.0125 
Category 
P = 0.02 
PurchaseDate 
P = 0.0005 
Merchant 
• 80 cities in 
Germany 
• 50 types • 365 days in five years (taxonomy tree 
in Figure 4.18) 
• 738 types 
 
This experiment was implemented by Java as a UDF combined with Pig script. The 
script reads the database by using the Hadoop reading process through HDFS. The 
experiment was divided into three sections: MDTDS, BUG and MDSBA. Both BUG 
and MDTDS were randomly split into smaller data blocks, and each block was executed 
several times to determine the best data size for Java heap memory. This was essential 
because a large data block size cannot be processed at once. A large file should be split 
into smaller files to overcome unexpected errors and prevent Java heap failure. There 
was no need to split the large files when the value of k < 16. The number of splits 
increased in parallel with the increasing value of k. The data split for the 4.6 GB dataset 
is illustrated in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. Each data split was processed independently. The 
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BUG method performed better with more significant data size, as shown in Table 4.9. In 
MDSBA, a split was only needed when the k value was quite large and the number of 
class values was very small. As shown in Table 4.10, the Adult data contained only two 
values of {< = 50K, > 50K}, so the data split occurred when k ≥ 50. The rest of the 
datasets required fewer split operations. The increasing number of class values may 
support the logical split. The number of G groups increased in parallel with the class 
values increase. 
 
Figure 4.18—Taxonomy tree for purchase date attribute in Kasandr dataset 
 
Table 4.8—Dataset of 4.6 GB split for both methods 
K 4 8 12 16 20 50 100 170 250 300 400 
MD
TDS 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
1.15 
GB 
650 
MB 
420 
MB 
230 
MB 
164 
MB 
110 
MB 
73 
MB 
38 
MB 
BUG No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
1.15 
GB 
770 
MB 
570 
MB 
350 
MB 
230 
MB 
170 
MB 
95 
MB 
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Table 4.9—Various datasets of 4.6 GB split for MDSBA 
K 4 8 12 16 20 50 100 170 250 300 400 
Adult No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
2.3 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
800 
MB 
800 
MB 
650 
MB 
Seer No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
2.3 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
Heart 
disease 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
2.3 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
1.15 
GB 
Kasandr No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
No 
split 
 
The second experiment was implemented with a classifier similar to the first 
experiment. The aim was to compare the three anonymisation methods. Moreover, more 
datasets were added to enable a better evaluation. The calculation was conducted before 
and after the anonymisation. Both BE and AE were measured for each dataset. The BE 
values were as follows. For the Adult dataset = 0.18, for the Seer dataset = 0.15, for the 
heart disease dataset = 0.16, and for the Kasandr dataset = 0.17. Figures 4.19 to 4.22 
show the classification error comparison of the three anonymisation methods. The 
comparison considered k = 50 in all trials. Three different data sizes were compared in 
the three anonymisation methods. 
All datasets showed similar results regarding the AE values. The anonymisation was 
conducted based on splitting data in BUG and MDTDS, as shown in Table 4.9, and in 
Table 4.10 for the MDSBA split. All trials of this experiment showed a low AE in 
MDSBA, which is represented by a discrete line in the diagrams. Exceptionally, Figures 
4.19 and 4.20 showed quite a high AE value when the data size was 1.2 GB. This may 
indicate that BUG and MDTDS perform better than MDSBA if no or few splits have 
occurred. In this trial, the data size of 1.2 GB did not require many splits in the three 
anonymisation methods; therefore, more accuracy and fewer AE values could be 
obtained when using BUG or MDTDS. However, MDSBA was proposed to increase the 
performance and security of the big data size. Fortunately, the information gained after 
anonymisation with MDSBA increased in parallel with the data size increase. When 
data size was greater than 1.2 GB, Figures 4.19 to 4.22 showed a lower AE value for 
MDSBA in comparison with the other methods. The low AE could indicate high 
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information gained in MDSBA. This could refer to the high number of data splits in 
BUG and MDTDS. Eventually, it was noticed that BUG and MDTDS performed better 
with the smaller data size. This is because of their algorithms’ nature of continuing 
iterations and splitting until no further cut is possible. 
 
Figure 4.9—AE results in the Adult dataset for three different methods 
 
Figure 4.10—AE results in Seer dataset for three different methods 
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Figure 4.11—AE results in heart disease dataset for three different methods 
 
 
Figure 4.12—AE results in Kasandr dataset for three different methods 
4.5 Anonymisation Classification 
Many techniques have been implemented to determine a benchmark to measure the 
performance of the anonymisation methods. Techniques usually compare data before 
and after anonymisation to ascertain the information loss. The most widely used 
classifiers are Naïve Bayesian, C4.5 and K means [53]. These classifiers present 
algorithms to predict output results as per the classified data. The comparison of pre- 
and post-anonymisation is measured by the classification error, which is measured 
before and after the anonymisation. The classification error involves building a cost 
matrix and calculating the precision and recall. This does not always mean an accurate 
measurement of data anonymisation, and different classifiers may output different 
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classification errors, precisions or recalls. Hence, classifiers measure the prediction 
level, rather than the actual anonymisation level and information usefulness. In some 
previous experiments, the classification error of AE was lower than the BE level, which 
is inadequate. For instance, Figure 4.15 showed a drift of AE below the BE value. The 
BE value presents data before anonymisation, while AE presents the anonymised data. 
Various anonymisation methods are expected to be proposed in the future, and it is 
essential to develop an adequate measurement tool to compare them. 
An alternative naïve equation is proposed to measure the percentages of information loss 
after anonymisation, denoted by disruption (Ɗ). The disruption value is a benchmark 
that offers a general indication of the size of anonymisation loss. As shown in Equations 
4.1 and 4.2, each anonymised block of tuples is calculated individually, and the Ɗ value 
is the result of the total summation of all anonymised blocks. Each block of data is a 
data bag produced by grouping a set of tuples. Let us assume that an anonymised block 
of data contains M records in a total number of N dataset records: 
Ɗ𝑠 =
𝑀
𝑁
× 
0.01
∏𝑃[𝑄𝐼𝐷]
         (4.1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ∏𝑃[𝑄𝐼𝐷]  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑄𝐼𝐷 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘: 
Ɗ[𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙] = ∑ Ɗ𝑠
𝑖
𝑠=0           (4.2) 
Equation 4.1 is derived from the reverse proportion between the Q-ID probability and 
Ɗ. The Ɗ value increases with the increasing number of Q-ID attributes that participate 
in anonymisation. Hence, anonymising three Q-IDs will result in a higher Ɗ value than 
anonymising two Q-IDs. Each block must have similar attribute values. If a block is 
found with two different anonymised values, it will be split into more than one block. 
The following example illustrates Equations 4.1 and 4.2. Recall the Adult data and 
consider that the total number of records is 500. Two blocks of data are anonymised by 
two Q-IDs of Education and Age. The number of anonymised records for these two 
blocks is three of each. The Education anonymisation is given Parent 2, which relates to 
(certificate) and (degree). Both anonymised blocks are shown in Table 4.11. Based on 
the EDU taxonomy tree, as shown in the previous chapter, the first block probability is 
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𝑃[𝐸𝐷𝑈] = 0.067 and the second block probability is 𝑃[𝐸𝐷𝑈] = 0.17. In addition, the 
Age probability for each block is 𝑃[𝐴𝐺𝐸] = 0.05. Based on the previous two equations 
and the given information, the value of Ɗ is calculated as Ɗ1= (3/500 × 0.01) / (× 0.067 
× 0.05) = 0.018, and Ɗ2= (3/500) × (0.01/(0.17 × 0.05)) = 0.007. Referring to Equation 
4.2, the total value of Ɗ = 0.025. 
Table 4.10—Disruption example with Adult data 
Blocks Education Gender Age Salary (Class) 
Block 1 CERTIFICATE Male 20–40 ≥ 50K 
Block 1 CERTIFICATE Male 20–40 < 50K 
Block 1 CERTIFICATE Male 20–40 ≥ 50K 
Block 2 DEGREE Female 30–50 < 50K 
Block 2 DEGREE Female 30–50 ≥ 50K 
Block 2 DEGREE Female 30–50 ≥ 50K 
 
The above example presents a suggested equation for comparing several anonymisation 
methods. The equation can accurately measure the amount of obfuscation in any dataset. 
Each dataset may output different values of Ɗ, depending on the nature of the data. 
Therefore, it is not possible to adopt one value of Ɗ as a benchmark for all data. 
However, a lower Ɗ value may indicate a low obfuscation in data. 
4.5.1 Using Disruption to Compare MDSBA and Other 
Anonymisation Methods 
The first experiment did not accurately measure the amount of disruption. The output 
results rely on the classifier accuracy and its efficiency with such a data type. The 
second experiment recalled the naïve disruption equation, instead of measuring the 
prediction error percentage. The four datasets were used with a 4.6 GB size for each set. 
The anonymisation methods were implemented by BUG, MDTDS and MDSBA. The 
first part of the experiment aimed to measure the disruption values for the smaller values 
when k = 4, while the second part aimed to measure the disruption values for the larger 
values when k = 50 and ?̄? = 50. The value of k was used for BUG and MDTDS, while ?̄? 
was used for MDSBA. Figure 4.23 presents the results of the first part of the 
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experiment, which indicated a minor contrast between the three methods. MDSBA 
showed a higher disruption than the others. However, the difference of around 0.0004 
was very small and may not have significantly affected the data analytics. Figure 4.24 
presents the results of the second part of the experiment, which indicated a significant 
contrast between the three methods. MDSBA showed the lowest disruption level when 
k = 50.  
 
Figure 4.23—Disruption comparison for 𝑘=̄4 and the four datasets 
These results were expected, since the smaller value of k = 4 does not require any split 
in BUG or MDTDS. As discussed earlier, BUG and MDTDS gain better results in 
information usefulness if no split has occurred. Therefore, Figure 4.23 shows a higher 
disruption value for MDSBA, while Figure 4.24 shows the lowest disruption value for 
MDSBA. For the 4.6 GB data size, both BUG and MDTDS needed to be split several 
times, which degraded the information usefulness. This experiment can conclude that 
MDSBA is suitable for a large data size combined with a large k value. 
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Figure 4.24—Disruption comparison for 𝑘 ̄= 50 and the four datasets 
In the second experiment, the aim was finding the anonymisation level in MDSBA on 
the variation of ?̄?. Figure 4.25 showed a granular increase in Ɗ on ?̄? ≥ 50 for all 
datasets. This Ɗ increase was expected because of the equivalency decrease with the 
large number of ?̄?. This experiment was conducted with a data size of 4.6 GB for each 
dataset. The ?̄? increase may reduce the privacy violation risk; however, it degrades the 
information usefulness. Hence, a trade-off between security and disruption should be 
considered when assigning the values of k. From the previous and current experiments, 
anonymisation was applied on varieties of datasets, and it was found that anonymising 
most datasets will output a Ɗ below 5%. However, this finding is a rough estimate and 
cannot be generalised to all datasets. The value of Ɗ is related to other factors, such as 
the data cumulative distribution and the attribute probabilities, as described previously. 
 
Figure 4.13—Relationship between Ɗ and 𝑘̄ variation in MDSBA 
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4.6 Performance Comparison 
Figure 4.26 illustrated a considerable time difference in processing the three 
anonymisation methods. It showed the lowest processing time for MDSBA, followed by 
MDTDS, and finally BUG. Obtaining more accurate data after anonymisation will 
require a more expensive process. Let us apply the same data used in the previous 
experiments. The data size is quite large, which means it is sufficient to be 
accommodated in the university Hadoop laboratory. The laboratory resources were 
limited; hence, adding more data was not possible. The Seer cancer datasets used in this 
experiment were 1.2, 3.3 and 4.6 GB. The experiment measured the performance of 
three different data sizes, and indicated that MDSBA had the lowest processing time. 
The disparity in processing time was small between MDSBA and the rest of the methods 
when the datasets were small. The disparity increased with increasing data size. 
 
Figure 4.14—Processing time comparison for the three anonymisation methods 
The second part of the experiment indicated good performance for MDSBA. Figure 4.27 
illustrates the processing time decline for the three data sizes when anonymising data 
with MDSBA. The four datasets showed nearly similar results in processing time. The 
highest processing time was recorded for the BUG method, followed by MDTDS, and 
then MDSBA. This experiment was conducted on k = 50. The value of k required 
several splits of data sizes for MDTDS and BUG. This split negatively affected the 
gained information but did not affect the processing time. BUG and MDTDS are 
computationally expensive because their algorithm relies on iterating a large-sized data 
block. As described earlier, the large-sized data block is transmitted to the UDF 
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program, which may be degraded by Java heap memory limitations. Thus, reducing the 
data flow to the UDF program is essential to leverage the parallelisation process. 
 
Figure 4.15—Processing time comparison of various datasets and sizes 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter conducted several experiments to measure and compare the MDSBA 
method with the other known anonymisation methods. The experiments indicated 
promising results in anonymising big data with the MDSBA method. The algorithms 
used in experiments supported the state-of-the-art approach for the k-anonymity 
concept. The aim was comparing MDSBA with the other known anonymisation 
methods—BUG and MDTDS. As aforementioned, both of these methods are 
appropriate for small data sizes, yet are not applicable for large data sizes without 
several splits, and, as proven in this chapter, several splits have a negative effect on the 
usefulness of the information gained. In addition, this chapter proved that data with a 
small k-anonymity value require a lower number of splits because of the high 
equivalency percentage in small values of k. Generally, MDSBA is the best fit for larger 
datasets with a large value of k. 
This chapter experimentally proved the good performance of MDSBA in comparison 
with BUG and MDTDS. The MDSBA processing time indicated a low cost for small 
and large data sizes because of the pre-calculated and predetermined anonymisation 
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parameters. In MDSBA, the anonymised Q-ID and amount of masking are computed 
before the anonymisation process. In contrast, current anonymisation processes spend 
considerable time calculating the most accurate Q-ID for anonymisation. MDSBA 
neglects this kind of accuracy; thus, the pre-calculation of parameters is straightforward 
and does not require a high amount of processing. Moreover, the three anonymisation 
methods (BUG, MDSBA and MDTDS) were implemented by Pig Latin scripts and 
UDF. The UDF algorithms were created and tested for comparison purposes, and it was 
explained that BUG and MDSBA intensively rely on the UDF program, instead of the 
parallelisation process. In addition, in both methods, the UDF receives massive data 
flow during the anonymisation process, which may be additionally cumbersome when 
executing the UDF algorithm. UDF receives a large size of data blocks and iterates these 
large blocks several times. 
The classification matrices were implemented to compare the prediction before and after 
the anonymisation. It is clear that the classifiers focus on the prediction, precision, recall 
and classification error, instead of focusing on the information gain before and after 
anonymisation. To enable a better benchmark for any future comparison of the proposed 
methods, this chapter introduced a disruption (Ɗ) equation. This equation can measure 
the exact amount of obfuscation of data after anonymisation. 
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5 FRAMEWORK FOR SENSITIVITY-
BASED ANONYMISATION 
 
Hadoop security consists of many modules of protection. The HDFS contains sensitive 
information that must comply with the owner’s security policy to enable granular access 
for multi-users. Multi-security levels must be available to protect the organisation’s 
assets during a security breach by securing the HDFS access, data analytics processes, 
Hadoop domain, data and processes/files of the operating system. The big data 
ecosystem is prone to multiple user access by individuals requesting data analytics. For 
instance, organisations’ alliance of business partners, contractors and subcontractors 
may require data access for data analytics. In addition, each organisation may contain 
more than one department, such as human resources, finances, engineering and medical 
departments. This requires a multi-layer security system to reduce data breach [103]. 
Hadoop ecosystems operate with tools residing at the top of the Hadoop core, such as 
Sqoop, Flume, Pig and Hive. These tools are essential for big data management and 
operations. The tools can be protected by applying security features on the Hadoop core. 
The security features of Hadoop consist of authentication, service level of authorisation, 
authentication for web console and data confidentiality. The Hadoop core structure 
comprises three main parts: HDFS, YARN and JobHistory. The three parts can be 
secured by using authentication—known as Hadoop secure mode—so that each user and 
service needs to be authenticated by Kerberos before using Hadoop services, as 
discussed in Section 4.2. 
In data analytics, current Hadoop security features can provide a satisfactory level of 
protection if implemented and configured properly. However, risks may appear at the 
data level among authenticated users, who should be unable to explore private data. 
Private and sensitive data should not be available to every authenticated user. Instead, 
limited users should be eligible to access such sensitive data. An authenticated user is a 
user who is permitted to access all or part of the data. Big data are correlated to a large 
number of users, which increases the percentage of potential users exploring prohibited 
attributes during data analytics. We need a framework that can organise and control 
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permissions by implementing an anonymisation method. Hadoop security features are 
unable to provide such a level of security for data. Hadoop security features only secure 
data from unauthorised access, without providing robust access control. 
A sensitivity-based anonymisation framework provides security access control that 
mimics role-based access control. The framework provides granular security access for 
multi-user levels. This is accomplished by providing anonymisation in a fine-grained 
access control. Data owners may wish to provide organisations with varieties of access 
levels. In addition, each organisation may contain several departments with different 
data interests. For instance, human resource departments may request patients’ private 
data, such as names and contact details, while researchers may request patients’ age, 
gender and health status. The MDSBA framework resides in two different locations: 
federation service (FS) and service provider (SP). The data are managed and controlled 
by data owners. The data owner is considered fully trusted, while the data analyst is not 
fully trusted. 
To implement fine-grained access control in MDSBA, several services should be able to 
map between FS and SP. The mapping should match the assigned access policy on the 
FS side and the access control policy on the SP side. The mapping consists of three 
different services that cooperate interactively to transfer the given access permissions 
from the FS to the SP. The services are the core on the FS side, the initialiser, and the 
anonymiser on the SP side. The core service is presented by applications that may 
operate at the top of the FS/SSO. The core service contains a database that stores the 
details of the organisation’s access levels and general security values. Before delving 
into these three services, it is essential to understand the transmission method between 
the SP and FS sides. 
5.1 Security Assertion Markup Language 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based SSO standard that 
provides an authentication and authorisation mechanism, with interoperability between 
different security services in distributed environments. SSO invokes ease of use access 
over the internet for different web services. Three main objects are involved in SAML 
procedures: the user, SP and FS [108]. 
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The SAML standard can be implemented in different scenarios, depending on the 
business needs and limitations. However, all scenarios follow similar procedures. We 
focus on the most prominent scenario that initiates the MDSBA framework in analytics. 
SAML is initiated by users who log into the FS first, and then request access permission 
for SP. The access details and permissions are encapsulated in an XML file, known as 
‘assertion’. This file is transmitted using SAML security tokens. Users may initially 
request access from the SP—if so, the SP redirects the user back to the FS authentication 
and authorisation service. The SP must redirect the user’s request to the FS or identity 
provider for authentication purposes. The request is formatted in assertion notations, 
which is a set of XML groups that are bound using several communication protocols, 
such as POST, GET, Representation State Transfer (REST) or Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP) [113; 146]. Developers implement GET and POST when transferring 
very limited parameters; therefore, currently, SOAP and REST are widely used in 
communication protocols for web development. The major differences between SOAP 
and REST are the performance and speed. REST implements a JavaScript Object 
Notation (JSON) file to transmit parameters as a faster option than XML, which is used 
in SOAP. However, REST performs better in mobile applications, while SOAP and 
REST perform similarly in desktop applications [45]. 
MDSBA is interoperable with two variant binding methods—front-channel bind and 
back-channel bind. Front-channel bind adopts the traditional transfer methods of GET 
and POST. It is triggered using web browsers between the FS and SP sides. This 
conventional method of web communication implements the standard security of 
TLS/SSL, and public and private keys over TCP/443 [21]. The second binding method 
usually occurs through server–server. It involves two servers communicating with each 
other, without human interaction, by initiating a connection through a predefined port. 
The first server is located on the FS side, while the second server is located on the SP 
side. SOAP is used in parallel with a set of artefacts. The communications procedures 
start with the FS artefact generator, which generates and transfers a source ID, 
references and messages. This artefact is transferred using the front-channel or back-
channel method, as described before. The SP verifies and recognises the received 
artefact messages. The SP generates an XML request, known as <ArtifactResolve>. 
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This request is transferred back to the FS. The FS generates an XML <response> or 
assertion and sends it again to the SP. Figure 5.1 summarises the SAML communication 
steps between SP and FS [120]. 
 
Figure 5.1—SAML communication steps between SP and FS 
The FS (or idP) builds a SAML XML response that contains several sections of 
assertions. The HTML form encrypts the XML assertions when transmitting to the SP. 
The response can be sent using POST, REST or SOAP. SAML is an XML-based SSO 
standard that provides an authentication and authorisation mechanism, with 
interoperability between different security services in distributed environments [108]. 
The SAML standard can be implemented in different scenarios, depending on the 
business needs and limitations. However, all scenarios follow similar procedures to 
those in [113; 146]. SAML 2.0 assertions divide the XML file into eight sections as 
follows: response ID, issuer ID, status (succeed or fail), assertion ID, signature key, 
conditions, authentication statement and attribute statement. The last section contains 
various names and values of attributes. Developers use this section to pass any 
authorisation attributes and values [21]. In MDSBA, we need to inform the access 
control system of the ownership and access levels, so MDSBA algorithms calculate the 
sensitivity values for each permitted Q-ID group [120]. This can be embedded in the 
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attribute section in the XML response file. The assertion can be formatted similar to the 
example in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 presents the XML response in SAML assertion sections. This response is 
transmitted from the idP or FS to the SP. MDSBA transmits some parameters through 
the attributes section. Other parameters are available on SP side with XML format, and 
there is no need to transmit them on every user’s access. The other parameters describe 
the dataset details of Q-ID attributes, general attributes, class values, k-anonymity value, 
taxonomy trees, Q-ID probabilities and others. The assertion XML file does not contain 
all needed parameters for MDSBA calculations—it only contains various parameters 
that should be updated as per users’ access levels. Variables such as ?̄?, ψ and data status 
are mutable and must be given for every separate user’s access. 
 
Figure 5.2—XML response in SAML assertion sections, and attributes section modification 
5.2 MDSBA and Granular Access Control 
MDSBA can be implemented for big data analytics, which require parallel distributed 
operations. Granular security anonymisation should be considered when processing a 
large number of big data access requests. Since multi-user access requires fine-grained 
access at the data level, MDSBA provides granular access by implementing granular 
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levels of anonymisation. As described in Chapter 3, data attributes are divided into 
groups of two to four Q-ID attributes, and anonymisation is applied separately to each 
group. The data owner can decide the level of data suppression or masking on each 
group. For instance, doctors do not need to know the costs of operation or patients’ 
financial status; hence, the data owner can highly anonymise financial status data and 
lightly anonymise health status data. 
MDSBA aims to fragment data nominally to reduce the data size when accessing the 
anonymisation software program. This can be implemented by bundling a number of Q-
IDs and classes into small groups horizontally. Medical information may contain more 
than one class attribute and a considerable number of Q-IDs. Eventually, the increased 
number of Q-IDs may produce a massive computation cost and data overflow, which 
may unexpectedly terminate the anonymisation program. Dividing the Q-IDs into small 
bundles vertically can support performance and scalability. However, the Q-IDs are 
determined by data owners and can be divided randomly or logically. Dividing Q-IDs 
logically supports granular access control and reduces anonymisation loss. Q-ID 
grouping can be divided based on users’ roles, where users’ privileges and interests vary 
from one role to another. Users’ roles refer to organisational departments, where each 
department conducts certain analytics to abstract the information of interest. For 
instance, the human resources department may need to know users’ personal 
information, while the financial department focuses on users’ financial status. An 
appropriate amount and value of information should be maintained to alleviate 
information overload and improve the security level. 
5.2.1 Live Data and Archived Data 
The data owner needs to assign Q-IDs and Q-ID groups and allocate a suitable k-
anonymity value for each group. The next chapter will discuss selecting the optimal k-
anonymity value. The data owner also needs to map Q-ID groups to users’ roles, as 
explained before. In data lifecycle management, unused data need to be archived to 
improve storage capacity and to provide non-active data with long-term retention. 
Eventually, data can be categorised into two types: live and archived. The data owner 
needs to determine the type of data (live or archived). If the anonymised data is live, 
Chapter 5—Framework for Sensitivity-based Anonymisation 
 
140 
then the aforementioned ageing factor in Equation 3.7 can be ignored, and Equation 3.6 
will be ψ = ω. The reason for omitting the ageing factor term derives from data’s 
continuous updating; hence, live data’s importance will not be degraded by the time 
factor. Data analytics requires intensive computation time, which renders real-time 
analytics difficult to obtain. In this case, live data can be anonymised in an acceptable 
time that is similar to real time. This is essential to obtain improved accuracy in 
analytics results. Production dataset varies frequently, and the growth of dataset varies 
from one dataset to another. The anonymised copy of the live or production datasets 
may become old in a few days or even hours. This depends on the changing growth rate 
of the data. 
In the MDSBA framework, a practical solution was added for archived data. This 
solution anonymised data for every specific user only once. The user employs the same 
anonymised data for every access, and there is no need to anonymise the same data each 
time. The anonymised data can be used for a long period, before gaining a replacement 
with a new anonymised copy. This solution saves the user’s time and improves 
performance. However, this solution cannot be implemented in live data, which is 
updated regularly. Hence, live data are controlled by a (lifetime) parameter. This 
parameter is determined by data owners. The anonymised copy of the data remains 
during the lifetime period. When the lifetime period expires, the anonymised copy is 
prone for removal. When the user accesses the same dataset, the anonymised copy is 
verified by lifetime expiry; if it has expired, the database copy is purged, and a new 
anonymised copy is generated. For example, if the lifetime was determined by the data 
owner to be 24 hours, the anonymised copy of the data will be erased if the user 
attempts to reuse the data after 24 hours, and a new anonymisation process will occur to 
create a new anonymised copy. 
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Figure 5.3—Live data options for data owner interface 
 
 
Figure 5.4—Archived data options for data owner interface 
 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the steps that data owners need to follow to create and 
configure a new dataset. The figures present the distinction options between archived 
and live data that data owners need to provide. The live data require the expiry number 
of hours before they are purged, as shown in Figure 5.3. The archived data require more 
parameters, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figures 5.5 summarises the steps for preparing any new dataset for analytics. Data 
owners must define the Q-ID attributes, assign the attributes to groups, assign a k-
anonymity value, and map the attributes to business roles. Each Q-ID attribute must be 
associated with a probability value and masking type. The dataset is categorised as 
archived or live data, where the archived data are given the time factor parameters of 
age participation, obsolescence value and obsolescence unit. Apart from dataset 
preparation, data owners must determine business roles and organisations, and assign a 
set of roles to each organisation. Users are created and managed by the delegated 
organisations. 
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Figure 5.5—Steps to configure initial values for each dataset 
5.2.2 MDSBA k̄ Percentage and Business Roles 
One of the granularity structures in MDSBA is assigning business roles to Q-ID groups. 
This is essential to formalise the access control as per business roles. Data owners prefer 
dealing with permissions using roles, rather than dealing with Q-ID groups. Moreover, 
business roles can be given variable parameters depending on users’ permissions, while 
Q-ID groups keep their anonymity parameters regardless of users’ permissions. This 
imposes two separate k-anonymity parameters: k value and k̄ value. The value of k is 
assigned to Q-ID groups as an unchangeable fixed value to represent the optimal k-
anonymity value from the grouping prospective. In contrast, the value of k̄ is assigned to 
business roles to represent the users’ access permissions. Therefore, k̄ value is assigned 
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to business roles that are delegated to organisations. Assigning ?̄?-value requires 
knowing the organisation’s business role needs. One more parameter was derived from k 
and k̄ value relations, known as k percentage (𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 ). This value is defined as the 
permitted level that allows a user to view data. For instance, 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  = 100% implies that 
the user is given ?̄? = 𝑘. The value of  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  = 60% implies that the user is given 60% of 
the k value, so if the k = 100, then ?̄? = 60. Business roles are assigned to organizations 
as per their request. Each assigned business role is given a  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐   value. The k̄ is 
calculated as k̄ = 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  × 𝑘.  
The anonymisation process needs two parameters to apply the appropriate amount of 
masking, and these are the k and k̄ values. These two values are essential for calculating 
the value of ψ. The data owners set up each organisation’s details by determining 
the 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 for each role. The  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 is determined based on the service level of agreement 
between the data owners and the organisations. Let us study an example that shows the 
sequential steps of preparing the Q-ID groups, mapping them to business roles, and 
assigning them to users. Table 5.1 presents a set of attributes for (Properties), where the 
data consist of {suburb_id, suburb, street_name, property_type, bedrooms_num, 
bathrooms_num, sale_price, cost_price, max_offer_price}. The suburb ID is the primary 
key of the table, but is not included in the Q-ID groups. However, the primary key is 
essential for ungrouping records during the anonymisation process. Such attributes can 
be divided into two Q-ID groups. The first Q-ID group can be G(QID)1 = {suburb, 
property_type, bedrooms_num, bathrooms_num}, with one class of {street_name}, 
while the second Q-ID group can be G(QID)2 = {sale_price, cost_price}, with one class 
of {max_offer_price}. In this example, the data owner may create a set of roles for 
G(QID)1 = {Strata Manager, Sales Representative} and for G(QID)2 = {Construction 
Contractor, Strata Manager}. The given roles determine the data of interest for each 
role. However, users can be given more than one role, and each role can be mapped to 
many Q-ID groups, as shown in Figure 5.6. 
Let us refer to this property example, as shown in Table 5.1, by considering a user (U1), 
who belongs to ABC Company. The company was given three roles of {Strata Manager, 
Sales Representative and Construction Contractor}. The company was delegated three 
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roles for its users. User U1 was given two out of three roles. The owner assigned k1 = 
500 for the G(QID)1 group, and k2 = 700 for G(QID)2. Moreover,  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  [Strata 
Manager] = 0.7 and  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  [Sales Representative] = 0.8 for ABC Company. The 
permission of user U1 will be given based on the percentage of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  . Hence, the first k̄ 
value for the first group is k̄ = 0.8 × 500 = 400. In the second Q-ID group, Strata 
Manager is the only role mapped to G1, so k̄ = 0.7 ×700 = 490. The final result indicates 
user U1 with the following k and k̄ ordered values: U1(k, k̄) = {(500, 400), (700, 490)}. 
Table 5.1—Example of properties data for roles and Q–ID groups 
Role for ABC Mapped To:  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐   
Strata Manager G(QID)1 + G(QID)2 70% 
Sales Representative G(QID)1  80% 
Construction Contractor G(QID)2 10% 
              
G(QID)1 k1 = 500  
Q-IDs Suburb property_type bathrooms_num bedrooms_num 
Class street_name 
              
G(QID)2 k2 = 700 
Q-IDs cost_price sale_price 
Class max_offer_price 
 
Given that there are two Q-ID groups available in the previous example, two pairs of 
integers will be created to be transmitted to the SP by SAML. The number of created 
integers must be equal to the number of Q-ID groups. If the number of Q-ID groups is 
three, then three pairs will be transmitted, and so on. The pair consists of 𝑘 and ?̄? values 
for each Q-ID group. The pair represents the permission decision for each group. For 
instance, if a pair of (70, 50) is transmitted to the SP, it will be interpreted as k = 70 and 
k̄ = 50. Moreover, the G(QID) suppression is denoted by k̄ = 𝑘. For example, if a user U 
is given the following pairs, U(𝑘, ?̄?) = {(80, 80), (100, 80)}, this notation is interpreted 
on the SP side as G(QID)1-[suppression] and G(QID)2-[permission]. In another 
example, if a user (U3) is assigned to the three available roles, the two pairs for G(QID) 
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are given as follows: for Strata Manager, k̄ = 490; for Sales Representative, k̄ = 400; and 
for Construction Contractor, k̄ = 630. G(QID)1 is given the lowest k̄ value, which is k̄ = 
400. Similarly, the G(QID)2 is given the lowest k̄ value, which is k̄ = 490. The final 
result is transmitted to the SP as follows: U3(𝑘, ?̄?) = {(500, 400), (700, 490)} because 
the Strata Manager role is mapped to both of the Q-ID groups. These examples show the 
permission’s mapping from FS to SP. If a user is delegated the Sales Representative 
role, then the second G(QID)2 must be suppressed or access is denied. 
The organisations are delegated to control their own users’ permissions and role 
assignment. However, organisations cannot decrease the predetermined  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  given by 
the data owner. Eventually, users inherit these percentages from their own organisations. 
In addition, each organisation is given limited roles with  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐   for each role. Figure 5.6 
illustrates the G(QID) to role mapping with the organisation’s intersections. 
 
Figure 5.6—Organisation–roles–groups mapping 
5.2.3 MDSBA Three Services 
The MDSBA framework starts from the FS processes and ends with the user’s analytics 
processes. The framework consists of three main services: core, initialiser and 
anonymiser. The core resides in the FS side, while both the initialiser and anonymiser 
reside in the SP side, as shown in Figure 5.7. The MDSBA framework consists of four 
groups of servers: FS, SP-Gateway, Kerberos and LDAP, and Hadoop domain. A 
customer is defined as any user who attempts to access the Hadoop domain for data 
analytics, and can be the data owner or a customer from any external organisation. 
However, the external customer must be approved by the data owner. Both the FS and 
SP-Gateway operate SAML Version 2 servers for data transmission between SP and FS. 
In addition, the SP-Gateway contains the initialiser service, which remotely creates the 
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anonymisation script. The anonymisation script is executed in NameNode servers. The 
Hadoop domain is managed by a domain server, which consists of LDAP and Kerberos 
services to provide security and users’ authentication and authorisation. Users are 
authenticated twice with two separate authentication accounts. The initial authentication 
is in the core service, while the second authentication is especially for the Hadoop 
domain and located in the anonymiser service. 
 
Figure 5.7—MDSBA three main services: core, initialiser and anonymiser 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the sequence diagram for the MDSBA three services—core, 
initialiser and anonymiser. The user requests access to the Hadoop domain for analytics 
tasks. The FS authenticates the user and determines the users’ organisations and roles 
attached to them. The service also determines the user’s own roles assigned by his or her 
organisation. The generated XML request by SAML contains attributes with 
information about user ID, data ID, data status and the other sensitivity parameters. 
SAML thereafter takes over the communication procedures between the FS and SP. The 
XML assertion is then transferred to the SP-Gateway, which in turn receives the request 
and retrieves the data information with the help of the data ID that was received from 
the assertion XML. The SP-Gateway contains a set of files, as described in Table 5.2. 
One of the essential XML files is definder.xml, which contains the necessary 
information about the requested data. The core service is completed when SAML takes 
over. 
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Figure 5.8—Sequence diagram for MDSBA framework 
As shown in Figure 5.8, the algorithm illustrates both services of initialiser and 
anonymiser. The initialiser service begins by creating the Pig script, which is generated 
by collecting information from parsing two XML files—definder.xml and the SAML 
assertion file. The initialiser service verifies the user’s availability from the 
LDAP/Kerberos server. The FS provides a user ID, which is considered the username on 
the SP side. Hence, the username generated from the FS user ID will be created in the 
LDAP server if it was not created before. In the third service, data are copied to the 
Hadoop domain, and specifically to the NameNode. If the username was created before, 
then the anonymiser service verifies whether to purge or keep the previously 
anonymised data. If data are purged, the Pig script is triggered and a new anonymisation 
process begins. Later, the user is provided with all access details, including username, 
password and data location of input and output paths. 
5.2.3.1 Core Service 
The core provides the initial authentication and authorisation for multi-access user 
levels. The core service consists of a data schema and user interfaces to update MDSBA 
users’ and dataset’s details. Users’ details include user name, login details, organisation 
names, general roles and roles assigned to the organisation. The data owner configures 
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the initial settings for each targeted dataset that users wish to access and analyse. The 
core service initial setup is shown in Figure 5.5. The aim of the setup is identifying the 
Q-IDs and classes in the data schema. Two to four Q-IDs and one class are assigned to 
one group. The chosen Q-ID group and class are not necessarily found in one table. The 
created roles’ conventional names should mimic the user’s actual roles. 
Figure 5.9 illustrates the entity relationship diagram (ERD) for the MDSBA core 
schema. The schema is located on the FS side. The relationship diagram consists of 10 
entities to store information of organisations, users, roles and datasets. The dataset entity 
describes any uploaded data schemas by data owners for analytics. The physical location 
of these data is available on the SP side, while the data’s information is available on the 
FS side. The dataset entity consists of the following attributes: {data_name, 
creationDate, liveObject, ageParticipation, obsolescence, obsol_unit}. The graphical 
interfaces of this entity are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The attribute of liveObject 
presents the expiry time in hours for the live data. Hence, if the data type is archived, 
then the liveObject value is zero. If the data type is live, then ageParticipation, 
obsolescence and obsol_unit are set to zero. ERD contains three associative tables. 
These tables are created to resolve the many-to-many relationship: {Assign, Role_QID, 
user_role}. Figure 5.9 contains the dataset entity, which is related to G(QID) and 
attribute entities. The attribute entity defines each attribute’s description in the dataset. 
The description includes description, probability, class_values, taxonomy_xml_file and 
mask_type (taxonomy, integer or suppression). Any attribute can be a Q-ID, class or 
ordinary entity. The attributes (isClass) and (isQID) are Boolean values. Hence, three 
possible value pairs are assigned to both attributes (isQID, isClass} = {(0, 0), (0, 1) or 
(1, 0)}. If both attributes’ values are (0, 0), then the attribute is an ordinary attribute. If 
both attributes’ values are (0, 1), then the attribute is a class. 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the data flow diagram for the MDSBA core schema. The diagram 
illustrates two main interfaces—for data owners and organisations. Data owners are 
responsible for initialising objects of the dataset, organisation, role, roles to 
organisations and G(QID). Organisations are responsible for creating users and adding 
business roles to users. 
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Figure 5.9—Core part of the MDSBA framework 
 
Figure 5.10—Dataflow diagram for the MDSBA core 
Figure 5.11 shows one of the administrator’s interfaces that is able to create Q-ID 
groups. The main parameters are selecting the Q-ID attributes, the k value, the class 
attribute and the classValues. 
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Figure 5.11—Interface to create G groups of Q-IDs, classes and classValues 
5.2.3.1.1 Keep or Remove Decision 
The core service generates several XML files to transmit them to the SP side. The 
services include assertion.xml, definder.xml and taxonomy tree files. The SAML server 
generates the assertion file. The generation process requires some parameters to be 
retrieved from the MDSBA data schema. The SP needs to know whether to retain or 
remove the anonymised copy of the dataset. The SP offers a service to regularly purge 
the anonymised copies. This service needs to know the exact expiry time for the 
anonymised copies. To gain this information, the core service examines two statuses of 
data types: live and archived data. These two types are essential to determine the expiry 
time of the anonymised copies. Both cases are presented in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. Live 
data are related to the expiry period established by the data owner, while archived data 
are related to the obsolescence value established by the data owner. The core service 
generates the assertion.xml file as per this available information. 
The assertion.xml file contains one attribute, known as data_status. This attribute 
presents two values for the data status: [remove: remaining hours] or [keep]. If a certain 
user is accessing a specified dataset for the first time, then an initial value is presented 
by (remove: 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈)), where 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) denotes the remaining hours calculated by the FS 
side. This value is interpreted on the SP side as indicating that a new anonymisation 
process is occurring, and the anonymised copy will last for the number of hours 
provided. For instance, if the value provided is [remove: 6], then a new anonymisation 
process will begin, and the expiry time for this copy is six hours. If the same user has 
accessed the same dataset after four hours, then the status will be replaced by [keep]. 
Note that the status [keep] does not need to be presented with the remaining time. If the 
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user accesses the data again the next day, the status will be replaced by [remove: 6]. The 
SP side will view the status and store the time value. 
5.2.3.1.2 Initial Access 
Usually, the FS determines whether to retain or remove by investigating the latest user’s 
access for the requested dataset. For the initial access, when a user has never accessed 
that specified dataset, then an initial value is created. Let us formalise the expiry time 
for each dataset. Suppose that the current date/time is denoted by 𝑡𝑐 and the expiry 
period given by the data owner is denoted by Ѐ. The remaining period for the specified 
dataset, D, and user, U, is denoted by 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈). For the user’s initial access when data 
type = live, the equation used in the FS side is shown below: 
Data Type = live:   𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) = Ѐ     (5.1) 
For the user’s initial access when data type = archived, the expiry period, Ѐ, is replaced 
by obsolescence value, Ø. The equation depends on the date and time that the dataset D 
was initially uploaded, which is denoted by 𝑈(𝐷). Thus, the equation used is shown 
below: 
Data Type = archived: 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) = Ø − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑇𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠(𝑡𝑐 − 𝑈(𝐷)) (5.2) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 Ø 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠. 
In archived data, the value of 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) falls between two-time intervals: the first interval 
when the user accesses the dataset before the end of the obsolescence period, and the 
second interval when the user accesses the dataset at or after the end of the obsolescence 
period. The first interval imposes that (𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) > 0), which means that the user’s 
access was before the end of the obsolescence value. The second-time interval imposes 
that (𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) ≤ 0), which means that the user’s access was at or after the end of the 
obsolescence value. Based on these two intervals, the keep/remove statuses are 
determined. The initial access is determined if the access was before or after the 
obsolescence value, Ø. If the access was before Ø, then the status will be [remove: 
𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈)], as illustrated in Equation 5.2. If the access was equal to or after Ø, then the 
status will be [remove: 𝐸(𝑇)]. The period of E(T) can be determined by the data 
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owner—for instance, one month or so. On the other side, the SP interprets this value 
differently. The SP stores the 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) value in the log file to purge the created dataset 
after the expiry period. For instance, if the data owner assigned (Ѐ = 74) and the user’s 
access date and time was 𝑡𝑐 = 5 December 2017 at 13.10, initially, the FS will transmit 
the value of [remove: 74]. The SP will purge the anonymised data at the end of the 
expiry time, which is 5 December 2017 at 13.10 + 74 hours = 8 December 2017 at 
15.10. The 74 hours contains three days and two hours. Therefore, the dataset will not 
be available after 8 December 2017 at 15.10. During the past three days, any access 
attempt will provide a data status of [keep], which allows users to access the previously 
anonymised copy. 
5.2.3.1.3 Subordinate Access 
After the initial access, the FS determines whether to keep or remove by investigating 
the latest user’s access for the requested dataset. If it finds that the user has already 
accessed the specified dataset, then the expiry period value 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) is calculated for 
data type = live as follows: 
𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) = Ѐ − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑇𝑜𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠(𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡𝑎(𝐷))     (5.3) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒/𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐷, 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒/𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 
The FS refers to the latest access for the specified dataset to determine whether to keep 
or remove. The above equation is used to help the decision making. The expiry 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) 
is calculated and compared with the expiry period, Ѐ, that was assigned by the data 
owners. If data type = archived and the access was before the end of the obsolescence 
value, then the status will be [keep]. If the data type = archived and the access was equal 
to or after the end of the obsolescence, then the status value will be [keep], if the time 
period E(T) has not yet expired. If the time period E(T) has expired, then the status will 
[remove: 𝐸(𝑇)]. 
5.2.3.2 Initialiser Service 
The initialiser service is the second component of the MDSBA framework. The service 
operates on the SP side and outside the Hadoop domain. The SP should provide a 
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gateway service, which is considered the first entry level for users who wish to 
participate in data analytics. For security purposes, the gateway server should be isolated 
from the Hadoop domain. This service provides initial documents to prepare data for 
anonymisation. The SP needs to provide a valid path on the SP-Gateway server for data 
owners. All uploaded data on SP servers must be provided with an essential set of 
documents to support the anonymisation process. Data owners need to upload these 
supportive files over a given path on the SP-Gateway. The files consist of two XML 
files, one ecosystem script (such as Pig or Hive) and the anonymisation software 
program (such as JAR). One of the XML files is definer.xml, which defines Q-ID 
groups and their related Q-IDs and other attributes. The format of this file is described in 
Figure 5.12. The file contains the database ID, path, attributes and Q-ID group types and 
classes. These attributes are needed to provide complete information about data on the 
SP side. The Q-ID types are given the letters (i, s, t) to denote the interval, suppression 
and taxonomy tree, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.12—Definder.xml file demonstration 
The file (definder.xml) is generated from the core service. Information is stored in the 
data schema and can be easily generated as per dataset. The file consists of Q-ID groups 
created from the data schema, as shown in Figure 5.12. The SP-Gateway server 
communicates with FS through the SAML Version 2 server. Upon a user’s login, the 
core service generates another XML file of SAML assertion (assertion.xml), which 
contains login and anonymisation information in the attributes section of the XML file, 
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as shown in Figure 5.2. The XML assertion file is unlike the definer.xml because it is 
generated each time a user requests access, while the definder.xml is transferred to the 
SP-Gateway only on dataset alteration. The attribute section of the assertion.xml file 
contains the following information: user ID, database ID, k̄ values, sensitivity level (ψ) 
and data status. Data status consists of two different values: keep or remove. The data 
status defines the previous anonymised copy and its validity for the same user. This 
decision is made on the FS side, based on the last login time by the user. The decision is 
made by comparing the last login and the obsolescence value for the archived data or the 
liveObject for the live data. Table 5.2 illustrates the essential available files for each 
dataset on the SP side, as part of the initialiser service in the MDSBA framework. 
 
Figure 5.13—Sample of data_id.xml file 
Table 5.2 presents the output files of Pig script and data_id.xml. The data_id file is vital 
for Java programs during the anonymising process. Java files—such as ADJUST.java, 
SSG_P1.java and SSG_P2.java—need some parameters to execute the program. The file 
data_id.xml is a combination of the definder.xml and assertion.xml files. The file is 
generated by the initialiser service, which contains the following attributes: all 
information contained in definder.xml, plus some information abstracted from the 
SAML assertion, including (data_id, user_id, k̄, ψ, data_status {keep, remove}). 
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Table 5.2—List of files used by the initialiser service 
File Name File Description 
Main Files (Outside Hadoop Domain) 
definder.xml Generated by core service and uploaded by the data owner once, or on data 
alteration. Contains data information, including: 
- attributes named by f sequence 
- Q-IDs named by f sequence 
- Q-IDs anonymisation type {taxonomy, t; interval, i; suppression, s} 
- k value for each Q-ID group 
- Q-IDs probabilities 
- class named by f sequence 
- class values. 
assertion.xml Generated by the core service, which contains the following attributes: 
- All information contained in definder.xml, plus some information abstracted 
from the SAML assertion, including (data_id, user_id, k̄, ψ, data_status {keep, 
remove}). 
Other Files (Transferred to Hadoop Domain) 
User_id-i.pig Set of Pig scripts files, generated by the initialiser service. 
Anonymiser.jar Contains six java files: ADJUST.java, SSG_P1.java, SSG_P2.java, NG_P.java, 
SUP_P.java and OBV_G. 
Taxonomy trees 
[fi.xml] 
Generated by core service and uploaded by data owner once, or on data alteration. 
Each file represents one Q-ID attribute of taxonomy tree type. This file is used by 
Java files during the anonymisation process. 
Data_id.xml Generated by the initialiser service, which contains the following attributes: 
- All information contained in definder.xml, plus some information abstracted 
from the SAML assertion, including (data_id, user_id, k̄, ψ, data_status {keep, 
remove}). 
 
Figure 5.13 presents an example of a data_id.xml file. The example shows complete 
details about the dataset ID, path, attributes, status and details of each group. The data 
status is presented by [keep], which indicates that the user can access the previously 
anonymised dataset. If the status showed [remove: 8], then the dataset would be purged 
after eight hours. The unit used in the data status is hours. Table 5.2 shows a set of files 
that are needed to generate a data_id.xml file. Two XML files, ‘definder.xml’ and 
‘assertion.xml’, are found on the SP-Gateway and outside the Hadoop domain. These 
two files provide some parameters to generate the Data_id.xml file before transmitting it 
to the Hadoop domain. 
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5.2.3.2.1 Generating Pig Scripts in Initialiser Service 
The Pig script is essential to anonymise data before permitting user access. The script is 
generated based on the definder.xml and SAML assertion.xml files. These two files 
provide the essential parameters to create a set of Pig script files. The anonymisation 
script will be transmitted to the Hadoop domain. The initialiser service creates one Pig 
script file for each Q-ID group. As described before, a Q-ID group may contain a 
number of two to four Q-ID attributes. Hence, the number of generated scripts depends 
on the number of Q-ID attributes in the group. 
The initialiser service reads the definder.xml file to obtain data information, including 
data location, Q-ID attributes, k values, status, probabilities and classes. The initialiser 
first determines the data status—whether the data have (keep) or (remove) status. If the 
data have (keep) status, then no anonymisation occurs and the user can log in to his or 
her previous HDFS directories. Otherwise, the old anonymised data will be purged, and 
a new anonymisation process will begin. Following this, the initialiser creates the scripts 
line by line, starting with registering the JAR file, assigning the load location, filtering, 
creating the user HDFS directories, grouping and anonymising by UDF Java. Figure 
5.14 illustrates an example of Pig script created by the initialiser service. 
Figure 5.14 describes part of the generated Pig script for three Q-IDs. The full script is 
attached in Appendix 1. The script filters the class value as per the two values of (yes, 
no). Hence, two G groups are created, and each group is aggregated by three Q-IDs, 
then by two Q-IDs, and finally by one Q-ID. In Pig Latin, it is possible to name 
attributes with (f) letter instead of using the attribute name. Before generating the Pig 
script, the initialiser initiates two HDFS directory paths for the user. The directories are 
not created thus far, but should be named with the standard of input and output as 
follows: 
hdfs://namenode:9000/[data_id][user_id]/input 
hdfs://namenode:9000/[data_id][user_id]/output 
Two HDFS directories are created for each user, and two Pig scripts files will be 
generated based on the given information. The HDFS path consists of the NameNode, 
followed by the port number, data ID and user ID. The default port number is usually 
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9000 or 8020. This given path will be created in the anonymisation service stage, as will 
be described in the next section. 
 
Figure 5.14—Pig script file created by the initialiser service 
5.2.3.3 Anonymiser Service 
This service operates between the SP-Gateway and NameNode, and specifically in both 
the gateway server and Hadoop domain/NameNode server. The service process is 
located on the SP-Gateway to copy and execute scripts in the NameNode server 
remotely. The process of the service copies the output files from the initialiser service. 
The files include XML, Pig and JAR files, as shown in Table 5.2. The anonymiser 
service executes anonymisation scripts in the Hadoop domain. The domain is controlled 
and managed by the LDAP and Kerberos server, which provides authentication and 
authorisation services of the domain user’s access. In addition, Kerberos is enabled to 
support tickets granting for Hadoop services, which creates a Hadoop secure mode. 
The anonymiser service executes shell commands by implementing web programming. 
This technique is secure and made possible with the new web programming extensions 
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and libraries. MDSBA adopted PHP programming language, with the support of 
phpseclib, php-devel, php-pear and libssh2-devel extension packages. The packages 
perform properly with Secure Shell Version 2 (SSH2) [27]. SSH2 can access other 
devices to execute commands via an interactive shell with read and write permissions, as 
shown in Figure 5.15. The command script is contained in a secure web page to protect 
the secure domain sudoers account related to the executed shell commands. The web 
page can be either by a trusted certificate or by a self-signed certificate. The used 
account should have full privileges over HDFS storage directory and part of LDAP 
sudoers [106]. There are subtle differences between LDAP sudoers and local sudoers; 
thus, the used account in the shown script must contain an LDAP domain account, as 
shown in bold in Figure 5.15 [102]. The script executes the Pig script remotely, as 
shown in Figure 5.15. Before executing the script, the previously mentioned files, of 
scripts and XML files, must be copied to the NameNode server. The command in SSH2 
is given by $command = "scp /var/www/html/".$user_name.$databas_id."/*.* 
/$NameNode_server". 
<?php 
       include('Net/SSH2.php'); 
       $ssh=new Net_SSH2('namenode.fullname'); 
       $ssh->login('hadoop','password') or die ("Login failed"); 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
       $ssh->exec("hadoop fs -mkdir /[data_id][user_id]/input"); 
       $ssh->exec("hadoop fs -mkdir /[data_id][user_id]/output"); 
       $ssh->exec("hadoop  chown -R user_id hdfs://namenode:9000/[data_id][user_id]/input/"); 
       $ssh->exec("hadoop  chown -R user_id hdfs://namenode:9000/[data_id][user_id]/output/"); 
       $ssh->exec("pig –x mapreduce script-1.pig"); 
?> 
Figure 5.15—PHP sample for anonymiser service 
The MDSBA framework maps the user_id of the FS to the Hadoop domain through the 
LDAP service. The same user_id is created in the LDAP domain, if it was not created 
before. The anonymiser service verifies the user_id availability with the LDAP service. 
If the user_id is unavailable, then the service creates a username and random complex 
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password. For security reasons, the password cannot be mapped with the FS password. 
Hence, a newly created password is required to authenticate the user when accessing the 
Hadoop domain. Thus, the user can access the NameNode though Secure Shell (SSH). If 
the user_id has already been created, then the service decides whether to delete or keep 
the anonymised data so that the user can employ the same authentication details. For 
first-time access, a shell command line is triggered to create the input and output HDFS 
directories, and finally run the Pig script, as illustrated by Figure 5.15 in PHP 
programming. 
Figure 5.17 illustrates the SP anonymisation algorithm. The procedures describe both 
initialiser and anonymiser services to permit users’ access to anonymised copies of the 
dataset. The procedures are summarised by parsing data ID and user ID from the 
assertion.xml file. The assertion file provides some needed information to build the Pig 
Latin script, which creates anonymised copies of datasets. The first conditional 
statement in the algorithm verifies whether or not the username was created before. The 
process interacts with the LDAP server and fetches the username by the user_id, where 
username = user_id. If the username is not found, it is created by using the user_id as a 
username, and a randomly created password. Next, the HDFS directories should be 
created and given permission. Creating the user’s directories requires knowledge of 
user_id and data_id. The initialiser service needs to read two XML files—definder and 
assertion—to prepare the needed documents for the anonymiser service. The initialiser 
first creates three main files of Pig script, data_id.xml and SP log file. The data_id.xml 
and Pig script are passed to the anonymiser service, which copies the essential files to a 
temporary file in NameNode of the Hadoop domain. Finally, the Pig script is executed 
so that the anonymised copy of the dataset is ready upon completion of the 
anonymisation process. 
The algorithm in Figure 5.16 shows two authentication levels by users to access the 
Hadoop domain. This is essential in securing the Hadoop domain. The first 
authentication process is required by FS to determine the user’s authorisation level. The 
second authentication process is needed for SSH access. The password authentication is 
essential when accessing the NameNode server through the SSH interface. Users are 
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able to use SSH to access the Hadoop service directly at any time to submit analytics 
queries, without going through the long process of web access. Nevertheless, this 
shortcut may not provide users with the latest live dataset. The solution to this issue is 
creating a continuous process to purge the anonymised copy of the dataset. The purge 
process continuously reads the SP log file to determine the purged data. 
Algorithm for Anonymiser Service 
1. Log in automatically with Hadoop username and password. 
2. Read the user_id and check if it is available in the LDAP domain. 
3. If it is not found, create a new username = user_id and a random password for the user. 
4. Create HDFS path for input and output by using Hadoop authentication. 
5. Give permissions to the username = user_id for HDFS I/O folders. 
6. Create a temporary folder in the NameNode server. 
7. Copy all needed files to the temporary folder. 
8. Run the Pig Latin script. 
9. The user logs in to the anonymised copy by using the SSH interface. 
Output: Anonymised copy of the original dataset. 
Figure 5.16—Algorithm for anonymiser service 
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Figure 5.17—Initialiser and anonymiser algorithms 
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5.2.3.3.1 SP Log File and Purge Process 
The log file is a major component of any server service. It is a primary tool for tracking 
all activities occurring on servers. For this reason, MDSBA creates its own SP log files. 
One of the primary log files is created for a continuous process, known as the purge 
process. The process mission is purging all expired anonymised datasets to use storage 
capacity. All types of datasets (live or archived) are affected by the time factor. Time is 
an essential parameter to determine the anonymisation and access level. MDSBA 
reduces archived data masking to allow more gained information in parallel with the 
time factor. Users should not access the same anonymised copies of datasets at all times. 
The current anonymised copies may not be valid after a certain period. Purging datasets 
and creating fresh anonymised copies is necessary. The created log file must record the 
user ID, data ID, anonymised data path and expiry date/time, as shown in Table 5.3. 
The FS side interprets the attribute data_status of the assertion.xml file. The attribute 
notation is presented by [keep/remove: 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈)]. The anonymiser service will not take 
any action when the status = keep, while a few steps are considered if the status = 
remove. The remove status is always attached with the expiry period; therefore, the 
anonymiser service registers part of the details in the log file, as shown in Table 5.3, and 
proceeds to the following steps. First, the anonymiser checks whether the previous 
dataset was purged. If it was not purged, the anonymiser process will purge the previous 
anonymised copy. Second, a new anonymisation process will be initiated. 
Table 5.3—Log file for the purge process 
User 
ID 
Data 
ID 
Anonymisation 
Path 
Expiry 
Date/ 
Time 
Last 
Purge 
Attempt 
No. of 
Attempts 
Purge 
Result 
Purged 
(Yes/ 
No) 
123456 111111 /111111123456/input 05.01.18 
15.20 
05.01.18 
18.10 
4 Fail No 
321215 111111 /111111321215/input 12.03.18 
11.05 
12.03.18 
13.30 
2 Success Yes 
123456 222222 /222222123456/input 25.03.18 
01.20 
24.03.18 
03.30 
3  No 
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Table 5.3 presents entries from two separate services. The first four attributes are added 
or updated by the anonymiser service. The expiry date/time is calculated in the core 
service. The anonymiser parses the data_status attribute value and converts the 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈) 
value to a real date and time by adding the current time 𝑡𝑐  to 𝐸(𝐷, 𝑈). The anonymiser 
stores only one record for each user attempting to access a specified dataset. As shown 
in Table 5.3, the user ID = 123456 has only one record for accessing data, ID = 111111. 
Another record for the same user can be created if the user accessed a different dataset. 
Therefore, each record will be created once and updated for every user’s access. 
The purge process cannot create any record; instead, it just updates the available data 
records. The purge process updates the last four attributes in Table 5.3. The purge 
process is an infinitive process that is considered part of the anonymiser service. The 
process is triggered as per a schedule. It can be established for execution as desired—
such as every three hours. The process reads all records of the log file, where {(purged = 
null/no), (purge result ≠ fail) and (expiry date/time ≥ current date/time)}. The purge 
process deletes all expired copies by following the anonymisation path for each copy. 
After deletion completion, the process updates the data record by {last purge attempt, 
no. of attempts, purge results and purged (yes/no)}. Some copies of datasets may be 
busy with other analytics operations or queries at the time of triggering the purge 
process. In this case, the purge process will wait for a period and skip a few purge 
rounds before trying another attempt. For this reason, the log file keeps the latest 
date/time for the purge attempt. This delay is essential to allow sufficient time for the 
query process to complete the task. The queries triggered by users may lock the datasets, 
while the process is ongoing. Therefore, it is inefficient to try to purge this busy dataset 
on each round. 
The purge process uses some parameters stored in a configuration XML file, known as 
purge.xml. The XML file is shown in Figure 5.18. The XML file allows system 
administrators to establish the waiting period before the next round begins. Figure 5.18 
displays the default value of the waiting period, which is 30 minutes, while the next 
purge attempt is assigned as 3. This means that the purge process will again try to delete 
the datasets if it previously failed. The next attempt will commence after two hours of 
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creating the anonymised dataset—that is, three attempts within a 30-minute waiting 
period between each attempt. Moreover, the process will try to delete the dataset four 
times, as per the configuration file in Figure 5.18. With each time, the log file is updated 
by incrementing the number of attempts and updating the rest of the attributes. As 
shown in Table 5.3, if any attempt has succeeded in purging data, then the attribute 
(purge result) is updated with the value= ‘success’, while the value = ‘fail’ is updated 
after the fourth attempt if all attempts have failed. If the result value is ‘fail’, then an 
email will be sent to the system administrator’s email (admin@service_provider.com), 
as shown in Figure 5.18. 
As explained, two different processes can delete expired datasets. Both processes are 
part of the anonymiser service and read from the same log file. The anonymiser may 
delete datasets only if data status is removed. Anyhow, the purge process is the main 
process that carries over the deletion operations. 
 
Figure 5.16—Sample of purge.xml configuration file 
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5.3 Improvement to MDSBA Security 
Sweeney described a few types of attack that can be instigated against the k-anonymity 
method, as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.1. The previously mentioned attacks 
are not possible in MDSBA. For instance, multiple quires impairment, which appears in 
k-anonymity, does not appear in MDSBA. This is because Q-ID anonymisation in 
MDSBA refers to the attribute probabilities. Anonymisation always begins with the 
lowest probability attribute; hence, amending queries does not switch the anonymisation 
process to other Q-ID attributes. In addition, in MDSBA, the class attribute must gain 
the k-anonymity equivalency principle. Other possible attacks against MDSBA can be 
summarised into two types of attacks: obvious guess and across groups unique identifier 
attacks (AGUI). These attacks are described in the next two subsections. 
5.3.1 Obvious Guess 
An adversary may be able to guess the sensitive attribute (class) if the Q-ID attributes 
are known to the adversary. This violation may occur when a group of equivalent 
records has one class value. In this case, increasing or decreasing the number of 
equivalent records does not affect the security level. For instance, if a group of patients 
have one value of the class ‘diabetes = positive’ and share the same race, age and state, 
then the intruder can obviously guess the diabetes state of the patient. This attack is 
simply defined as follows: 
Definition 5.1: An obvious guess attack may appear in MDSBA if a group of fully 
equivalent records has one class value. 
In an obvious guess attack, an adversary may easily guess the sensitive attribute (class), 
without having to identify the record. For example, in the Seer data, we may have a data 
bag as shown in Table 5.4. In this example, the diagnostic may contain only one value. 
This class demonstrates the obvious guess breach, which can be interpreted as indicating 
that any black person living in county 125 who was diagnosed in 1997 and is aged 25 
must have a positive histology cancer. The obvious guess occurs if the bag contains only 
one class value. 
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Table 5.4—Obvious guess example 
Y. Diagnosis  County  Race  Age  Diagnostic 
1997 125 Black 25 Positive histology 
1997 125 Black 25 Positive histology 
1997 125 Black 25 Positive histology 
 
5.3.2 Across Groups Unique Identifiers (AGUI) 
The second possible attack against MDSBA is caused by splitting Q-ID attributes into 
small groups, where the unique identifier’s security threat is lower than the uniqueness 
appearing in each Q-ID group. In this scenario, the attacker needs to know almost 
everything about the victim’s background. This is believed to be a background 
knowledge attack and is defined as follows: 
Definition 5.2: AGUI is a unique record that appears after anonymisation. The record 
is not anonymised because of its equivalency with the other records; hence, its 
uniqueness appears across multiple Q-ID groups and disappears in individual Q-ID 
groups. 
Based on this definition, we may notice that an AGUI attack is possible if the adversary 
knows most of the personal attributes in multiple Q-ID groups. In this case, the AGUI 
attack severity will not be as high as attacks involving personal re-identification records 
that are targeted by k-anonymity. This low-security threat should be reduced to a 
minimum to inhibit its effect on security violation. MDSBA does not guarantee AGUI 
prevention but supports the minimal appearance of such records. Dividing attributes into 
small Q-ID groups is essential to reduce the anonymisation computation cost and to 
participate in the granular access process. 
AGUI is caused by G(QID) grouping, which may create another security concern. This 
may appear when dividing data attributes into small groups of Q-IDs and classes. Two 
to four Q-ID attributes are divided into groups, with one class for each group. This 
grouping is essential, but it may help adversaries to identify a few known records. To 
explain this, let us examine Table 5.5, which shows a small part of the Seer data, with 
two Q-ID groups. 
Chapter 5—Framework for Sensitivity-based Anonymisation 
 
167 
Table 5.5—Part of Seer data with two Q-ID groups 
G(QID)1 Class-1   G(QID)2 Class-2 
Age Gende
r 
County State and 
County 
Year of 
Diagnosis 
Race Grade Diagnostic 
Confirmation 
26  Female 31 Hartford, 
CT 
1991 White Unknown Unknown 
26 Female 31 Chaves, 
NM 
1991 White Unknown Unknown 
26  Female 31 Chaves. 
NM 
1991 White Unknown Direct 
visualisation 
26 Female 31 Jefferson, 
WA 
1991 White Unknown Direct 
visualisation 
26 Female 31 Jefferson, 
WA 
1991 Black Moderate; 
Grade II 
Positive 
histology 
28  Female 31 Dubuque, 
IA 
1991 Black Moderate; 
Grade II 
Positive 
histology 
28 Female 31 San Juan, 
UT 
1991 Black Moderate; 
Grade II 
Clinical 
diagnosis 
28  Female 31 Utah, UT 1991 Black Moderate; 
Grade II 
Positive 
histology 
28  Female 31 Salt Lake, 
UT 
1991 Black B-cell; pre-B; 
B-precur. 
Clinical 
diagnosis 
28  Female 31 Jefferson, 
WA 
1991 Black B-cell; pre-B; 
B-precur. 
Clinical 
diagnosis 
 
5.3.3 Resolving Obvious Guess 
To avoid obvious guess breach, initial filtration in Stage 0 can be implemented, before 
splitting class values into groups. For the sake of performance and to avoid data 
overflow on Java heap memory, this type of filtration is implemented using a simple 
UDF program. The program only checks the equivalent records of a data bag that is ≥ k̄. 
If only one class value is found, the data bag will be transferred to the SSG group. This 
group aggregates the attributes based on the highest Q-ID probabilities. The lowest Q-
ID probability will not be aggregated. In other words, the obvious guess data bag is 
considered a semi-equivalent record, even with fully-equivalent data records. A single 
class value is prone to data leakage and can be noticed before anonymisation begins. 
Figure 5.19 illustrates the Stage 0 procedure, which protects data bags from obvious 
guess records. 
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The UDF program reads the fully-equivalent data records that are greater than or equal 
to k̄. The program loops only once to verify the class values. If one value is found, the 
data bag is stored in SSG groups. This algorithm implements a small number of arrays 
with one iteration process, which enhances the overall performance and increases the 
process scalability. 
 
Figure 5.17—Stage 0 of anonymisation to protect from obvious guess 
5.3.4 Resolving AGUI 
Resolving AGUI issues can be undertaken by increasing the value of k for each Q-ID 
group. Therefore, assigning a large k value is highly recommended in MDSBA. A large 
k value leaves a sufficient range of numbers to be assigned to the ownership levels, ?̄?, 
which provides a granular access method. In addition, the large k value dramatically 
increases the anonymisation percentage, which makes AGUIs appear less frequently. 
Moreover, a large k value decreases the appearance of obvious guess records. It has been 
experimentally proven that obvious guess records may granularly decrease in parallel 
with k value increase. However, the continuous increase of the k value may negatively 
affect information gain. Therefore, a trade-off should be considered between 
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anonymisation loss and security threat reduction. The value of k should be moderate—
neither too large nor too small. 
Let us consider data that have been anonymised with k(G(QID)1) = 5 and k(G(QID)2) = 
4, in the previous Table 5.5. Each G(QID) is anonymised separately. The highlighted 
record can be easily identified by adversaries, since the first five equivalent records of 
G(QID)1 overlap with the second four equivalent records of G(QID)2 [141]. Generally, 
an increased number of Q-IDs in any data may expose the data to a higher rate of attack 
because of the increased number of personal identifications or attributes. For instance, 
knowing the patient’s age, gender and postcode may lead to uniquely identifying the 
patient with a probability of 87% [118]. Thus, increasing the number of identifiers 
would further increase the likelihood of identifying the patient. The likelihood of the 
scenario in Table 5.5 is low because each Q-ID is anonymised individually, which 
allows a chance of randomness between both Q-ID groups. Regardless of the probability 
of the scenario occurring, there should be distinctive procedures to prevent or minimise 
the possibility of this occurrence. 
5.4 Experimenting with Data Disruption in MDSBA 
Framework 
In this chapter, the MDSBA core structure was examined and tested with the defined 
services and security threats and resolutions. To evaluate the MDSBA framework 
efficiency, a small laboratory was designed to demonstrate the three MDSBA services 
and the effect of security threats on them. The laboratory was set up at the University of 
Western Sydney, as shown in Figure 5.7. The aim was to undertake an experiment about 
the framework components of the core, initialiser and anonymiser services. The 
laboratory comprised five virtual machines (VMs) and one laptop. The five VMs were 
divided into one NameNode and two DataNodes for the Hadoop domain, an SP-
Gateway, and an LDAP/Kerberos server. The laptop demonstrated the FS server, with a 
software application programmed in PHP language, with a MySQL 5.6 database 
management system. In addition, an SAML server (Gluu Server [128]) was set up on 
both sides of the FS laptop and SP-Gateway. SAML was successfully embedded in the 
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user’s attributes in the XML assertion file, while transmitting attributes between both 
ends. 
The experiment adopted the Seer dataset, with two G(QID), as shown in Table 5.5. 
Organisation A was created and delegated to three different roles. The created roles 
were a Human Resources (HR) Officer, with 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 40% (mapped to G(QID)1); 
Oncologist, with 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 40% (mapped to G(QID)2); and Hospital Manager, with 
𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 60% (mapped to both G(QID) groups). The organisation and role delegation 
percentages are illustrated in Figure 5.20. Three users were also created and assigned to 
the following roles: user1 (HR Officer), user2 (Oncologist) and user3 (Hospital 
Manager). 
 
Figure 5.18—Organisation A and delegated roles 
The granular principle promotes a trade-off between the level of anonymised data and 
information gained. Fragmenting Q-IDs into groups to enhance the access control 
method is an accepted technique if it does not notably contaminate the information 
gained. However, Q-ID groups may cause a security violation. The violation may occur 
with multi-Q-ID access when anonymisation is conducted on each Q-ID group 
separately. Some non-anonymised records are sufficient to create an AGUI. These 
identifiers may occur as a result of anonymisation randomness, which is conducted for 
each Q-ID group independently. AGUI records appear when a user is permitted to 
access more than one Q-ID group. Even though, accessing more Q-ID groups does not 
necessarily increase the number of AGUI record appearances. To reduce the AGUIs in 
multiple Q-ID groups, we conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of 
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increasing 𝑘 or 𝑘̄, which can theoretically reduce the percentage of AGUI records. This 
outcome needed to be proven experimentally. Moreover, there was a need to find a 
compromise value for 𝑘 or ?̄? that could reduce security violation, yet not degrade 
information usefulness at the same time. 
The previously mentioned disruption equations were implemented in these two 
experiments. The equations were detailed in Chapter 4 and formalised as 𝐷𝑖 =
𝑀
𝑁
× 
0.01
∏𝑃[𝑄𝐼𝐷]
, where the anonymised blocks were calculated by finding the total 
summation of the disrupted blocks: ∑ 𝐷𝑥
𝑖
𝑥=1 = 𝐷1 + 𝐷2 +⋯+ 𝐷𝑖. This chapter used 
Seer cancer data with some records, N = 60,803,185 [62]. The data structure is shown in 
Table 5.5. Each Q-ID group was anonymised individually by assigning random values 
of ?̄?. First, the three MDSBA services were implemented and experimented regarding 
automating the anonymisation process for different users. Second, the disruption values 
were calculated for each anonymised G(QID). Each G(QID) was examined with various 
values of 𝑘 as follows: 𝑘(𝑄𝐼𝐷) = {15, 30, 45, 60}. All anonymised records in both Q-
IDs were examined for AGUI records. Any data record that could re-identify a person 
with a unique record and was not anonymised at all was considered an AGUI record. 
The AGUI record uniqueness appeared across multiple Q-IDs. 
AGUI records were detected by transferring the anonymised data to the SPSS program 
[60]. A small SPSS search script was applied to detect the AGUI records by applying 
the uniqueness criterion. The criterion was finding any non-anonymised record without 
equivalency with any other records. First, the user3 account was used, so data were 
anonymised based on 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  = 60%. The number of AGUI was counted for each value of 
k-anonymity—that is, for 15, 30, 45 and 60. Figure 5.21 compares the D level for both 
Q-ID groups, and the number of AGUI that appears in all records. The results indicated 
a slight increase in D on the larger values of ?̄? for both Q-ID groups, yet a dramatic 
decrease appeared in the AGUI number. This may indicate that the AGUI number can 
be reduced by increasing the value of ?̄?. This increase of ?̄? is permitted up to a certain 
level. This level means finding a compromised solution that trades-off the large number 
of disruptions and privacy violation. In Figure 5.21, the value of ?̄? = 27 may output less 
anonymity loss in conjunction with the AGUI reduction effect. These results require 
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data owners to trade-off between D value and AGUI. This can be investigated by 
assigning large values of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  for roles that are permitted to access more than one Q-
ID group. 
  
Figure 5.19—Trade-off between D and AGUI no. in [× 103] 
In the second experiment, granular access and its effect was tested with the number of 
obvious guess records. This was essential to identify an appropriate scale of minimum 
and maximum values for k and ?̄? values. In this experiment, user1 and user2 were used 
individually to access each Q-ID group. It is clear that a single group access permission 
will not encounter any AGUI problem; however, obvious guess remains an obstacle, 
even with a single Q-ID group. The anonymised values increased in direct proportion to 
k value, and also decreased in reverse proportion to obvious guess. In other words, the 
increase value of ?̄? may decrease AGUI and increase the obvious guess. Thus, one 
factor increases D, while another factor decreases D. This is a logical explanation for the 
slight increase in disruption level, as shown in Figure 5.21. 
Figure 5.22 shows that the lower values of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  increased the number of obvious guess 
records. Therefore, choosing an optimal percentage of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  is essential to compromise 
a value between a low disruption level and a low number of obvious guess records. In 
Figure 5.22, the indicated bars, with a red square, indicate the optimal range, which is 
between 24 and 36. The optimal value in this range can output the lowest values of D 
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and obvious guess. Both experiments demonstrate that selecting the appropriate values 
of k and 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 is the solution to AGUI and obvious guess violations. 
 
Figure 5.20—Single Q-ID group access and obvious guess 
5.5 Summary 
Big data are prone to multiple user access; hence, more fundamental structural shift 
towards big data granular access is necessary. A few techniques can be implemented to 
support access granularity. For example, aggregating Q-ID attributes into separate 
groups may support the granularity approach. Another technique is providing variant 
numbers of equivalent records. This is implemented by assigning a granular disparity for 
k-anonymity value. These two techniques are supported in the proposed MDSBA 
framework. The framework leverages MapReduce performance and scalability. Its 
operational steps correspond to the MapReduce ecosystem structure. In the experiments 
conducted in this chapter, a practical demonstration was implemented to measure user 
granular access by applying Hadoop ecosystem tools. The method of granularity is 
related to k-anonymity adjustment and Q-ID grouping. Hence, users can be assigned to 
pre-created business roles that are allocated a maximum percentage of ownership 
level, 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 . We demonstrated permissions assignments in MDSBA. The permissions 
were managed by creating Q-ID groups, mapping business roles to groups, and 
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delegating roles to organisations. Users were given access permissions by the delegated 
organisations. 
This chapter has demonstrated the three components of the MDSBA framework, which 
are deployed between FS and SP. The three components—of core, initialiser and 
anonymiser—presented an automated solution for the granular access control of data 
anonymisation. The granularity results are successfully measured in anonymised data. 
The contrast between anonymisation levels was calculated with a mathematical 
equation, given as a disruption (D). The experiments showed some security violation 
when assigning business roles mapped to more than one Q-ID group. The violation 
appeared across groups as a unique identifier (AGUI). Reducing the effect of this 
violation required selecting optimal values of k and 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 . It was proven that a small 
value of k may cause a large number of AGUI records, while a large value of k may 
cause high information loss upon anonymisation. Hence, we need to find a compromise 
value of k that trades-off between AGUI violation and information loss. The next 
chapter focuses on determining the best practice when assigning k and 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 values for 
improved security and performance operations in big data. 
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6 TOWARDS OPTIMAL k-ANONYMITY 
 
Datasets containing private and sensitive information are useful for data analytics. Data 
owners cautiously release such sensitive data using privacy-preserving publishing 
techniques. The possibility for personal re-identification is much greater now than ever 
before, and social media has dramatically increased exposure to privacy violation. The 
well-known technique of k-anonymity proposes a protection approach to privacy 
exposure. MDSBA adopts the k-anonymity method by developing an improved concept 
to apply a wider framework that can manage and control users’ authorisation access. 
The framework establishes a fine-grained approach and a granular concept. This 
approach may reduce personal re-identification in a comprehensive framework for big 
data. This approach can also lessen the usefulness of the information gained. Thus, the 
value of k should be carefully determined to trade-off between security and information 
gained. Unfortunately, there is no standard procedure to define the value of k. The 
problem of finding the optimal k-anonymisation is NP-hard [20]. In this chapter, a 
greedy-based heuristic approach is suggested to provide an optimal value for k. The 
approach evaluates the empirical risk concerning sensitivity-based anonymisation 
method. The approach is derived from fine-grained access and business role 
anonymisation for big data, which forms the framework. 
A Q-ID refers to a subset of attributes that can uniquely identify some tuples in a table. 
Incautious publication of Q-IDs will lead to privacy leakage. Moreover, selecting a 
small number of Q-IDs may negatively affect security and create more chances to re-
identify personal information. Nowadays, re-identifying a person is much easier than 
ever before as a result of the internet revolution, with smartphones, social media and 
service automation. This highlights the risk of auxiliary information that may lead to 
identifying a person, regardless of the relationship between the adversary and victim. 
This indicates the need to increase the number of Q-IDs. Any personal information can 
be considered a Q-ID. The current anonymisation methods assume a limited number of 
Q-IDs—usually up to seven or nine Q-IDs. MDSBA increases the number of Q-IDs and 
merges them into a small number of attributes, between two and four for each group. 
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Each group is denoted by G(QID), and each G group can be a combination of attributes, 
as discussed later in this chapter [7]. 
6.1 Previous Solutions to Find the Optimal k Value 
Eliminating re-identification through rigorous inference in data is NP-complete as a 
result of functional and multi-valued dependencies. Hence, preventing privacy violation 
is eventually impossible [137] [99]. Data are redundant with multi-owners, and the same 
data records and private information can be available with multi-owners. For instance, a 
patient’s information is accessed by general practitioners and health insurance 
companies at the same time. Hence, linking released data to other external data may 
carry hundreds of probable inferences. Moreover, the current social media revolution 
provides an even higher probability of identifying a person. A few pieces of personal 
information can be obtained by searching an individual’s social media public profile on 
Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn to identify the person’s age, address, current location and 
possibly other personal information. This inference combination increases privacy 
violation and derives unlimited possible types of attacks [133]. Data owners may be 
unable to protect against all kinds of attacks; therefore, security advisers need to 
improve rules and techniques to protect privacy continuously. While this does not 
guarantee complete security protection, it may reduce the probability of security threats 
[154]. 
The currently proposed k-anonymity models do not provide access control frameworks 
for big data analytics [84]. The core method of any access control is identifying 
analysers’ needs and interests regarding data analytics. Researchers implement a de-
identification technique that modifies data such that no combination of Q-IDs is smaller 
than k [30]. This technique involves organising attributes into equivalent groups or 
domains to gain k-anonymity. The key part of de-identification is assigning appropriate 
Q-IDs and k numbers by data owners [68]. Hence, the amount of information gained not 
only depends on the method of anonymisation, but also depends on the chosen number 
of k value and the way of determining the Q-ID attributes. 
There are no direct instructions to assist business owners to select Q-IDs or k-anonymity 
values. A few studies have highlighted some thoughts on finding the optimal values of k 
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and Q-ID nomination [100]. Contemporary studies have proven that finding the optimal 
k value is NP-hard [112]. The problematic aspect of determining the k-anonymity value 
is not about identifying any random number, but about finding the optimal known value. 
Researchers have proposed different techniques to determine the best k value [94]. 
Proposed techniques implement one of two methods: generalising or specialising 
techniques. The generalisation technique suppresses or generalises all data, computes 
the cost metrics for determining the best cut, and assigns the optimal k value by 
recursively examining the best specialising level [13]. In the specialising technique, 
researchers follow greedy-based heuristic approaches by implementing entropy 
equations or adopting crowdsourcing answers before and after anonymisation [56]. A 
few studies have suggested techniques for determining the optimal Q-IDs. A distinct Q-
ID and tuple separator can be computed to determine the optimal Q-ID and k value 
[118]. Practically, the proposed methods for determining the k value are expensive, and 
data owners need to scan datasets numerous times to determine the optimal k value. In 
addition, the proposed methods did not consider the increasing number of Q-ID 
attributes in improving the de-identification. Thus, this chapter proposes a solution to 
determining the optimal value of k in the k-anonymity method. The solution approach is 
based on MDSBA for big data analytics. The framework provides data analytics 
granularity for multi-domain access. 
6.2 MDSBA Grouping and Granular Access 
This chapter presents guidance for data owners in assigning k-anonymity parameters. 
The suggested proposal is related to the role-based anonymisation control framework. 
The framework provides fine-grained access control by dividing Q-ID attributes into 
vertical groups, with two to four attributes for each group. The core method of granular 
access is introduced by three approaches: the probability value of the Q-ID attributes; 
the ownership level, ?̄?; and the Q-ID grouping method. The probability value of the Q-
ID attributes is calculated by counting the number of unique values in the specified 
attribute. The ownership level, ?̄?, is the key point of distinguishing users’ access levels. 
The ?̄? value is an element of k in the k-anonymity method that determines the number of 
equivalent records upon anonymisation, where 2 ≤ ?̄? ≤ k. 
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Related to Definition 3.1 in Chapter 3, the number of G(QID) groups can be described 
mathematically by denoting a number n of Q-IDs, where Q-ID = {qid1, qid2, … qidn} 
in a table T. A number of s classes are presented by C = {C1, C2, … ,Cs}, where the 
class is denoted by C. Each two to four Q-IDs are grouped in a group G. The number of 
created groups, denoted by ϒ, is related to the total number of Q-IDs (n), and can be 
presented by 
𝑛
4
 ≤ ϒ ≤  
𝑛
2
. Each non-overlapped G(QID) group consists of several Q-IDs 
and one class, which is usually mapped to one or more business roles, R. Let us also 
denote a user as U and an organisation as O. The role-based anonymisation control is 
presented as {G  R} (many-to-many relationship), {R  O} (many-to-many 
relationship) and {O  U} (many-to-many relationship). As previously discussed, users 
are given permission to access Q-IDs through their own organisations. Next, a k value of 
k-anonymity is assigned to each G group, while ?̄? is assigned to each organisational R. 
This means that k is a fixed value that is given only once to the G groups, regardless of 
the user’s privileges, while ?̄? is a dynamic changing value that is given differently to 
each role of each organisation. Hence, a similar role, R, is given different values, ?̄?, for 
various organisations. To set up the core method of the granular access, data owners 
create G groups and assign an appropriate k value for each group. 
Meanwhile, organisations are delegated some G groups as per the business needs. Every 
organisation is given a set of roles, with an authorisation level of 𝑘 percentage value 
(𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐) for each role. The 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  is decided based on the service level of agreement 
between the data owner and organisation and is given within a range of [0.1–1]. The ?̄? 
value is calculated as ?̄? =   𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  × 𝑘. Organisations are delegated with the requested 
business roles. It is the organisation’s responsibility to assign its own users to their 
appropriate business roles. 
It is evident that personal re-identification increases in parallel with the number of 
permitted Q-ID increases. It is believed that any information belonging to individuals 
may support personal re-identification. Previous research has indicated that the 
knowledge of additional attributes other than Q-IDs can also raise the problem of unique 
identifiers [12]. Hence, additional attributes are preferable to be accommodated within 
G(QID) groups. Therefore, MDSBA considers each auxiliary attribute as a potential Q-
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ID. The proposed technique of finding the k value determines the optimal k value used 
in the k-anonymity method. In traditional data, determining the optimal k value requires 
many experimental trials before determining the lowest k value that leads to the least 
information loss. In big data, the situation is even worse and requires more computation 
time and cost. In MDSBA, the optimal k value is determined with minimal computation 
time and cost, as described in Section 6.4. 
The MDSBA method is operated by MapReduce operations. Its approach implements 
iterated split and filter techniques for data records, with mapping, shuffling and 
reducing. The first split aggregates data based on sensitive class value, C. Each group is 
anonymised separately. This type of split supports the parallel operations of 
MapReduce. The anonymisation is then applied to the lowest probability attribute for 
each split. For instance, suppose that G group contains two Q-ID attributes—that is, 
G(QID) = {GENDER, USA_State}. The probability of GENDER is P(GENDER) = 0.5 
if the values of the attributes are only (male, female), while the P(USA_State) = 1/50 = 
0.02. In this case, the anonymisation is applied by grouping GENDER records and 
anonymising USA_State records. The amount of anonymisation applied on GENDER 
records is related to the value of ?̄?, where a larger value of ?̄? promotes a higher 
anonymisation level. Further details about the mathematical computations and processes 
stages were presented in Chapter 3. 
MDSBA divides the process into four to five stages. Stage 0 filters out the obvious 
guess records, as described in Section 5.3.3. Stage 1 filters out the fully-equivalent 
records. All Q-ID attributes must be equivalent so that they can be excluded from the 
Stage 2 process. This is stated by [group all(qid)]. The rest of the non-fully-equivalent 
records are further filtered by semi-equivalency in Stage 2. The semi-equivalency is 
measured by grouping all Q-ID attributes, except the lowest Q-ID probability attribute, 
as stated by [group all(qid)-1]. The lowest Q-ID attribute is anonymised by taxonomy 
tree, interval or suppression. Stage 3 follows similar steps by grouping all Q-ID 
attributes, except the lowest Q-ID probability attributes, as stated by [group all(qid)-2]. 
The least probability attributes are anonymised and merged with the rest of the groups. 
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In the final stage, grouping is only applied to one Q-ID attribute, which is the highest 
probability attribute. 
6.3 Possible Attacks against MDSBA 
Sweeney addressed a few of the types of attacks that can occur with the k-anonymity 
method [16]. When using this method, attacks may occur through multiple queries for 
analytics, so anonymisation is applied to different Q-ID attributes for each 
anonymisation occurrence. Adversaries may request data several times with multi-
queries so that the anonymisation process may apply anonymity on the first Q-ID 
attribute in the first trial, and on the second Q-ID attribute in the second trial. As a 
result, the linking chance between the two anonymised tables is high. This type of attack 
is not possible in MDSBA as described earlier in section 5.3.  
Two attacks were mentioned in the previous chapter: obvious guess and AGUI. 
Resolving both attacks was related to finding optimal values of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 and k to 
compromise security and disruption. This indicates the importance of finding an optimal 
value of k, as explained in the next section. 
6.4 Finding the Optimal k Value 
As discussed previously, determining the optimal k value has been proven to be NP-
hard. It was also discussed that small values of k-anonymity are inadequate in multi-Q-
ID groups. Moreover, the MDSBA framework relies on the granular access of users, 
which requires a granular increase or decrease in ?̄? value. A greedy-based heuristic 
approach is suggested to determine the optimal values of k. The obtained k value should 
be as large as possible. We need to consider some factors that may help k value 
estimation. The aim of determining the optimal k value is a trade-off between the 
security level and gained information level. Thus, we need to be aware of the security 
risk when assigning a low value of k, especially when datasets contain multiple G(QID) 
groups. However, larger values of k may negatively affect the usefulness of the gained 
information. Limiting the degradation of data to a minimum is possible by selecting the 
optimal value of k. 
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The minimum permitted a number of equivalent records is ?̄? = 2. This minimum value 
achieves the safe threshold value to prevent unique identification. Based on this fact, the 
value of k can be assigned as per the 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 value. As described before, the minimum 
permitted value of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 0.1. Given that ?̄? = 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 × k and the minimum ?̄? = 2, the 
value of k should be at least k = 2/0.1 = 20. Considering the minimum k = 20, we may 
increase the value of k starting from k = 20 because dropping k below 20 may eliminate 
the equivalency concept and ruin the k-anonymity principle. In some cases, we may 
require larger values of k; thus, k = 20 is the smallest possible value. Datasets with 
multiple G(QID) groups should be given larger values of k. This refers to the dramatic 
increase of AGUI values in G(QID) groups. To select a larger k value for each G(QID) 
group, we must first ensure that the chosen k does not extensively negatively affect the 
information gained. To do so, let us study the cumulative frequency equation, which 
presents a benchmark or reference point for measuring the data contrast. The cumulative 
frequency can be calculated by the disruption equation, as described in the next section. 
6.4.1 Cumulative Frequency 
The term ‘frequency’ in statistics refers to the number of times a given datum occurs in 
a dataset. Two types of frequencies are defined in statistics: relative frequency and 
cumulative relative frequency. Relative frequency measures the fraction of times for a 
value occurrence. The total percentage of each occurrence must equal 100%. 
Cumulative relative frequency represents the accumulation of the previous relative 
frequencies. The frequency always represents the occurrence of a discrete value or 
occurrences of the value in an interval of a data. This means that all types of frequencies 
require intervals to determine the more common values [138]. 
In datasets, it is possible to calculate the anonymisation loss starting from k = 20. 
MDSBA adapts a naïve equation to calculate the anonymisation loss, known as 
disruption. The disruption equation measures the data disturbance occurring after 
applying anonymisation. The disruption increases monotonically with the increasing 
value of k. The disruption value was previously described in Section 4.5. The equation 
of 𝐷𝑠 =
𝑀
𝑁
× 
0.01
∏𝑃[𝑄𝐼𝐷]
 calculates one block of anonymised data, where M denotes the 
number of the records in each block, and N denotes the total number of records for all 
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datasets. The total disruption for all datasets is calculated by the summation of all values 
of Ɗ[total] = ∑ 𝐷𝑠
𝑖
𝑠=0 . This total equation finds the total disruption value after 
anonymisation process is completed. On the other hand, there is a process that should be 
accomplished prior the anonymisation process, which is finding the optimal k value. 
Unfortunately, finding the optimal k value is calculated also by the total disruption 
equation. In this case we have the same equation needs to be applied prior and post 
anonymisation process. The total disruption equating cannot be accurately applied prior 
anonymisation process, therefore, we can apply only a rough estimation for the 
disruption value. This estimation can be accomplished by finding four check points of k.  
To assign the checkpoints, data owners must first define the k value range. This range 
depends on the security level of the internal organisational policy. Data owners may 
choose a range from [20–80] or even higher. Data owners then select the four 
checkpoints: {𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑘𝑜𝑙𝑑, 𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑤}. The symbol of 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 represents the first value of 
the k range, which is 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 20. The second symbol of 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the last value of 
the k range, which can be 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 80 or even higher. The initial suggested k value is 𝑘𝑜𝑙𝑑 
= 20. The data owner needs to investigate the new value 𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 30. If the cumulative 
frequency (CF) of the new value is far from the reference line, then k will remain 20. To 
save the calculation time for disruption values, it is better to count the number of non-
equivalent records when k = 20 and then when k = 30. This rough calculation accelerates 
the process of finding the optimal k value. 
Practically, finding the number of non-equivalent records is straightforward in Pig Latin 
script. A fast computation script aggregates all equivalent records: 
SG = GROUP data by (QID1, QID2, QID3) 
and then filters the grouped records: 
frequency = FILTER SG by k < 20 
The number of non-equivalent records for each value of k is accumulative. Hence, the 
CF can be calculated based on the number of non-equivalent records. To state the CF 
mathematically, let us denote the disruption values for {𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑘𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑤} by 
{𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑 , 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤}, respectively. The values of 𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 represent the 
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lowest and highest disruption for minimum and maximum k, while the values 
𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤 represent the current and new inspected disruption for the current and 
new inspected k. Eventually, the number of inspected values of k are denoted by I. The 
CF is measured by disruption values as follows: 
𝐶𝐹(𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑤) =  
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 
𝐼×(𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑤−𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑑)
         (6.1) 
The inspected 𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑤 is approved if the 0.9 ≤ CF ≤ 1.1. A range of 0.2 is allowed for data 
dispersion in comparison with the linear increase of data disruption. This equation is 
formulated to reduce the information loss that occurs because of anonymising data with 
larger values of k. To demonstrate Equation 6.1, let us study the Seer data records, 
which included three G(QID) groups, as shown in Table 6.1, with classes in bold. 
A data owner has decided on an interval of k from [20–80]; thus, the seven inspected 
values of k are {20, 30 … 80}. It is apparent that the k value increases by tens of units to 
avoid the overhead computation cost. The initial value of k is (20), while the inspected 
value for the three G(QID) groups is k = 30. The lowest disruption value for G(QID)1 
is 𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.038. The disruption is calculated based on the lowest probability attribute, 
which is (Age = 0.012). Recalling Equation 1, the 𝐶𝐹(𝑘30) = (𝐷80 −𝐷20)/(7 × (𝐷30 −
𝐷20)) = 0.93. Given that the CF ≥ 0.9, the new value of k = 30 is accepted. Next, we 
need to inspect k = 40, so 𝐶𝐹(𝑘40) = (𝐷80 − 𝐷20)/(7 × (𝐷40 − 𝐷30)) = 0.54, which is 
< 0.9. Therefore, the new k value is rejected, and the value of k remains as k = 30. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the CF of the G(QID)1 and the diversion when k = 40 from the 
reference point. The reference point is found by calculating the linear disruption 
increase based on the minimum and maximum D values only. 
Table 6.1—Seer dataset with three G(QID) groups 
G(QID)1 G(QID)2 G(QID)3 
Age Year tumour 
Gender Race Radiation 
County Grade Marital status 
State (class) Diagnosis (class) Survival months (class) 
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Figure 6.1—CF for Seer G(QID)1 disruption 
 
6.4.2 Linear Regression 
Regression analysis is another statistical modelling technique that is related to frequency 
distribution. This type of modelling helps to understand the relationship between an 
independent variable with a regular increase, and dependent variable changes. The 
regression analysis is used for prediction and machine learning [34]. In MDSBA, linear 
regression analysis may offer a general model for anonymisation loss. In the 
anonymisation concept, the regression analysis can be applied to measure the level of 
anonymisation loss. Increasing the k value will decrease the number of fully-equivalent 
records. This will subsequently increase the anonymisation loss, and reduce the gained 
information. In other words, the anonymisation loss increases in parallel with the k value 
increase. The k value can be considered an independent value because it increases 
regularly without depending on any other variables. The anonymisation loss depends on 
the k value, which means it is a dependent variable that changes in parallel with the k 
value increase [22].  
The previous CF equation can be used with archived data to determine the optimal k 
value. The same equation can also be used with live data if accuracy is ignored. Live 
data increases with time, and the disruption values continue to change accordingly. The 
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disruption value decreases proportionally with the increased number of data records. 
The previous CF equation is just a naïve equation derived from the linear regression. 
Determining the regression line by using the linear regression is an easy task but 
inaccurate. A more accurate method is drawing a regression line and determining the 
largest diverted values. The regression line is found by the equation   y = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑥, 
where      𝛽 =
𝑛(∑𝑥.𝑦)−(∑𝑥)(∑𝑦)
𝑛.∑𝑥2−(∑𝑥)2
 and  𝑎 = ?̅? − 𝛽𝑥 . Replacing the anonymisation 
parameters imposes that the disruption line d replaces 𝑦, and k replaces 𝑥. The general 
regression equation is given by the following equation: 
𝑑 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑘          (6.2) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒,  
𝑎 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒. 
The value of the slope, 𝛽, is formulated as follows: 
𝛽 =
𝐼(∑𝑘.𝐷)−(∑𝑘)(∑𝐷)
𝐼.∑𝑘2−(∑𝑘)2
         (6.3) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐼 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑘.  
𝑎 = ?̅? − 𝛽?̅?          (6.4) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ?̅? 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐷 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅? 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑘 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒. 
Equations 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 are used to calculate the regression line for the disruption 
values. These equations can be used for both archived and live data to determine the 
largest disruption values in a specific range of k values for a certain sized dataset. This 
equation is strongly recommended in live data, since the regression line continues 
changing in parallel with the data growth. More data records impose a disruption decline 
with a minor disruption disparity between the various k values. For instance, if the 
disruption value for k = 30 is D = 0.001, then the disruption value for k = 40 may be D = 
0.012. This small disparity value between two values of k may lead to a high error rate if 
the previous CF equation is used. Hence, using a more accurate equation is strongly 
recommended to determine the optimal value of k.  
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In the previous example, applying CF on Seer data resulted in k = 30. The diagram in 
Figure 6.1 indicated quite a large disruption when k = 40; hence, the appropriate value 
was k = 30. If the regression line was replaced by CF, then Equations 6.2 and 6.3 
calculate the d value, as shown in Table 6.2. The values of D represent the actual 
disruption values, which were found by grouping and investigating the number of 
anonymised records. The regression lines of d and D values are plotted in Figure 6.2. 
Table 6.2—Seer data/G(QID)1 results after line regression calculation 
k d (reg. line) D D − d 
20 0.040879 0.03865 -0.00223 
30 0.055709 0.051998 -0.00371 
40 0.070539 0.074965 0.004426 
50 0.085369 0.088056 0.002687 
60 0.100199 0.103597 0.003398 
70 0.115029 0.114283 -0.00075 
80 0.129859 0.126033 -0.00383 
 
As noted in Table 6.2, similar results to CF were found when k = 40. Table 6.2 shows 
the subtraction result of (D − d). The table shows the largest contrast value between the 
regression line and the actual line when k = 40. Some values of D are located below the 
regression line, so D - d result is negative. These values indicate low disruption values. 
Table 6.2 shows some negative values when k = {20, 30, 70, 80}. The largest disruption 
value must be positive. The largest value prevents k from gaining a higher value. In the 
previous example, the largest disruption value occurred when k = 40. The initially 
chosen value was k = 20, and then moved up to k = 30. The k value progression was 
inhibited when k = 40. Table 6.2 shows similar results when k = 40.  
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Figure 6.2—Regression calculation for Seer G(QID)1 disruption 
6.4.2.1 Three Security Levels 
In linear regression, some disruption values are below the regression line, while others 
are above the regression line, as shown in Figure 6.2. This is apparent because the 
regression line presents the average middle line between various disruption values. 
Suppose that three disruption values are above the regression line. The question is 
whether we consider the highest unique value as an inhibitor, or any one of the three 
highest values as inhibitors. For example, we can study the disruption values for 
G(QID)2, as presented in Table 6.3. We find that the highest three disruption values 
appear when k = 20, 30 and 60. The first two values are similar. In such cases, it is better 
to allow the data owner to determine the number of inhibitors. More inhibitors will 
hinder the k value progression, which means gaining smaller values of k, and 
subsequently lower security. 
High security imposes a higher value of k, so one inhibitor can be used when data 
owners apply a high-security level on a specified dataset. Generally, we can apply three 
different levels of security {high, medium and low}. Data owners may decide to select 
any of these three security levels. In addition, other security options, such as the k value 
interval, may support the security levels, as mentioned earlier. Briefly, we can 
summarise the security definition applied to any dataset by creating Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.3—Seer data/G(QID)2 results after line regression calculation 
Seer G(QID)2 
k d D D − d 
20 0.02468 0.027145 0.002465 
30 0.03674 0.039215 0.002475 
40 0.0488 0.048745 ˗5.5E-05 
50 0.06086 0.058712 -0.00215 
60 0.07292 0.076587 0.003667 
70 0.08498 0.082143 -0.00284 
80 0.09704 0.098473 0.001433 
 
Table 6.4—Security level options set up by data owners to decide the optimal k value 
Security Level Number of Inhibitors k Value Interval 
High 1 Example [20–200] 
Medium 2 Example [20–150] 
Low 3 Example [20–80] 
 
In the Seer/G(QID)2 example, if the data owner chose the security level = high, then the 
value of k for G(QID)2 is (k = 50). This is because the highest distribution value was 
found on k = 60. For the high-security level, we use only one inhibitor, which is k = 60. 
Therefore, k should stop at the value before the inhibitor. If the security level = medium, 
then the value of k is (k = 20) because k = 30 is the second inhibitor. In addition, a 
similar k value is gained for the medium security level. 
6.5 Determining the Optimal k Percentage 
It is important to remember that a k value is given for each G(QID), and is not related to 
users’ access and privileges. Regardless of users’ access, a k value is assigned to G 
groups, while ?̄? is given as per users’ access level and privileges. For this reason, we 
need to identify a reasonable approach to assign the ?̄? values for each permitted G(QID) 
group. The given value of ?̄? can be determined based on the service level of agreement 
with organisations. A minimum value of ?̄? should be determined to avoid security 
violation. The 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  was explained in the previous chapter, Section 5.2.2. The k̄ is 
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calculated as k̄ = 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 × 𝑘. It seems that more permitted G(QID) groups cause a higher 
probability of personal violation; however, we need to investigate whether this is correct 
by examining various dataset groups. We conducted experiments to measure the 
percentage of AGUI appearance, with the aim of identifying the factors that increase 
AGUI records. This is essential to identify the best approaches for assigning ?̄? values. 
Two datasets of Adult and Seer were anonymised. Each dataset included three G(QID) 
groups, as shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.5. The three G(QID) groups were mapped to two 
business roles: HR manager and oncologist. In each dataset, the HR manager was 
permitted to access G(QID)1 and G(QID)2, while the oncologist was permitted to access 
G(QID)2 and G(QID)3, as shown in Figure 6.3. In the first experiment, anonymisation 
was applied on G(QID)1 and G(QID)2, which were mapped to HR manager. Every 
anonymised G(QID) was measured by disruption for different values of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐. 
Table 6.5—Adult dataset with three G(QID) groups 
G(QID)1 G(QID)2 G(QID)3 
Age Relation Gain 
Job Race Loss 
Marital Gender Hrs-per-wk 
Edu (class) Work-class (class) Salary (class) 
 
In the second experiment, anonymisation was applied on G(QID)2 and G(QID)3, and 
measured by disruption equation for different 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 values. In the third experiment, a 
user was given both roles—HR manager and oncologist. The number of AGUI records 
was counted after completing the anonymisation. The anonymisation was applied with 
several  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 values for both roles. The results are shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 for the 
Seer and Adult datasets sequentially. The figures indicate that increasing the number of 
G(QID) groups will increase the disruption, which contributes to reducing the number of 
AGUI records. G(QID) groups in both datasets were given different values of k, ranging 
from [20–50]. The experiments indicated two factors that may support the reduction of 
AGUI: the increased value of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  and the increased number of G(QID) groups. The 
number of permitted G(QID) groups is related to the assigned roles, and we have no 
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control over this. Thus, we can control the minimum value of  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 . Users with one 
G(QID) permission group can be given any preferred  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 value with no restrictions. 
Moreover, the highest AGUI appearance occurs when the number of G(QID) groups = 
2. With the continuous G(QID) group increase, the number of AGUI continues 
declining. This approach leads us to increase the 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 to 1, when the number of groups 
= 2. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show that the AGUI number is reasonable when (𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 1) 
and there are two G(QID) groups. 
 
Figure 6.3—Groups mapping to business roles 
The experiments indicated that  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 should be assigned based on the number of 
G(QID) groups. Referring to Figures 6.3 and 6.4, if an organisation has been granted 
only the oncologist role with two G(QID) groups, then  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 1 is fair to reduce the 
number of AGUI to the minimum. If another organisation was given both roles with 
three G(QID) groups, then  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 0.7 is adequate to reduce the number of AGUIs. 
The value of  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 0.7 can be given to any role that is mapped to more than two 
G(QID) groups. The number of G(QID) groups is only one factor that affects the 
 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 estimation, denoted by f(QID). Business owners may determine their own factors 
to conclude a comprehensive equation that estimates 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 . In this thesis, only two 
factors were defined—the number of G(QID), denoted by f(QID), and the organisational 
trust level, f(T). The f(QID) was explained earlier, as it is assigned by the data owner. 
The f(QID) is given the value of 1 when the number of G(QID) = 2, and given a value 
less than 1 when the number of G(QID) > 2. The factor f(T) is given a value within the 
range of [0.1–1] where 0.1 is the most trusted organisation for the data owner, while the 
least trusted organisation is given the value of 1. The final  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐  is found by calculating 
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the average value of both factors. The final equation is 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 =
𝑓(𝑄𝐼𝐷)+𝑓(𝑇)
2
 . However, 
data owners may decide their own equations based on their own security policy. 
 
Figure 6.4—AGUI number for both roles in Seer data 
 
 
Figure 6.5—AGUI number for both roles in Adult data 
In the previous example, if an organisation requested two business roles of oncologist 
and HR manager, and f(T) = 0.2, then f(QID) can be given a value of 0.8—that is, 
f(QID) = 0.8. The final average is given by 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 0.5. In another example, if the same 
organisation has requested only the oncologist role, then f(QID) can be given a value of 
1. This is because the two G(QID) groups manifest the highest AGUI value; 
hence, 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 = 0.6. Suppose that G(QID)1 is given k1 = 30, and G(QID)2 is given k2 = 
Chapter 6—Towards Optimal k-anonymity 
 
192 
40. The ?̄? is calculated for the oncologist by ?̄?1 = 30 × 0.6 = 18, and ?̄?2 = 40 × 0.6 = 24. 
If a user has requested access with the oncologist role, then a pair of ?̄? values will be 
produced to authorise the user. 
6.6 Dynamic G(QID) Groups 
In some datasets, there are many attributes available in data schemas, while users’ 
enquiries and interests vary. In MDSBA, it is possible to control the amount of data that 
is permitted for organisational access. Permitted data may comprise a small or large 
number of attributes. Data owners predetermine the G(QID) groups before mapping 
them to business roles. Roles are later delegated to organisations. Organisations need to 
examine each business role and its related mapped G(QID)s so that they can determine 
the best-fit roles for their business nature. One of the obstacles that organisations may 
face is rigid G(QID) groups, where organisations focus more on attributes than groups. 
For example, if an organisation requests only one attribute from G(QID)1 and another 
attribute from G(QID)2, then we may need to define new G(QID) groups for each 
organisation, which is impractical. For this reason, dynamic G(QID) groups are 
preferable solutions, which suit different types of organisational queries. 
To explain this approach, let us consider a set of attributes, Vi, for a dataset S = {V1, 
V2, V3, V4, V5, V6, V7}. Let G(QID) groups be determined by the data owner as 
follows: G(QID) = {G1(V1, V2, V3, V4), G2(V5, V6, V7)}. The attached business roles 
to the G(QID) groups are R = {R1(G1), R2(G2)}. Suppose that an organisation has 
chosen to analyse the following attributes: Ś = {V3, V4, V5, V6}. As noticed, 
organizations have chosen attributes from two groups, G1 and G2. This choice inhibits 
the suitable attachment to business roles. It is possible to force the organisation to follow 
the G(QID) groups, but it will be better if we have predefined additional G(QID) groups 
for such cases, where V3 to V6 will be aggregated in another G(QID). A convenient 
solution can be implemented by creating different patterns. Each pattern concatenates 
different attributes and assigns them to separate business roles. In the previous example, 
we may define a second pattern for the G(QID) group = {G3(V3, V4, V5, V6)}, and 
map the second pattern to R = {R3(G3)}. However, the third role (R3) should be 
exclusive to the second pattern, so each created pattern should have its roles. Data 
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owners may create two or three patterns for each dataset, and organisations may trade 
the best-suited attributes. The software application should be able to find the closest 
matched pattern to the user’s choice. 
One real example that can be implemented by dynamic patterns involves census and 
survey data. Census data comprise hundreds of attributes, and creating a multi-pattern is 
the desired option for analysers. One of the census examples is available from the US 
website, Ipums—a site that provides many samples of data collected by survey or census 
[136]. We downloaded some datasets from the Ipums website, with the attributes shown 
in Table 6.6. The table shows the chosen data after creating G(QID) groups and classes. 
The pattern divides attributes into five G(QID) groups, with one highlighted class for 
each group. 
Table 6.6—Pattern 1 of census data presented by G(QID) groups 
Pattern 1 
G(QID)1 G(QID)2 G(QID)3 G(QID)4 G(QID)5 
REGION FRIDGE SCHOOL NO_CHILD EMPSTAT 
COUNTY PHONE HIGRADE RACESING LABFORCE 
CITY FUELHEAT EDUC BIRTHPLACE LOOKING 
HOMELAND VEHICLES GRADE_ATT YR_IMMIG WORKEDYR 
  
DEGFIELD SPEAKING 
 The above attributes can also be re-grouped in different patterns, depending on the 
user’s queries and demands. Table 6.7 presents another suggested pattern that data 
owners may follow. 
Establishing separate business roles for each pattern is necessary. This is essential to 
avoid a k value conflict between G(QID) groups. Organisations may select the required 
attributes, and an automated algorithm can select the best-fit pattern. For instance, if an 
organisation decides to analyse the attributes (REGION, COUNTY, LABFORCE, 
LOOKING, EMPSTAT), the automated decision can determine the best pattern by 
creating a comparison matrix. The matrix lists all available patterns and calculates the 
availability of each attribute within the G(QID) groups. The matrix in Table 6.8 
determined that Pattern 2 was closer to the user’s query. 
Table 6.7—Pattern 2 of census data 
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Pattern 2 
G(QID)6 G(QID)7 G(QID)8 G(QID)9 Attributes 
N_CHILD HOMELAND SCHOOL REGION FRIDGE 
EMPSTAT BIRTHPLACE HIGRADE COUNTY PHONE 
RACESING YR_IMMIG EDUC CITY FUELHEAT 
 
SPEAKING GRADE_ATT LABFORCE VEHICLES 
  
DEGFIELD LOOKING 
  
Table 6.8—Matrix for choosing the best pattern 
 
Pattern 1 Availability % Pattern 2 Availability % 
REGION G(QID)1 0.5 G(QID)9 0.8 
COUNTY G(QID)1 0.5 G(QID)9 0.8 
LABFORCE G(QID)5 0.75 G(QID)9 0.8 
LOOKING G(QID)5 0.75 G(QID)9 0.8 
EMPSTAT G(QID)5 0.75 G(QID)6 0.33 
  Total 3.25 TOTAL 3.53 
 
The matrix calculates the availability percentage of each attribute and chooses the 
highest total pattern. The availability percentage is computed by dividing the number of 
attributes appearances in each G(QID) group by the total number of attributes for the 
specified G(QID) group. For example, in the first pattern, the availability percentage for 
(REGION and COUNTY) is a result of two attributes appearing in G(QID)1 over four 
attributes, which is the total number of G(QID)1 group attributes, so 2/4 = 0.5. 
Similarly, G(QID)9 is calculated by counting the number of appearing attributes 
(REGION, COUNTY, LABFORCE, LOOKING), while the total number of G(QID)9 
attributes is five; thus, the division result is 4/5 = 0.8. Practically, the matrix can be 
stored in a database and presented as a part of an ERD, as shown in Figure 6.6. This 
relationship diagram is part of the dataset created for the core service, as described in 
Section 5.2.3. 
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Figure 6.6—Part of ERD showing the relationship between patterns and G groups 
The MDSBA core service contains a program that can determine the most relevant 
pattern. The matrix in Table 6.8 is used to calculate the highest pattern score. The matrix 
can be presented in an algorithmic structure by reading each pattern from the database, 
reading all related Q-ID groups, and reading all attributes attached to each Q-ID group. 
Each G(QID) group is stored in a three-dimensional array, which stores the attributes 
and pattern number. The array presents the pattern number, denoted by i; G(QID) 
number, denoted by j; and attribute name, denoted by k. For the three values, there is a 
need for three loops programs to read each array object for calculation. For instance, in 
the previous example of the census, two patterns were created by the data owner. Each 
pattern consists of a set of G(QID) groups. An iterated algorithm counts the number of 
available G(QID) for the census dataset. In the previous example, the number of 
available G groups is nine, so nine arrays are stored in a three-dimensional array. The 
array presents three values of G(QID) number, pattern number and Q-ID description. 
This can be denoted as described below: 
array_G_QID [i][j][k] = {(1, 1, REGION), (1, 1, COUNTY), (1, 1, CITY), (1, 1, 
HOMELAND), … , (2, 9, REGION), (2, 9, COUNTY), (2, 9, CITY), (2, 9, LABFORCE), 
(2, 9, LOOKING)}. 
Next, the attributes chosen by users are stored in a separate array. The array is iterated 
and compared with the three-dimensional array. With each comparison, mathematical 
calculations are conducted based on the number of objects matching between both 
arrays. A complete algorithm is shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Algorithm for finding the best-fit pattern 
Input: user chooses the needed attributes {𝑎1, 𝑎1, 𝑎1… , 𝑎𝑛} 
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦1 = {𝑎1, 𝑎1, 𝑎1… , 𝑎𝑛}    //the chosen attributes by users 
// counts the number of patterns for database_id =1111 
𝑝𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 = ”𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛_𝑖𝑑) 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑞𝑖𝑑_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝. 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝑖𝑑 = 11111”   
 𝑫𝒐𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆(𝒊 < 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝒑𝒂𝒕)){            //Loop for each pattern 
        //read all Q-ID IDs from the specified pattern  
     𝐺𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 = ”𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑞𝑖𝑑_𝑖𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑞𝑖𝑑_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛_𝑖𝑑 = 𝑝𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝑖)” 
      𝑫𝒐𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆(𝒋 < 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑮𝑸𝑰𝑫_𝒊𝒅_𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒚)){            //Loop for each G(QID) 
              𝐺𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 = ”𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝑖𝑑 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑞𝑖𝑑_𝑖𝑑 =
𝐺𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝑗)” 
𝑫𝒐𝑾𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒆(𝒌 < 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑮𝑸𝑰𝑫_𝒏𝒂𝒎𝒆_𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒚)){ 
// Create three-dimensional array for all patterns  
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦_𝐺_𝑄𝐼𝐷[𝑖][𝑗][𝑘] =
𝑎𝑑𝑑_𝑡𝑜_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝑝𝑎𝑡(𝑖), 𝐺𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝑗), 𝐺𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(k))  
𝑬𝒏𝒅 𝑫𝑶 
     𝑬𝒏𝒅 𝑫𝑶 
𝑬𝒏𝒅 𝑫𝑶 
/* The array is created and now it is ready for matching*/ 
𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒊 < 𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉(𝒑𝒂𝒕) 𝑳𝒐𝒐𝒑      //the first loop for the patterns available 
     𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒋 < 𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉(𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒚_𝑮_𝑸𝑰𝑫) 𝑳𝒐𝒐𝒑       //The second loop for all groups in each pattern 
           𝐺_𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝐺_𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1           //Number of Q-IDs in each G(QID) 
                    𝑭𝒐𝒓 𝒌 < 𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒕𝒉(𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒂𝒚𝟏) 𝑳𝒐𝒐𝒑                  //Loop for user’s attributes    
                       𝐼𝑓 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦1[𝑘] = 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦_𝐺_𝑄𝐼𝐷[𝑖][𝑗][𝑘]            //If statement to match attributes 
                             𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1         //Number of equal objects between G(QID) and user’s attributes 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 =
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝐺_𝑄𝐼𝐷_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
             //Calculate the probability between equal objects and the actual Q-IDs 
                        𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑓 
               𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝑲 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦[𝑢] = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝 
𝑢 = 𝑢 + 1 
  𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒋 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦) 
𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑝𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦[𝑝] = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝒊 
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑝𝑎𝑡_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦) 
Figure 6.7—Algorithm for determining the best patterns 
6.7 Summary 
A major issue with k-anonymity is related to finding the k value. Determining the 
optimal k value was proven to be NP-hard. The previously proposed methods for finding 
the k value heuristically are computationally expensive. Data owners need to experiment 
with various values of k to determine the best k value that obtains the highest 
information gain. These methods are even harder with big data anonymisation. MDSBA 
provides a greedy-based heuristic approach to find the optimal values of k. The approach 
suggests an initial k value, with a possibility to increase the value granularly based on 
the CF of the data. The CF equation is a practical and cost-effective computation 
method that can provide an approximate k value before commencing the anonymisation 
process. Moreover, linear regression is another computation method to find the value of 
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k accurately. CF is a special case of linear regression, where linear regression concludes 
a reference line to calculate the optimal k value with reasonable computation times. 
The second part of this chapter determined the access granularity by choosing the best 
ownership level, ?̄?. This was implemented by dividing Q-ID attributes into small groups 
and mapping the groups to business roles. Organisations were then delegated to the 
required roles with an authorisation level of 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 for each role. The 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 was 
determined by different factors. The experiments unveiled two factors: trust percentage 
between data owners and organisations, and the number of permitted G(QID) groups. 
The experiments recommended a value of 70% for 𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 if the number of G(QID) 
groups is larger than two, and a value of 100% if the number of G(QID) group is two. 
The proposed method of finding  𝑘𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐 helps reduce AGUI, while the proposed 
approach of finding k values helps reduce obvious guess risk. 
The final part of this chapter created various G(QID) patterns by shuffling the Q-ID 
attributes as per organisations’ desires. When the number of Q-IDs is large, customers 
may choose different Q-ID attributes. Since access permissions are assigned at the 
G(QID) level, users are permitted to access some unneeded Q-ID attributes. This may 
create false access privileges by allowing users to access unneeded attributes. To avoid 
such a security breach, several random G(QID) were created. The pattern was chosen 
automatically based on the selected attributes by organisations. To achieve this, a matrix 
was created to calculate the best value for the number of appearances. The pattern was 
chosen as per the highest score, which was calculated by the highest number of 
appearances. 
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7 COMPARISON OF MAPREDUCE AND 
SPARK 
 
Privacy is one of the greatest concerns regarding big data and analytics. It is believed 
that the forthcoming frameworks and theories will establish several solutions for privacy 
protection. One of the known solutions is k-anonymity, which was introduced for 
traditional data. Recently, two major frameworks leveraged big data processing and 
applications—MapReduce and Spark. Spark data processing has been attracting more 
attention because of its significant effects on a wide range of big data applications. One 
of the predominant big data applications is data analytics and anonymisation. The 
previous chapters discussed a complete framework for data anonymisation, and the 
proposed anonymisation framework was implemented for MapReduce and Spark 
operations. This chapter will establish a comparison of MapReduce and Spark in 
processing performance for data anonymisation. The Spark application programming 
interface environment is delivered with some libraries of code to support data analytics. 
These libraries include SQL, multimedia, machine learning, graph-parallel computation 
and data stream. The focus of this chapter is the SQL Spark, which is adequate for big 
data anonymisation. 
Spark operates on an in-memory platform; thus, we need to observe its limitations, 
speed and fault-tolerance with data size increase. Spark introduces an abstraction called 
RDDs, which reads and serialises a collection of objects partitioned across a set of 
machines. Developers claim that Spark can outperform MapReduce by ten times in 
iterative machine learning jobs; thus, the experiments in this chapter compare 
MapReduce and Spark. The overall results indicate better performance for Spark’s 
processing time; however, in some limited cases, we prefer to implement the old 
MapReduce framework when cluster resources are limited and the network is 
uncongested [49]. 
7.1 Spark Structure 
Spark operations are different from the traditional MapReduce. Spark architecture is 
implemented to increase process performance by using the maximum capabilities of the 
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available resources. For this reason, multiple jobs can run in parallel by implementing 
applications, executors and active drivers. The traditional MapReduce splits each job 
into many tasks, and each task is undertaken by a single process within each container, 
so the process terminates when the task is completed. Every node consists of one JVM 
core, unlike with Spark, where each worker node may consist of many cores, and each 
core operates in one JVM, as shown in Figure 7.1. The node may have many cores, 
depending on the node capacity. Each core comprises one executor process that can run 
multiple tasks, and remains for the entirety of the Spark life. This structure accelerates 
the initiation of the process and tasks. In addition, Spark consists of a process, known as 
an active driver. This driver is used to manage the job flow and schedule tasks, and is 
located on the master node. It interactively communicates with the executor of each 
node. If Spark was deployed on top of YARN, the Spark driver could run over the 
cluster [131]. 
Spark is shipped with distribution processes that can mimic the functions of YARN. 
Users may install Spark in three different modes: standalone, cluster and client mode. In 
standalone mode, the built-in resource manager can manage the cluster nodes, without a 
need for YARN or Mesos. Both cluster and client modes are deployed over YARN. 
Each mode was designed for different tasks. Users may run cluster mode for production 
jobs, while client mode is used for user interactive and debugging jobs. The main 
difference between the modes is the location of the Spark driver [49]. 
 
7—Spark structure and job distribution 
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One of the negative aspects of Spark is the programming difficulties that programmers 
may face. Spark operates in RAM, and programming with large data may cause Spark to 
run out of heap memory because of the unnecessary RDD data collection caused by the 
programmer algorithm. Programmers should have previous knowledge about Spark core 
structure and jobs, such as partitions, nodes, serialisation, JVM, executors, memory and 
disk, shuffles, compressed files and columnar formats (parquet). They may need to try 
various algorithms to deduce the most efficient one. This frustrating and time-
consuming code may cause bugs during the program execution as soon as the data 
exceed the maximum limit of resources. Usually, cached data that do not fit in the 
memory are either spilled to the disk or recomputed when needed, as determined by the 
RDD’s storage level. However, this does not prevent data growth bugs and overflow 
[39]. 
Anonymity in data analytics is an example of complex analytics, where anonymisation 
operations scan the data records many times during the filtration, aggregation and 
masking operations. The anonymisation process latency is considerably high; therefore, 
batch processing tools are more efficient to deal with a large data size and long latency. 
Big data tools were developed to accommodate both data batches and streams. The first 
generations of MapReduce frameworks, such as Hadoop, were unable to process the 
data stream. The next generation was developed based on Lambda architecture, which 
was designed to handle both batch and stream processing methods. The Spark 
framework structure attempts to a trade-off between latency, throughput and fault-
tolerance. Most of the real-time frameworks follow a similar structure of storing 
temporary data frames and tables in the memory, so most of the operations are 
completed without performing I/O operation with disks, thereby decreasing latency [53]. 
7.2 MapReduce and Spark 
Both the Spark and MapReduce frameworks are very similar in some core features. 
Spark runs on Hadoop, on Mesos or standalone; hence, it is not possible to categorise 
Spark as a non-MapReduce framework. The MapReduce core structure consists of 
YARN and HDFS, and these two Hadoop native processes are used intensively in 
Spark. They provide reliability, performance and scalability for Spark. It is worth 
Chapter 7—Comparison of MapReduce and Spark 
 
201 
mentioning that the notable difference between MapReduce and Spark is the processing 
methods. MapReduce wastes considerable time on I/O transmission between memory 
and disks. The inefficiency of read/write from the disk and the high latency in each 
operation are the major inhibitors in MapReduce. In contrast, Spark operations are 
executed over a built-in memory, without a need for read/write on disks [49]. 
Anonymisation requires a large buffer size to accommodate the massive size of data 
flow. Spark infrastructure should contain a larger memory size than Hadoop 
infrastructure because Spark relies intensively on memory. However, this does not mean 
that Hadoop is always less efficient than Spark. When the memory size in Spark equals 
the memory size in Hadoop, then Spark may attain better performance in some cases, 
but not always, as explained in Section 7.5. The comparison between MapReduce and 
Spark tends to evaluate the MDSBA approach’s performance in each framework. 
All previous chapters’ experiments were conducted in the MapReduce environment, and 
within Hadoop ecosystems. Other frameworks have not been tested thus far; however, 
there have been a considerable number of cluster computation engines available in the 
market during the last decade, including Hadoop, Spark, Flink, Storm, Heron and 
Samza. The storm is a viable framework in the big data industry, as it presents a real-
time processing engine that is able to stream SQL records from HDFS, Kafka, 
MongoDB and Redis [26]. Storm is a popular framework worldwide, and is 
implemented in enterprise company networks, such as Yahoo, Twitter, Flipboard and 
Yelp. It is written in Clojure Language—the Lisp-like functional language. Moreover, 
the structural design of Storm was built for the data stream, which means that the Storm 
process is continuous and infinitive. However, Storm was not selected for data 
anonymisation because it does not process batching datasets—it only operates with data 
streaming—and anonymisation methods and operations are only applied to batching 
data. This is essential for grouping and counting the number of equivalent records and 
masking the non-equivalent records. These operations cannot induce adequate 
anonymisation results in the data stream; hence, Storm is not preferable in k-anonymity 
methods [1]. 
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Hadoop reads data from the disk, executes the two stages of map and reduce, and returns 
output to the disk. This dataflow of in/out creates a high I/O latency, and keeps the 
scheduler busy with creating more tasks. This may enable Spark to operate more rapidly 
than MapReduce, reaching up to a 100-times faster speed. Speed is an important issue 
with big data because of the large data size. Thus, this new framework opens the door 
for various new applications that were not possible to develop with the old frameworks. 
 
7—Comparison of Hadoop and Spark in dealing with memory and disks 
Figure 7.2 illustrates a comparison of Hadoop and Spark. Spark’s in-memory cluster 
computing capabilities are high, which boosts performance, even with the large data 
magnitude. The time difference between reading data from the disk or the memory is 
significant. A larger data size shows higher latency than a smaller data size when 
reading from disks. In addition, Spark implements a caching technique to store data in 
the memory to minimise the disk I/O. Figure 7.2 describes the iterated stages in Hadoop 
operations—that is, keeping two stages mapping or reading from the disk, and reducing 
or writing to the disk. Considerable time is consumed by memory/disk I/O. This two-
stage principle is not available in Spark; instead, it maps blocks from disks, processes 
them, and keeps them in the memory for another staging process. Hence, several stages 
may save the disk I/O. 
The second factor that enables Spark to operate more rapidly is the advanced job 
execution engine. Both Spark and MapReduce convert a job into a DAG of stages. The 
DAG theory is an old theory that represents any graph with a collection of vertices 
connected by edges [148]. Graph theory was developed and implemented in many 
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fields, such as computer science and medical science. In Hadoop and Spark, graph 
theory is used for scheduling tasks. Each job is presented by DAG, which is a set of 
vertices connected by directed edges. Each vertex in the graph represents one processor, 
and each edge represents a communication link. The difference between Spark DAG 
and Hadoop DAG is the communication link. In Hadoop, each processor reads all 
incoming messages from the in-edge (disk), performs some computation, and writes 
messages to the out-edge (disk). The in-edge and out-edge are presented by disk I/O, 
which causes major delays. Hence, two stages can be processed at a time. In other 
words, there is no way to start at a vertex in a DAG and follow a sequence of directed 
edges to return to the same vertex [83]. Hadoop creates a DAG with only two predefined 
stages: map and reduce. Developers are forced to process their commands within one of 
these two stages. Based on this core structure, complex jobs need to be split into two or 
more jobs to fulfil the two-stage process. In contrast, Spark can accomplish the job with 
multiple stages, without splitting the single job into many sub-jobs. This structure 
optimises job scheduling and processing. For instance, if the processing algorithm 
contains read from storage, filter and group, Spark can accomplish this algorithm in one 
job with three stages of map, shuffle and reduce. In Hadoop, this would be divided into 
two jobs of (map, shuffle) and (map, reduce) for each job. Data would be read from the 
disk, filtered and stored back to the disk with the first job. Again, data would be read 
from the disk, grouped and stored back to the disk. 
However, some obstacles may degrade the efficiency of Spark. As aforementioned, if 
the data size does not fit the total memory size of the cluster, then Spark uses disks to 
spill data. This action causes a higher delay on disk I/O, which is a similar delay factor 
in the Hadoop framework. Therefore, the Spark cluster always needs a large memory 
size to leverage the best performance. The average amount of processed data should be 
considered when building the Spark cluster because Spark has the capability of caching 
RDD in memory. Developers benefit from this feature to avoid disk I/O; however, 
caching features requires a sufficiently large memory size. For instance, if the Spark 
cluster is expected to analyse a data size of 3 TB, then Spark uses up to 60% of the total 
configured executor memory to cache RDDs. If data analysers decided to cache half of 
the 3 TB in-memory at once, there should be enough memory space to accommodate 
Chapter 7—Comparison of MapReduce and Spark 
 
204 
this large data size. In this scenario, a Spark cluster with 20 workers and 128 GB 
memory for each worker is enough to cache 1.5 TB. A rough calculation is 20 × 128 ×
0.6 = 1536 𝐺𝐵 ≈ 1.5 𝑇𝐵. As explained earlier, the Spark cluster infrastructure should 
consist of powerful servers and fast connectors between workers and storage units. 
Therefore, VMs connected to storage nodes by iSCSi are not a suitable choice for 
building a Spark cluster. Spark requires physical or non-virtual servers. In addition, 
network connections between servers and storages should be through direct access 
connection, such as SAS or SATA. 
The (persist) or cache commands in Spark can be completed automatically or by 
developers. Spark persists some intermediate data in some shuffle operations without 
users calling persist. This is undertaken to avoid re-computing the entire input if a node 
fails during the shuffle. However, it is recommended that developers call persist on the 
resulting RDD or during the map phase [63]. A common misconception is that Spark 
cannot be used if the input data do not fit in the memory; however, this is not true 
because Spark can process terabytes of data on a cluster that may have only 100 GB 
total cluster memory. However, this is not recommended for data anonymisation by 
SQL Spark. The small memory size compared with the data size may degrade the Spark 
operation’s performance. It is the developer’s responsibility to decide which data should 
be cached and at which point in a data processing pipeline. In fact, if a data processing 
application makes only a single pass over data, there is no need to cache data at all. 
Developers may cache data when data are read several times [53]. 
7.3 Data Streaming versus Batch 
Data should be stored in repository storage units. Data analytics operations fetch data 
from the repository and process them. Stored data may represent production data or 
archived data, where the production data are live data with a real-time or close-to-real-
time update. Archived data are old data that are no longer actively used. From an 
analytics perspective, archived and backup data are similar. The difference between 
backup and archived data can be controversial, since the technical definition for each 
data type is slightly different. Archiving is applied to original data, while backup data 
are copies of the data. However, the aim is identifying the analytics operations for real-
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time and non-real-time data. Regardless of the originality of data, real-time data need to 
be analysed differently [24].  
Anonymity in data analytics is an example of complex analytics, where anonymisation 
operations scan the data records many times during the filtration, aggregation and 
masking operations. Anonymisation latency is considerably high; therefore, data 
batching tools are more efficient when dealing with large data size and long latency. 
Various big data tools have been developed to accommodate both batching and 
streaming data. The Hadoop framework is unable to process data streaming. Thus, the 
next generation was developed based on Lambda architecture, which is designed to 
handle both batching and streaming data. The Lambda structure is based on a trade-off 
between latency, throughput and fault-tolerance. The recently developed frameworks 
follow a similar structure of storing data temporarily in the memory to reduce the disk 
I/O latency [156]. Employing Spark in data anonymisation is adequate because Spark 
can undertake both stream and batch processes. 
7.4 Implementing MDSBA in Spark 
Spark has many advantages over Hadoop ecosystems. It mitigates latencies and 
increases performance. For instance, Pig divides jobs into small tasks, and, for each task, 
Pig reads data from HDFS, and returns the data to HDFS once the process is completed. 
This in/out consumes considerable time, and is unlike Spark, which implements an 
RDD. RDD is the main distinguishing feature of Spark. RDD divides jobs into many 
DAG stages, and, for each stage, Spark reprocesses RDD in the memory without 
referring to the disk. Spark may perform many times faster than MapReduce. 
In this chapter, Pig’s and Spark’s performances are evaluated in MDSBA. To conduct a 
detailed evaluation, Spark’s transformation and functions used in anonymisation should 
be properly defined. All Spark scripts are coded by Scala program. Some functions and 
transformations operate faster than others. For example, inner join transformation 
commands may require a high computational cost. MDSBA was proposed for big data 
processing frameworks. Its core concept is applying optimised anonymisation 
procedures and algorithms by splitting data into small tasks so that they can be 
parallelised among the cluster nodes.  
Chapter 7—Comparison of MapReduce and Spark 
 
206 
In big data processing, the reduce phase is expensive because it involves data 
partitioning, data serialisation and de-serialisation, data compression and disk I/O. These 
operations require data transfer over the network to aggregate data over multiple nodes. 
Leveraging any application’s behaviour should consider the size of data transferring 
between nodes during the reduce phase [81]. In data anonymisation, the reduce phase is 
presented by SQL grouping commands, which causes high shuffling processes. To 
reduce the groupBy effect in the anonymisation application, a filtration command is 
initiated to split data logically as per nominal values. This type of split reduces the 
performance degradation caused by the shuffling process. This reduces the amount of 
shuffling among cluster nodes during the reduce stage. 
The previous anonymisation techniques, such as BUG and TDS, were supposed to work 
efficiently in parallel distributed processing. Technically, anonymising data with these 
algorithms may negatively create data overflow without considering the cluster 
resources and capabilities. For instance, Figure 7.3 illustrates a comparison of the TDS 
and MDSBA algorithms. In the TDS algorithm, the data flow may negatively affect 
parallelisation. First, grouping of all records without filtering data is inefficient. This is 
experimentally proven in Section 7.5.1. Second, most TDS operational steps should be 
executed in UDF, which degrades the algorithm performance. Spark and Pig are unable 
to run intensive computations and conditional iterations without UDF. Therefore, UDF 
is embedded in the script’s codes to execute complicated operations. However, using 
UDF in most anonymisation steps inhibits the performance of Hadoop and Spark. The 
operations of UDF are executed in a black box, and are not related to Spark or Hadoop 
frameworks. This is also true in Pig operations. UDF does not use the resources of 
YARN; instead, it uses the resources of locally installed JVM. Therefore, implementing 
Spark with such an algorithm is inefficient.  
In MDSBA, UDF was embedded in Spark and Pig scripts, but with a minimal size of 
data processing. As explained in the next section, the anonymisation is applied on fewer 
attributes at a time. This technique controls and minimises the size of data flowing to the 
UDF. The UDF is executed in a local JVM beyond the source manager’s control—a 
memory pool located outside the Spark JVMs. Therefore, there is a need to reduce the 
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amount of data flowing outside the Spark JVMs [39]. Moreover, the anonymised Q-ID 
in TDS is volatile. This means that the specialisation is applied to different Q-ID 
attributes in each group of records. The chosen attribute for specialisation is the attribute 
with the highest score value [40]. Calculating the highest attribute score for each group 
is an expensive computation process. In contrast, in MDSBA, the anonymised Q-ID is 
predetermined based on the Q-ID probability. This saves a considerable amount of 
computation time. This solution may not provide the optimal anonymisation for the pre-
chosen Q-ID, by resulting in a higher percentage of anonymisation loss. However, we 
may sacrifice some information gain to benefit data performance. 
Figure 7.3 compares TDS and MDSBA in anonymising data. The TDS algorithm 
involves various iterations when calculating the best cut and scores. This type of 
iteration is inefficient for big data, and even worse when using UDF, where the program 
executes the UDF code outside the Spark framework. Further, the UDF program needs 
to iterate a large size of arrays. The UDF executes almost all anonymisation processes; 
thus, there is no real benefit from a parallel distributed system. In contrast, MDSBA 
implements UDF with a limited data size flow. As shown in Figure 7.3, UDF use was 
reduced to minimal operations. UDF reads only a few data attributes to apply some 
masking operations. The data size flowing to the UDF is relatively small. 
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7—Comparison of the anonymisation algorithms of MDSBA and TDS 
7.4.1 User-defined Functions in MDSBA 
MDSBA implements user-defined functions in different locations. This is essential for 
two main purposes: anonymising and ungrouping. In anonymising, three masking types 
of interval, taxonomy tree and suppression are implemented. Figure 7.4 shows the 
algorithm for anonymising any numerical group. In Scala, the group of objects can be a 
list or sequence. Minimising the amount of data when accessing the UDF program is 
essential to reduce the processing cost and avoid data overflow, as described before. 
It is difficult to predict the failure of non-Spark JVM; therefore, we must keep the data 
flow to the lowest level. For instance, installing JVM in any computer may take up to 
25% of the total memory. This size can be reconfigured and enlarged if needed. If the 
Spark worker memory is large enough to fit the data size, then the external JVM that 
handles the UDF may be able to handle up to 25% of the data size located in Spark. The 
size of the UDF heap memory is not the only obstacle—the complex iteration with 
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several IF statements can be another cumbersome factor that degrades the data 
processes. MDSBA implements a fast algorithm to anonymise data with the minimum 
number of iterations. In MDSBA, the UDF algorithm converts a numerical list of values 
into a set of intervals. Each interval consists of a minimum and maximum value. In 
MDSBA, the minimum values are found by rounding the minimum number in the list 
down to the nearest 5. This round down is different from ordinary rounding. As shown 
in Table 7.1, the values of the example are rounded down to the nearest 5. 
Table 7.1—Data example for rounding down to the nearest five 
No. Before Rounding 
Down 
No. after Rounding 
Down  
Math. Calculation 
2 0 2 − (2 mod 5) 
6 5 6 − (6 mod 5) 
12 10 12 − (12 mod 5) 
14 10 14 − (14 mod 5) 
 
The rounding down is calculated by using mod 5. The rounded value is only used as an 
initial value. In the interval, the minimum value is calculated by rounding down, while 
the maximum value is calculated by adding the interval range to the minimum value. 
For instance, if the interval range is 10, then the values of (4, 7) can be presented by a 
range of [0–10]. The initial value of 4 is 4 − (4 mod 5) = 0. The maximum value is 10 + 
0 = 10. However, the value of 10 is not included in the interval; instead, it is included in 
the next interval of [10–20]. The interval range is derived from the sensitivity level, ψ. If 
ψ = 0.5, then interval range = 1/0.2 = 5. The interval range must be a multiple of 5; thus, 
if the number in the interval range is found to be smaller than 5, then it is rounded up to 
5, and, if the number is found to be larger than 5, then it is rounded up to multiples of 5. 
This concept is described in Table 7.2. The example shows a list of ψ values and the 
interval range calculation. 
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Table 7.2—Interval range rounding down to the nearest five 
Sensitivity Level ψ Interval Range Interval Range Rounding 
0.4 1/0.4 = 2.5 2.5 + (5 − (2.5 mod 5)) = 5 
0.015 1/0.015 = 66.6 66.6 + (5 − (66.6 mod 5)) = 70 
0.045 1/0.045 = 22.2 22.2 + (5 − (22.2 mod 5)) = 25 
 
Table 7.2 illustrates an example for calculating the interval range rounding. The 
equation used in calculations can be mathematically presented in the following equation: 
𝐼𝑅 =
1
ψ
− (5 −
1
ψ
 𝑀𝑂𝐷 5)        (7.1) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑅 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜓 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. 
In a similar algorithm, we can mask data with taxonomy trees, as explained in Section 
3.2.4.3. This algorithm aims to reduce the size of data flowing to the UDF program. This 
is implemented by masking fewer attributes at a time, and then attaching the rest of the 
data tuples to the anonymised attributes. To determine the estimated size of data flow to 
the UDF, we may roughly estimate the size of 10 data records as 1 KB, while the size of 
one attribute of the ten records may not exceed 20 bytes. This shows that the actual data 
size flowing to the UDF file may not exceed one-third of the total data size. For this 
reason, data processing in UDF is not expected to be expensive. 
7.4.2 MDSBA Algorithms Differences between Pig and Spark  
Figure 7.4 presents two algorithms implemented by Pig and Spark. Both are similar, 
with minor differences in the data flow between memory and disk. Spark does not need 
a disk read/write operation. In both programs, the fully-equivalent records (SG) are 
stored in disks as output files. The major difference between programs is the semi-
equivalent records (SSG) and their management. In Pig, SSG records are stored 
temporarily in disks. Moreover, unlike Scala, Pig Latin script does not support UDF 
script as embedded code. Therefore, an external program, such as Java, should handle 
the UDF operations. Spark can complete one task and move to the next task by creating 
a series of map and reduce processes. Each map and reduce process is known as a stage. 
This is very efficient technique, but requires sufficient memory to cache each stage in 
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the memory. However, the stages output of data are overwritten in most cases. If the 
memory does not fit the output size of data, the memory spills the rest of the data to the 
disk. 
In the Spark algorithm, it is difficult to concatenate the anonymised data with the rest of 
the attributes in the table. To illustrate this, let us study the following example. A table T 
contains the following attributes: T = {A, B, C, D}. The anonymisation process has 
finished masking attribute A only, and transformed it to a—that is (A  a). The 
anonymised attribute {a} needs to be concatenated with the rest of the attributes {B, C, 
D}, so the new table TA will be TA = {a, B, C, D}. In Scala, the anonymised attribute 
(a) is considered a DataFrame, and the {B, C, D} group is another DataFrame. In 
Scala’s implementation of DataFrames, there is no direct way to zip two DataFrames 
into one. We can simply work around this limitation by adding indices to each row of 
the data frames, and then inner join DataFrame by these indices. However, all join 
operations are known as Cartesian join, which requires a high number of shuffling 
between nodes. Therefore, join operation is very expensive and is not recommended by 
Spark developers. 
An appropriate solution is implementing another method of concatenating without 
creating an independent DataFrame. To understand the concept of this UDF script, let us 
study the following example. Table 7.3 presents four Q-ID attributes and one non-Q-ID 
attribute. The records are grouped by three attributes (CLASS, SCHOOL and LEVEL). 
The rest of the attributes (TEACHER and MARK) collect multiple values in arrays. The 
script calls the anonymisation UDF to anonymise the MARK, and concatenates the rest 
of the attributes in one table. This can be implemented through the (withColumn) 
command. The command syntax is shown below: 
val anonymise _MARK = Grouped_QID.withColumn("MARK", 
AnonUDF($"MARK")).select("TEACHER","CLASS","SCHOOL","LEVEL",”MARK”).  
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Table 7.3—Grouped and anonymised table 
 Q-ID Group 
TEACHER CLASS SCHOOL LEVEL MARK 
Jones, Khan, Steve A School 1 1 [70–80], [70–80], [70–80] 
Mark, Jane B School 2 2 [90–95], [90–95] 
 
Table 7.3 should be ungrouped for storing or possibly for further processing. This 
format of grouped records cannot be easily managed for computation or statistical 
operations. The grouped data can be ungrouped in various ways. The optimal approach 
determined was creating another UDF that can map every sequence to a wrapped array, 
and rotate the direction of the wrapped array. The aim is to convert the format of Table 
7.3 to Table 7.4. It is clear that the three Q-ID attributes are repeated according to the 
number of grouped objects in MARK and TEACHER. 
Table 7.4—The new state after ungrouping records 
 Q-ID Group 
TEACHER CLASS SCHOOL LEVEL MARK 
Jones A School 1 1 [70–80] 
Khan A School 1 1 [70–80] 
Steve A School 1 1 [70–80] 
Mark B School 2 2 [90–95] 
Jane B School 2 2 [90–95] 
 
The ungrouping algorithm reads each wrapped array, counts the number of objects, and 
maps each array with indices. Each wrapped array has a varied number of objects; 
therefore, we need to define a function that can update the array size on each wrapped 
array. Scala defines functions by using the (val) or (def) command. In our case, we 
implement (def), so the command can update the number of array objects, with the 
following syntax: 
def assertSameSize(arrs:Seq[_]*) = {assert(arrs.map(_.size).distinct.size==1,"sizes 
differ")}.  
This UDF recalls the below command to rotate the array direction: 
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val ungroup = 
udf((xa:Seq[String],xb:Seq[String],xc:Seq[String],xd:Seq[String],xe:Seq[Integer]) => 
{ 
assertSameSize(xa,xb,xc,xd,xe) 
xa.indices.map(i=> (xa(i),xb(i),xc(i),xd(i),xe(i))) 
}) 
The above UDF ungroups Table 7.3 and expands the wrapped array to the format of 
Table 7.4. In this example, the anonymisation UDF outputs the range of marks in one 
string of values: MARK = {[70–80], [70–80], [70–80]}. This string should be converted 
to a wrapped array before ungrouping it. Converting a string to an array in Scala is 
implemented by the command split (col(MARK)). 
Implementing the fastest algorithm relies on several trials of execution before choosing 
the best method. In general, programming with big data should be carefully considered. 
This is similar to programming multi-task programs on a single computer with multiple 
processors. The program may not gain any advantage from the multi-core processor 
without a suitable algorithm. For example, an operation of total = a + b + c + d will run 
in one core only, while the rest of the cores are in ideal states. The same operation can 
be completed faster if the algorithm is amended by tot1 = a + b, tot2 = c + d, and total = 
tot1 + tot2. Splitting the single operation to three operations of tot1, tot2 and total 
enhances the performance and leverages the parallel processing on multiple cores. 
However, the operation of total will be completed on one core only. The final result of 
total will wait for the parallel operations of tot1 and tot2 to be completed. This operation 
is known as a sequence operation, which causes a major delay in algorithms [72]. 
Applying a similar concept to a parallel distributed operation mimics the mapping and 
reducing operations. Reduce is a sequence operation that waits for mapping completion 
before the shuffling operation start-up. More shuffling leads to higher operating costs. 
Operation of the grouping process is implemented by the built-in transformation 
command ‘groupBy’. Alternatively, Scala permits SQL embedded commands so that the 
grouping can be implemented with either a groupBy or Select query. However, groupBy 
was found to be more efficient in terms of performance. Each data tuple or record 
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contains many attributes. As described before, MDSBA creates small Q-ID groups that 
include only two to four attributes. In addition, each data record may consist of several 
G(QID), classes and non-Quasi attributes. For this reason, we need to groupBy each 
G(QID) independently, while the rest of the attributes must be aggregated and 
concatenated or zipped with the anonymised G(QID). Appendix 2 presents a full Scala 
program, including UDF. 
7.5 Comparison of Hadoop Ecosystems and Spark in 
Processing MDSBA 
Experiments were conducted to compare the Hadoop ecosystem and Spark. The 
experiments aimed to measure the performance of the old MapReduce framework and 
new Spark framework. The performance included the computation cost and scalability 
of each. Spark is a distributed in-memory platform; thus, we need to observe Spark’s 
behaviour in data growth. Spark was developed for the new powerful servers that have 
large memory sizes and considerable numbers of CPU cores. Spark is a memory 
consumer and CPU-intensive operator; therefore, each worker should contain a 
reasonable size of memory and cores. Usually, memory size in each worker starts from 
16 GB, with two quad-core processors. However, the required size of memory and 
processor in each worker of the cluster depends on three main factors: the data size, the 
time required to complete the job, and a number of workers and masters within the 
cluster. 
A laboratory was set up at Western Sydney University, including five VMs, with one 
master and four workers. Each node’s CPU was a single core Intel Xeon CPU @ 
2.40 GHz, with a physical memory of 8 GB. The operating system was CentOS 7. Both 
Spark and Hadoop were set up in the same cluster. Spark 2.1 was set up on Apache 
Hadoop 2.7. In addition, Pig was set up in NameNode to run the Pig Latin script. Two 
different scripts programmed in Pig Latin and Scala were created. Both scripts had to 
output similar results. To save resources, Pig script was executed first, and then Scala 
script was executed after the completion of Pig script. Adult data were used for the 
experiments. Data were randomly enlarged up to seven different sizes: 500 MB, 1 GB, 
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2 GB, 3 GB, 4 GB, 5 GB and 6 GB. The size of datasets was chosen with consideration 
of the limited available resources in the cluster. 
The first experiment aimed to compare the processing time between Spark and Pig. Both 
scripts are designed to read data files, filter data by class value, group, anonymise and 
ungroup. The program concept is similar to the algorithm described in Figure 7.4. The 
Adult data attributes included {AGE, JOB, MARITAL_STATUS, EDU, SOCIAL, 
RACE, GENDER, POSITION, COUNTY, COUNTRY, SALARY}. The attributes were 
divided into three groups of Q-IDs. The first Q-ID group was G(QID)1 = {AGE, JOB, 
MARITAL_STATUS, EDU}, where EDU was the class attribute. The second group 
was G(QID)2 = {SOCIAL, RACE, GENDER, POSITION}, where POSITION was the 
class attribute. Finally, the third group was G(QID)3 = {COUNTY, COUNTRY, 
SALARY}, where SALARY was the class. For this experiment, group G(QID)1 was 
anonymised by grouping Q-IDs of {AGE, JOB, MARITAL_STATUS} in the first 
stage, then {JOB, MARITAL_STATUS} in the second stage, and finally 
{MARITAL_STATUS} only in the third stage. Spark was set up with a total of three 
workers with six cores. Each worker node contained two cores, and each core contained 
2 GB of memory. The three nodes had 12 GB of memory, with a total of six executors 
or cores. 
The results with three workers showed a large contrast in processing time between both 
scripts of Scala and Pig. Figure 7.5 shows the processing time for various data sizes. 
Spark was much faster than Pig with the relatively smaller data size. The relativity was 
determined by comparing data size with memory size. With an appropriate memory size, 
Spark may function up to eight times faster than Pig. During data size growth, Spark 
performance degraded dramatically, and the processing time became like Pig when data 
size = 3 GB. More data growth led to improved performance for Pig speed in 
comparison with Spark. Pig did not speed up its processes during data growth, but its 
processing time grew steadily. In contrast, as indicated by the discrete line in Figure 7.5, 
Spark processing time underwent exponential growth. SQL Spark consumes more 
processing time when the memory is not sufficiently large in comparison with the data 
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size. For instance, when data size = 6 GB, the process time was around 570 minutes, 
which was much larger than the Pig process time (which was around 390 minutes). 
 
7—Comparison of process time between Pig and Scala scripts with three workers 
In the second experiment, one more worker was added to observe Spark’s behaviour 
with the larger hardware capacity. The additional worker node consisted of 8 GB of 
memory and two core processors. The previous experiment was conducted by three 
workers and one master, while this experiment was conducted by four workers instead. 
The fourth worker was added to both the Pig and Spark clusters. It indicated a dramatic 
increase in Spark performance. Figure 7.6 illustrates the same datasets with the extra 
worker added to the Spark domain and Pig domain. Spark’s processing time showed a 
dramatic degradation when data size exceeded 3 GB; however, the overall performance 
was better than when using only three workers. 
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7—Comparison of process time between Pig and Scala scripts with four workers 
MapReduce is prone to network congestion during the map and shuffle phases. Spark 
reduces this negative effect by reducing the data transmission between disks and 
memory. Following many trials of experiments with Pig, it was identified that several 
tasks took much longer before causing errors and terminating the tasks. The engineering 
structure of MapReduce and Spark is similar when handling slow tasks. They both 
implement a speculative execution, which tags any task that takes longer on average 
than the other tasks from the same job. It clones this slow task and runs it on another 
node. It will not stop the slow task, but rather runs another copy in parallel. This is 
beneficial in large clusters, whereas small clusters may lose their available resources. 
However, the university network is not dedicated to the MapReduce structure, and 
suffers from high network congestion most of the day. In both cases of enabling or 
disabling Pig’s speculative execution, an almost similar delay appeared in some tasks. 
Therefore, each experiment was repeated several times—mainly when running Pig 
script. The failure jobs were repeated and excluded from the comparison time. The 
failure percentage of processing tasks in Pig script was around 4%, which increased with 
the data growth. Many factors may cause this congestion, such as the virtual 
infrastructure in the university lab and connection types between storage and VMs. 
Figure 7.7 shows 319 tasks that were executed by Pig script for various data sizes. The 
tasks belonged to more than 15 jobs, with an average processing time of between 10 
seconds and 18 minutes for the successful tasks. The shown pulses display the failed 
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tasks after a long processing time. The failure tasks increased in parallel with the data 
size increase. 
 
7—A number of 319 Pig script tasks, including repeated tasks 
7.5.1 Spark Tuning in MDSBA 
Tuning Spark is one of the most difficult tasks when managing a Spark cluster. It 
requires knowledge, experience and several experiments. There are no clear instructions 
on tuning Spark to gain the optimal performance. The focus here is on anonymisation 
operations only. Different tasks and applications may require different steps of tuning. 
In MDSBA, the main operations include grouping, ungrouping and masking data. These 
three main operations should be organised appropriately to enable the best possible 
performance. Both ungrouping and masking require UDF programs. In masking, the 
algorithms should consider the least number of iterations and the smallest size of data, 
as explained earlier regarding the importance of reducing the data flowing to the UDF. 
We experimented with and configured several tuning techniques. As a result, two main 
tuning concepts were identified: filter/group and cache data. 
In SQL grouping, we experimentally identified that filtering and then grouping data 
might reduce the grouping time and enhance performance. Hence, it is necessary to filter 
and then group data, rather than jumping to the GROUP command first. It is apparent 
that grouping data records can replace the FILTER command; thus, technically, we can 
group any record without the need for filtration first. However, to reduce the number of 
shuffling times and to leverage parallelisation, it is better to filter records first. For a 
better understanding, let us consider a set of passengers’ records, as shown in Table 7.5. 
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If the grouping command included the attributes of Depart, Arrive and Flight, then the 
grouping results can be {ATL, DXB, (Adult, Child), K380}. We also gain similar 
results if we use the filter command first. For instance, if we filter the records with the 
class value = K380, then the data size will be reduced to two records instead of three. 
Using the filter/group commands attains the same results as using the group command 
alone; however, they differ in terms of performance. 
Table 7.5—Passengers’ records Example 
 Depart Arrive Passenger Type Flight 
ATL DXB Adult K380 
HND SYD Adult D120 
ATL DXB Child K380 
 
 
7—Process time between filter/group and group only 
Figure 7.8 displays the processing time difference between grouping data after filtration, 
and grouping data without filtration. Filtering data first increases the program 
performance. Filtering data first is beneficial when the attribute values are known so that 
they can be added by programmers. In MDSBA, the attribute values are pre-added 
automatically in the early preparation stages. The MDSBA framework consists of three 
main services: core, initialiser and anonymiser [6] . The Scala script is generated in the 
initialiser stage by reading dataset parameters and users’ access parameters from two 
Chapter 7—Comparison of MapReduce and Spark 
 
221 
different XML files. A user’s XML file is received from the FS, while the dataset XML 
file is previously uploaded by data owners to the SP’s servers, in parallel with the 
dataset. The MDSBA framework was further explained in Chapter 5. 
The second tuning in Spark is data caching. The percentage of failure tasks in the Spark 
script was much lower than in the Pig script. This percentage was even lower when 
using the ‘persist’ command to read data from disks. As aforementioned, the (persist) 
command caches the data in the memory. Developers may assign (persist) if data will be 
read many times for multiple tasks. The comparison of the (persist) and non-persist 
commands indicated a tangible difference in performance between them. The persist 
command was implemented after reading a dataset from the disk. Figure 7.9 indicates a 
large difference between both cases, where using (persist) reduces the processing time 
of tasks. The (persist) command is part of Spark tuning to increase the overall 
performance efficacy. However, the command is not recommended when the data size is 
larger than the available memory. If the data size is larger than the memory, the 
overloaded memory will be spilled to the disk. Figure 7.9 illustrates the performance 
comparison between (persist) and non-persist. The contrast in processing time increases 
with the increase of the data size. 
 
7—Performance comparison between caching and non-caching data 
These two steps of tuning cause a considerable difference in anonymisation performance 
by MDSBA. Before tuning Spark, it is essential to build a robust Spark cluster and 
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robust nodes. The hardware infrastructure is a major factor for big data operations’ 
success and performance. As aforementioned, the memory size of each worker, number 
of cores, number of workers and a network connection between workers and storage 
should be sufficiently large to accommodate the massive size of data. Data 
anonymisation and analytics are expensive processes that require powerful and large 
cluster specifications. 
7.6 Summary 
Various processing frameworks have been developed as a result of the recent 
revolutionary growth in big data. Some of these frameworks optimally fit stream 
processing, while others can be applied to batch processing. In this chapter, two popular 
frameworks were experimentally examined for the k-anonymity method. MapReduce 
and Spark were examined in the MDSBA anonymisation process, with the aim of 
building reliable grounds for MDSBA state-of-the-art anonymisation with the most 
reliable performance. The experiments indicated a few hurdles in each framework; 
however, Spark is faster and more fault tolerant as an in-memory operations framework. 
In congested networks, Spark reduces data transmission between memory and disks 
when serialising data with RDD. Spark can be many times faster than MapReduce 
during anonymisation. To avoid SQL Spark performance degradation, the memory 
should be sufficiently large to accommodate the processed data. SQL Spark requires a 
large memory size to boost the processing performance. Other Spark tuning methods 
that may leverage the anonymisation performance are the UDF algorithm, filter/group 
commands, and caching data in the memory. 
In contrast, MapReduce is an old framework that can perform more successfully when 
memory resources are small. This is conditioned by the network traffic and congestion 
level. MapReduce may operate on small memory resources, but requires an ideal 
network because it relies on a heavy transmission between memory and disks. In 
conclusion, it is recommended to implement MDSBA in the Spark framework; however, 
the cluster infrastructure must be prepared well by providing sufficient resources of 
memory and processor for each node. 
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Future research will focus on determining a suitable method for data stream 
anonymisation. For big data, streaming is an essential feature of most data applications. 
However, the current anonymisation method of MDSBA does not support data stream 
anonymisation. Most recent big data frameworks provide complete solutions for data 
streams; thus, we may need to amend the current MDSBA method to cope with 
continuous data streaming. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Datasets containing private and sensitive information are useful for data analytics. Thus, 
data owners cautiously release such sensitive data using privacy-preserving publishing 
techniques. However, the possibility for personal re-identification is greater than ever 
before. For instance, social media has dramatically increased the chances of privacy 
violation. Many data anonymisation methods have been proposed to provide some 
degree of privacy protection by applying data suppression and other distortion 
techniques. However, the currently available methods suffer from poor scalability, poor 
performance and lack of framework standardisation. The current anonymisation 
methods are unable to cope with the massive size of data processing. Some of these 
methods were specifically proposed for the MapReduce framework to operate with big 
data, yet still operate with conventional data management approaches. As a result, there 
have been no remarkable gains in performance. To address these shortcomings, this 
thesis proposed a framework that can operate in the MapReduce environment to benefit 
from its advantages and the advantages of Hadoop ecosystems. The framework provides 
granular user access that can be tuned to different authorisation levels. The proposed 
solution provides a fine-grained alteration based on users’ authorisation levels to access 
the MapReduce domain for analytics. By using well-developed role-based access 
control approaches, this framework is capable of assigning roles to users and mapping 
them to relevant data attributes. 
This research followed a logical sequence of determining the barriers hindering the 
current anonymisation methods for big data. These impairments were related to the 
concept of selecting the optimal Q-ID to generalise or specialise attributes. Moreover, 
random splits, poor algorithms, a lack of granular access and the limited number of Q-
IDs cause significant degradation to anonymisation performance and security. The key 
concept of this research was based on one fact regarding big data equivalency. Data 
equivalency increases in parallel with the increasing number of records. This fact 
indicates the major difference between traditional data and big data. Generally, big data 
equivalency is high—particularly for Q-ID attributes that have a small number of 
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values. Understanding these concerns regarding the current anonymisation methods and 
determining some equivalency facts helped us outline the shortcomings of the current 
anonymisation methods. Therefore, the MDSBA method was developed to overcome 
the current impairments and harness big data anonymisation operations. 
The MDSBA core concept was derived from probability and Q-ID aggregation. The 
current anonymisation algorithm iterates several times to determine the best generalised 
or specialised Q-ID. In MDSBA, the best generalised Q-ID is determined before the 
anonymisation operation, and the lowest Q-ID probability value is intuitively 
generalised. Therefore, there is no need to calculate the best score for each Q-ID 
attribute. The anonymisation process does not impose a direct iteration; instead, the 
grouping action is repeated several times for generalisation. The process begins by 
grouping all Q-IDs to filter out the fully-equivalent records. The remaining records are 
not fully equivalent; therefore, all Q-IDs are grouped, except the one with the lowest Q-
ID probability. The lowest one is generalised by interval masking or taxonomy tree. 
Once again, all Q-IDs are grouped, except the lowest two Q-ID probabilities. Similarly, 
the lowest two Q-IDs are generalised by interval masking or taxonomy tree. This 
operation of grouping continues until the grouping aggregates only one Q-ID. The 
masking is finally applied to all Q-IDs, except the one with the highest probability. The 
few remaining non-equivalent groups are totally suppressed. The equivalency is 
measured by the ownership level k̄, instead of k. It is important to keep the k value 
constant, while the value of k̄ increases granularly as per users’ access. 
The current anonymisation methods split data randomly to fit in the limited memory 
size. This random split reduces the gained information and increases the number of non-
equivalent records. For this reason, MDSBA splits data logically based on class value. 
The sensitive class consists of a limited number of values, and each value is aggregated 
in one group and processed separately. This step is initially conducted before the 
aggregation and anonymisation begin. The number of aggregated groups equals the 
number of class values. This logical split is essential to avoid data overflow to the 
memory. The parallel distributed framework can manage a large data size to a certain 
extent, since a very large data size may increase error rates and pitfalls, which may 
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unexpectedly terminate the process. The second core concept of MDSBA is the 
aggregation of Q-IDs. Every two to four Q-ID groups are horizontally aggregated and 
mapped to one or more of the business roles. Multidimensional data require many Q-
IDs, which may exceed tens or even more. The current anonymisation methods accept a 
limited number of Q-IDs, which may not exceed eight or nine. The more Q-IDs added 
will reduce the performance and increase the required computation time. The recent 
decade has witnessed a technology revolution in social media, which has enabled 
adversaries to develop new attacking scenarios and techniques. This has raised the need 
to increase the number of Q-IDs, while keeping the processing costs low. MDSBA 
enables an increased number of Q-IDs, while maintaining a low processing time. This 
outcome is achieved by aggregating the Q-IDs into small groups. 
Initially, the thesis introduced MDSBA in Chapter 3. This chapter presented a 
preliminary definition of probabilities and aggregations of MDSBA. The research 
established some mathematical equations aiming to provide a granular level of 
anonymisation according to users’ access levels. The equations determined the 
sensitivity level for users, whereby users with higher sensitivity levels will gain less 
information. Moreover, the sensitivity level can be affected by the time factor, as 
datasets importance degrades with the time, which causes a sensitivity level decrease. 
After introducing MDSBA, the experiments examined MDSBA anonymisation results 
and their effect on prediction results. The classification error was used as a benchmark 
to determine the amount of information loss. The classification error was compared with 
the other anonymisation methods in BUG and TDS. MDSBA failed with small data size 
and succeeded with larger data size. BUG and TDS displayed a lower classification 
error rate when anonymising small datasets, while MDSBA displayed a lower 
classification error rate when anonymising large datasets. However, employing the 
classification error rate is not an accurate method to measure information loss, since 
different classification methods may output different results. Thus, another benchmark 
was proposed to measure the actual information loss, rather than measuring the 
prediction level. This benchmark, known as ‘disruption’, was deployed in most MDSBA 
experiments.  The experiments indicated lower disruption results, for large-sized 
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datasets in MDSBA, and higher disruption results in BUG and TDS. The disruption was 
even lower when the data were split into smaller data files, or when using a larger value 
of k. Moreover, the MDSBA computation cost was much lower than that of the BUG 
and TDS methods for big datasets. 
To accomplish one of the main objectives of this research—to determine a solution to 
big data granular anonymisation—a complete framework was proposed. This framework 
is disseminated between the FS and SP. The framework comprises three services: core, 
initialiser and anonymiser. The core service is embedded in the FS, which converts 
users’ requests to assertions transmitted over the SAML service. The SP stores the 
requested datasets in parallel with the initialiser and anonymiser services. The initialiser 
service operates on the edge server of the SP, which generates the anonymisation script, 
and transfers the script and other contextual files to the MapReduce domain. The 
anonymiser service completes the task by conducting the anonymisation process. An 
anonymised copy of data is created, ready for user access in a secure, enclosed 
directory. The anonymised copy can be generated from production (live) or archived 
data. The archived data create a stable anonymised copy, which can be available for 
users as long as the obsolescence value does not expire. The production data expiry may 
last for only a few hours or days. 
The research investigated all possible shortcomings in MDSBA security, and two issues 
were found in the MDSBA structure: obvious guess and AGUI. Several experiments 
were undertaken to resolve these two security breaches. The experimental results 
indicated that preventing obvious guess is possible by beginning an early filtration step. 
In contrast, AGUI cannot be completely prevented, yet can be mitigated by increasing 
the k value. These conclusions led the research to suggest a large number for the k value; 
however, the chosen large k value should not negatively affect the gained information. 
Therefore, Chapter 6 suggested some heuristic-based approaches to determine the 
optimal values of k. Some mathematical concepts were applied to determine the largest k 
value possible. CF and linear regression were used to move the k value upwards, starting 
from k = 20. The k value increased by ten until the disparity between the actual value 
and linear regression line was high. Moreover, the research suggested some security 
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levels be controlled by data owners. These security levels are high, medium and low. 
The security parameters are controlled by the number of inhibitors and k value interval. 
The number of inhibitors belongs to the linear regression. Increasing the number of 
inhibitors will reduce the security level. 
Finally, MDSBA was executed in a new parallel framework, known as Spark. This is a 
memory-base framework that performs faster than MapReduce. Spark was tested and 
compared with MapReduce. Two similar algorithms were programmed in Pig Latin 
script for MapReduce and Scala script for Spark. The results of the experiments 
indicated improved performance in Spark’s processing time when the data size fit the 
memory size in the Spark domain. However, Spark performance degraded when 
increasing the data size, in comparison with Pig. In contrast, MapReduce performed 
better when increasing the data size. MapReduce operates well with limited resources, 
unlike Spark, which requires larger resources. 
This thesis has answered the research questions by demonstrating that it is possible to 
provide data owners with methods that enable them to control the granularity of users’ 
access in big data analytics. The research has further demonstrated the possibility of 
implementing a framework that can apply an access control model. The model can 
enforce organisational business roles over big data. The framework is able to increase 
the analytics performance and reduce the information loss that can occur as a symptom 
of data anonymisation. The MDSBA method offers some significant improvements in 
data obfuscation in security and performance approaches. This research has proven that 
applying such a method is desirable for big data. However, MDSBA suffers from some 
issues regarding multiple G(QID) groups and the possibility of re-identifying some 
records. AGUI may appear in some cases. Even with low chances of re-identification, 
AGUI remains the major hurdle in the MDSBA framework. Eliminating AGUI from 
data records may create issues for MDSBA performance. 
It should be noted that the experiments in this thesis were conducted in a university 
laboratory. The laboratory was established by VM infrastructure, which was not fully 
qualified for the MapReduce or Spark domains. In addition, the laboratory contained 
limited resources for name nodes, workers and data nodes. Experiments were conducted 
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on a maximum of five VMs, with limited memory and processors. This efficient 
infrastructure and small scale cannot process very large datasets (such as in terabytes) 
because of the resource limitations and congested transmission medium between nodes. 
During the experiments, the university network was congested most of the time. The 
slow transmission appeared when applying Pig Latin script to read/write to/from the 
disks. For these reasons, gigabytes of datasets were used instead of terabytes. Moreover, 
many experiments were repeated several times to avoid arbitrary tasks failure. The 
failure was explained in Chapter 7. 
The future of data anonymisation will be directed towards finding more advanced 
methods for real-time data. Big data access demands will increase exponentially with 
data size increase, and with the pervasive of data over the Cloud. This high demand 
imposes the need to develop improved anonymisation methods that are able to obfuscate 
data in real time or near real time. This is essential to provide fast and reliable data for 
various applications. MDSBA may support real-time anonymisation in the future, 
especially with the fast development of processing tools. 
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APPENDICES  
- Appendix 1 
Note: the below scripts are available in an external source of https://gist.github.com/ 
These scripts are shared publicly for academic studies  
A script of Pig Latin (anonymize.pig) to anonymize data, which is available here 
This script requires Java programs. In this Pig script example, three Java programmes are used: 
1. SG.java 
2. NG_interval.java 
3. adjust.java 
4. Suppress.java 
The anonymisation program has used Adult dataset. A sample of the adult dataset is available 
here 
- Appendix 2 
Scala Script for data anonymisation is available here  
I use the following software applications for Experiments: 
1. RapidMiner Studio, which can be downloaded from 
https://rapidminer.com/products/studio/.  
2. SPSS, which can be downloaded from https://www.ibm.com/ 
3. SAML server, open source server known as Gluu Server, which can be installed 
from https://www.gluu.org/  
4. Apache 2 server for web development 
5. PHP 5 for programming some interfaces 
6. MySQL database 
7. Apache Hadoop v2 
8. Apache Pig Version 0.15.0 
9. Apache Spark Version 2.3.0 
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In all experiments, Servers were configured with CentOS 7 operating system. Hadoop was setup 
in a cluster of three to four DataNodes and one NameNode. Cluster configuration is found here 
https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-common/ClusterSetup.html. 
Apache Pig was installed on all DataNodes and NameNode, and setup in the configuration files. 
Apache Pig for the cluster is found at 
https://www.tutorialspoint.com/apache_pig/apache_pig_installation.htm. 
Apache Spark was installed on master and workers. Codes were executed by either Pig or Spark 
each time. Apache Spark setup is found here https://data-flair.training/blogs/install-apache-
spark-multi-node-cluster/.   
